Extraterritorial Personal Jurisdiction For The Twenty-First Century: A Case Study Reconceptualizing The Typical Long-Arm Statute To Codify And Refine International Shoe After Its First Sixty Years by Van Detta, Jeffrey A. & Kapoor, Shiv K.
  339
 
Extraterritorial Personal Jurisdiction for the Twenty-
First Century: A Case Study Reconceptualizing the 
Typical Long-Arm Statute to Codify and Refine 
International Shoe After its First Sixty Years 
Jeffrey A. Van Detta† & Shiv K. Kapoor†† 
I. Introduction ............................................................................. 342 
A. An Overture to the Reader ................................................. 342 
B. The Authors’ Map of the Territory Ahead ......................... 343 
II. Why Change is Necessary: An Illustrative Case Study of 
Georgia’s Long-Arm Statute....................................................... 344 
A. Two Primary Reasons Why Change is Necessary ............. 345 
1. States Want to Exercise Personal Jurisdiction to Due 
Process Limits..................................................................... 345 
2. Practitioners and Judges Should Have a Long-Arm Statute 
that Allows for Predictable and Consistent Application..... 348 
B. A Case Study of Georgia’s Categorical Long-Arm Statute349 
1. How the Statute as Worded Does Not Provide Due Process 
Limits .................................................................................. 350 
2. History of Long-Arm Statute Amendments Shows Desire 
by Georgia Legislature to Exercise Jurisdiction to Limits of 
Due Process......................................................................... 353 
3. The Resulting Inconsistent Application by Georgia Courts 
Due to the Conflict.............................................................. 359 
                                                                                                             
 †  Professor of Law, John Marshall Law School, Atlanta, Georgia. Professor Van 
Detta is admitted to practice in New York and Georgia, as well as before many federal 
courts. In 1987–88, he served as law clerk to Judge Roger J. Miner, of the U.S. Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals. 
 ††  Mr. Kapoor is a member of the Georgia Bar and works as a practicing attorney 
with the Law Offices of Brij M. Kapoor, P.C., an Atlanta, Georgia firm.  He is a 2006 
alumnus of Atlanta’s John Marshall Law School, and he is a pilot who holds the rank of 
Lieutenant Colonel in the United States Air Force Reserve. 
340 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 3:339 
a. Subsection (1): “Transacts any Business” Category....... 361 
b. Subsections (2) and (3): The “Tortious Act” and “Tortious 
Injury” Categories............................................................... 370 
c. The Defamation Exclusion of Subsection (2) ................. 377 
4. Limitations of the Statute in Light of Internet       
Commerce ........................................................................... 379 
III. Visual Reconceptualization .................................................. 383 
Diagram 1: Constitutional Limits on Personal Jurisdiction:     
The Domain of Minimum Contacts ........................................ 386 
Diagram 2: Cartesian Metaphor for Personal Jurisdiction     
Rules ....................................................................................... 388 
Diagram 3: Detailed Cartesian Metaphor for Personal 
Jurisdiction: Correlation with International Shoe ................... 389 
Diagram 4: Conceptualization of Litigation Events as Principles 
Mapped to Juridical Jurisdiction Rules................................... 395 
IV. Model Long-Arm Statute...................................................... 396 
A. Option For Reform: Why a Due-Process-Limits Long-Arm 
Statute Guided by Predicted-Outcome Rules of  International 
Shoe is the Better Choice........................................................ 396 
V.  Application to Representative Cases Originally Decided Under 
a Categorical Long-Arm Statute ................................................. 404 
Diagram 5: Chosen Cases Plotted by Quadrant...................... 406 
A. Quadrant I—Continuous and Systematic + Connected Cause 
of Action ................................................................................. 407 
1. Hollingsworth v. Cunard Line, Ltd. ................................ 407 
a. Georgia Long-Arm Application.................................. 407 
b. Model Long-Arm Application .................................... 408 
c. How Applying the Model Long-Arm Statute Recognizes 
the Intersecting Domains of the Corrective Justice and 
Enterprise Regulation Principles..................................... 409 
2. Griffin v. Air South, Inc................................................... 410 
a. Georgia Long-Arm Application.................................. 410 
b. Model Long-Arm Application .................................... 411 
c. How Applying the Model Long-Arm Statute Recognizes 
the Intersecting Domains of the Corrective Justice and 
Enterprise Regulation Principles..................................... 412 
B. Quadrant II—Single or Occasional Contact + Connected 
Cause of Action....................................................................... 412 
1. Catholic Stewardship Consultants, Inc. v. Ruotolo 
Associates, Inc..................................................................... 413 
2007] Extraterritorial Personal Jurisdiction for the 21st Century 341 
a. Georgia Long-Arm Application.................................. 413 
b. Model Long-Arm Application .................................... 414 
c. How Applying the Model Long-Arm Statute Recognizes 
the Intersecting Domains of the Corrective Justice and 
Enterprise Regulation Principles..................................... 415 
2. Worthy v. Eller ................................................................ 416 
a. Georgia Long-Arm Application.................................. 416 
b. Model Long-Arm Application .................................... 416 
c. How Applying the Model Long-Arm Statute Recognizes 
the Intersecting Domains of the Corrective Justice and 
Enterprise Regulation Principles..................................... 417 
C. Quadrant III—Continuous and Systematic Contacts, but 
Unconnected Cause of Action ................................................ 418 
1. Allstate Insurance Co. v. Klein ....................................... 419 
a. Georgia Long-Arm Application.................................. 420 
b. Model Long-Arm Application .................................... 421 
c. How Applying the Model Long-Arm Statute Recognizes 
the Intersecting Domains of the Corrective Justice and 
Enterprise Regulation Principles..................................... 422 
2. Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc. v. Sanders....................... 422 
a. Georgia Long-Arm Application.................................. 423 
b. Model Long-Arm Application .................................... 423 
c. How Applying the Model Long-Arm Statute Recognizes 
the Intersecting Domains of the Corrective Justice and 
Enterprise Regulation Principles..................................... 424 
D. Quadrant 4—Single or Occasional Contact + Unconnected 
Cause of Action....................................................................... 425 
1. Barton Southern Co. v. Manhole Barrier Systems, Inc... 425 
a. Georgia Long-Arm Application.................................. 426 
b. Model Long-Arm Application .................................... 427 
c. How Applying the Model Long-Arm Statute Recognizes 
the Intersecting Domains of the Corrective Justice and 
Enterprise Regulation Principles..................................... 428 
2. Gee v. Reingold ............................................................... 429 
a. Georgia Long-Arm Application.................................. 429 
b. Model Long-Arm Application .................................... 430 
c. How Applying the Model Long-Arm Statute Recognizes 
the Intersecting Domains of the Corrective Justice and 
Enterprise Regulation Principles..................................... 430 
VI. Conclusion ............................................................................ 431 
342 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 3:339 
A. The Authors’ Map of the Territory Traversed ................... 431 
B. A Coda for the Reader........................................................ 431 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. An Overture to the Reader 
Long-arm statutes have been around since the pioneering Illinois 
long-arm statute,1 the first effort to codify International Shoe Co. v. 
Washington2 through the use of general categories under which a 
nonresident was subject to personal jurisdiction. However, the world of 
communications and business—two of the cornerstones on which long-
arms evolved out of International Shoe—has changed substantially since 
1955, when Illinois adopted its long-arm statute. 
It has been nearly twenty years since the United States Supreme 
Court last addressed the constitutional limitations on long-arm 
jurisdiction in civil cases. In that interim, long-arm jurisdiction doctrine 
has been challenged in several new ways, and International Shoe, the 
foundation of long-arm jurisdiction theory, has turned sixty years old. 
But rather than be destined for retirement, this sexagenarian remains in 
the bloom of youth, still awaiting its full maturation. 
The two-decade lacuna in United States Supreme Court precedent 
has left long-arm jurisdictional law in considerable disarray. This 
disarray is partly the result of judicial and scholarly misunderstandings of 
Chief Justice Stone’s International Shoe opinion, whose highly 
structured analytic template courts and many scholars have failed to 
discern adequately. This disarray is also partly the result of challenges 
that modern economy and technology have created, but which the 
existing case and statutory law are not fully equipped to meet. These 
challenges result in part from the exponential increase in interstate and 
globalized commercial deals, consumer transactions, and cross-border 
torts–all occurring in the background of worldwide, instantaneous access 
made possible by the Internet. 
This article presents a case study of the long-arm statute in one of 
the country’s fast-growing, globalized commercial centers, Georgia, with 
the objective of bringing coherence to an area noted most for its 
incoherence. The Georgia statute is similar to New York’s long-arm 
statute, which, like the statutes of many other states, purported to limit 
                                                                                                             
 1 1955 Ill. Laws 2283, § 1. 
 2 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
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the reach of extraterritorial service of process by employing the 
narrowing device of defining categories of contacts and their 
relationships to causes of action. The Georgia experience, like that of 
many other states, is that the comfort legislators found forty years ago in 
the categorical approach has been undone not only by rapid changes in 
the nature and extent of inter-state and international litigation, but also by 
judicial interpretations of the statutes themselves. 
The authors believe that the sixtieth anniversary of International 
Shoe should direct us to return to the fundamentals, so elegantly and 
foresightfully expressed in Chief Justice Stone’s succinct opinion. By 
returning to those fundamentals, we construct an analytic model for 
analyzing long-arm jurisdiction cases. Based on that model, we propose 
reform—a model long-arm statute based on the factors used in 
International Shoe: quality and quantity of contacts between the non-
resident defendant and the forum, and the connectivity of the cause of 
action to those specific contacts. We use that model long-arm statute to 
critique contemporary court decisions and explore how such cases could 
be more coherently decided in accordance both with constitutional 
limitations on the extraterritorial exercise of judicial power and with the 
needs of a twenty-first century business environment. 
Our article will appeal both to the theorist—especially those who 
seek a reconceptualization of long-received doctrine based on a long-
overdue critical dissection—as well as to the practicing attorney who 
seeks a new structure for framing long-arm jurisdictional arguments to 
meet the demands of the twenty-first century cases s/he is now litigating. 
B. The Authors’ Map of the Territory Ahead 
The time, therefore, has come to take stock in a way other scholars 
have not. We propose to explore in detail, from the novel perspective 
articulated in the “Overture,” a series of recurrent, pragmatic questions 
that arise about long-arm jurisdiction. Do the long-arms produce 
outcomes true to the International Shoe mandates? And, what about the 
Illinois, categorical model—has it proven effective in practice? Does it 
produce consistent judicial outcomes? Is the California due-process-
limits model preferable? Or, finally, is there another approach altogether, 
one consonant for the twenty-first century realities? 
In Section II, this article will show that the categorical long-arm 
statutes do not square with states’ desire to exercise personal jurisdiction 
over nonresidents to the limits of due process. The article will then 
discuss the resulting inconsistency due to the inherent conflict between 
the categorical long-arm statutes that, as written, are narrower than the 
limits of due process, and the states’ intent in enacting their long-arm 
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statutes that they reach to the limits of due process. These two premises 
will then be illustrated by a case study of Georgia’s long-arm statute. 
Georgia’s long-arm statute is used because it is fairly representative of 
the many state long-arms that take a categorical approach to exercising 
personal jurisdiction,3 and because Georgia’s rapid growth and 
modernization over the decades since its long-arm was enacted4 make it 
an ideal laboratory to study the issues involved with the categorical long-
arms and why changes are necessary to make them more user-friendly 
for practitioners and judges. 
After showing the shortfalls of the categorical long-arm statutes 
through the case study untaken in Section II, this article accomplishes a 
visual reconceptualization of long-arm statutes in Section III. This then 
leads to a model long-arm statute proposal in Section IV. Rather than 
merely use an unguided “limits of due process” statute such as the 
California long-arm statute,5 this proposed long-arm statute, founded on 
the visual reconceptualization of Section III, enables predictable and 
consistent application through specific guidance based on the actual 
factors and predicted outcome rules of International Shoe. 
Finally, in Section V, the proposed model long-arm statute is 
applied to cases from Georgia that were decided under its traditional 
long-arm statute to illustrate how the proposed model statute will work in 
practice to provide predictable and consistent results. 
II. WHY CHANGE IS NECESSARY: AN ILLUSTRATIVE CASE STUDY OF 
GEORGIA’S LONG-ARM STATUTE 
This section begins with a discussion of two primary reasons for 
why a conceptual change in long-arm statutes is needed: (1) states want 
to exercise personal jurisdiction to the limits of due process, and (2) 
practitioners and judges need a more predictable and consistent long-arm 
statute with guidance that allows for such results. This leads to a 
discussion of Georgia’s long-arm statute that illustrates the problems of 
unpredictable and inconsistent results associated with categorical long-
arm statutes. These problems are caused by the conflict between the 
                                                                                                             
 3 Forty-four states enacted categorical long-arm statutes. See Douglas D. McFarland, 
Dictum Run Wild: How Long-Arm Statutes Extended to the Limits of Due Process, 84 
B.U. L. REV. 491, 525-530 (2004) [hereinafter McFarland] (breaking down state long-
arm statutes among those that have been construed to the limits of due process, those that 
have not, those where a provision was subsequently added to the statute to extend it to the 
limits of due process while retaining the categorical subsections, and those which 
subsequently switched completely to a limits-of-due-process statute). Professor 
McFarland refers to these long-arm statutes as “enumerated-acts” statutes. Id. at 497. 
 4 Georgia’s long-arm statute was enacted in 1966. 1966 Ga. Laws 343, § 1. 
 5 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 2007). 
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state’s desire to obtain personal jurisdiction to the extent allowed by due 
process and a long-arm statute, which, as worded, does not actually allow 
for personal jurisdiction to be exercised to the due process limits.  
Although this discussion is addressed to categorical long-arm statutes, 
those states with statutes which authorize jurisdiction to due process 
limits would benefit from a system that provides guidance for consistent 
and predictable application for a variety of reasons also addressed below. 
A. Two Primary Reasons Why Change is Necessary 
1. States Want to Exercise Personal Jurisdiction to Due Process 
Limits 
State policymakers in general believe their citizens should be able 
to seek redress within their own state to the greatest extent possible for 
any claims arising against a nonresident. This can be seen by the fact that 
many states when enacting their long-arm statutes believed they were 
allowing for the exercise of personal jurisdiction to due process limits. 
For example, the first long-arm statute after International Shoe, enacted 
in Illinois in 1955 and the template for many other states’ long-arm 
statutes, “was designed to extend the reach of Illinois state-court 
jurisdiction to the limits permitted by International Shoe.”6 While the 
early long-arm statutes did not actually extend to the limits of due 
process, this was more a result of the uncertainty of those limits. The 
trend of the states is unquestionably towards construing and/or changing 
the long-arm statutes to reach to the limits of due process, thus showing 
the desire of most states to have personal jurisdiction over nonresidents 
coterminous with due process.7 
                                                                                                             
 6 LARRY L. TEPLY & RALPH U. WHITTEN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 217 (2d ed. 2000) 
[hereinafter TEPLY & WHITTEN] (footnote omitted). In a footnote, the authors cite an 
Illinois Supreme Court case, Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Mosele, 368 N.E.2d 88, 91 (1977), 
where the court recognized that “Illinois expanded the in personam jurisdiction of its 
courts to what was in 1955 understood to be the limits permitted under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” TEPLY & WHITTEN at 217 n.215. But see 
McFarland, supra note 3, at 502 (arguing “that is not what the drafters of the long-arm 
statute intended.” (footnote omitted)). Professor McFarland also argues that two other 
early long-arm statutes, Wisconsin’s and the Uniform Long-Arm Act were not intended 
to reach the limits of due process. Id. at 508-11. But his reasoning, that these early long-
arm statutes were merely intended “to grant only long-arm jurisdiction that the courts 
previously approved,” illustrates the fallacy with attempting to codify specific categories 
of long-arm jurisdiction. Id. at 510. The ideal type of long-arm statute should not just be 
an unguided “limits of due process” statute, but should lay out guidelines that allow for 
fair, consistent, and predictable results in determining whether a particular factual 
scenario allows for personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. 
 7 Of the forty-four states that enacted categorical long-arm statutes, nine have since 
added “catch-all” provisions that extend their statute to the limits of due process while 
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In fact, the basis for many of the conflicts with the application of 
the long-arm statutes is that state legislatures enacted them with the 
belief that they were allowing for the exercise of personal jurisdiction to 
the limits of due process. However, the statutes actually did not do so. 
This became apparent as the scope of the limits of due process was 
recognized to be broader than state policy makers had originally thought 
through the United States Supreme Court’s setting of the boundaries in 
cases subsequent to International Shoe and as commentators expounded 
on the limits of due process based on those cases. Both because the 
categorical long-arm statutes were enacted at a time when the full limits 
of due process as allowed by International Shoe was not fully understood 
(or developed), and because of subsequent understanding of the more 
expanded scope of the limits of due process, these statutes have become 
outdated. The courts were setting the limits of personal jurisdiction case-
by-case and expanding the limits as new situations arose. State 
legislatures’ codifying what the courts had already decided tended to 
freeze in place the approved categories and did not allow the courts to 
continue to define the limits as their contours became clear in modern-
scenario cases that arose after International Shoe. Instead of freezing in 
place the already approved categories, a long-arm statute that allows for 
expansion to new circumstances as they arise would be more beneficial. 
By contrast, the open-ended California-style of long-arm statute allows 
for continued development of the law in response to diverse, new factual 
situations. Yet, it encourages a judicial “grab” for the expansion of long-
arm jurisdiction (as the California courts did, e.g., in the Asahi Metals 
case) with no structured legislative guidance. The absence of legislative 
guidance gives cases decided under “due-process-limits” long-arm 
statutes a pronounced ad-hoc aura–which is accurate, because such 
unguided common law-decision making leads to scattered, less 
predictable and sometimes incoherent results.8 
                                                                                                             
retaining the previous categories as well (Alabama, Alaska, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, 
Nebraska, Oregon, South Dakota, and Tennessee) and five have changed to due process 
limits language exclusively (Arizona, Arkansas, Iowa, Nevada, and Oklahoma). 
McFarland, supra note 3, at 525-31. Of the thirty remaining states that have categorical-
only long-arm statutes, twelve interpret their statute to reach to the limits of due process 
(Colorado, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, New Hampshire, North Dakota, 
South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Washington), which leaves only eighteen 
states that continue to adhere to the categorical approach (Connecticut, Delaware, 
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, 
Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, West Virginia, and 
Wisconsin). Id. 
 8 For an example of how rule development can lead to inconsistent, vague, and 
indeterminate articulations of law even in the hands of some of the most skilled and 
learned common-law judges,  see the slip opinions on the basic law of the tort of nuisance 
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In addition to wanting such long-arm statutes, states need them in 
order to protect their residents and allow them to seek redress against 
nonresidents who do them harm. The Illinois Supreme Court best 
expressed this need in Nelson v. Miller,9 the first case in which that court 
interpreted Illinois’ long-arm statute; “[t]he foundations of jurisdiction 
include the interest that a State has in providing redress in its own courts 
against persons who inflict injuries upon, or otherwise incur obligations 
to, those within the ambit of the State’s legitimate protective policy.”10 
Such a long-arm statute can also create a better environment for 
businesses (especially smaller businesses) in the state as they tend to 
minimize costs from having to pursue out-of-state legal actions that 
could otherwise be pursued within the state. 
Furthermore, the artificial nature of the categorical approach leads 
to missed opportunities (and unfair results) where personal jurisdiction 
was pleaded but not upheld under one specific category, yet might have 
been under another category that was not pleaded. This occurred in 
Designs Unlimited, Inc. v. Rodriguez,11 where the trial court determined 
that the defendant was not subject to personal jurisdiction under one 
subsection (or category) of Georgia’s long-arm statute (the “transacts any 
business” category).12 On appeal, Designs Unlimited argued that the trial 
court erred because the defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction 
under another subsection (the “tortious act” category).13 The appellate 
court affirmed the dismissal, because the plaintiffs had not raised the 
issue of that subsection with the trial court.14 Thus, due to the artificial 
nature of a categorical statute, the plaintiff lost an opportunity to seek 
redress in its own state court. This categorical nature is analogous to the 
                                                                                                             
in Bamford v. Turnley, 122 Eng. Rep. 27 (Exch. Ch. 1862). Bamford is particularly 
notable in Chief Justice Williams admission that the rapidity of growth in new factual 
scenarios as commerce and industry expanded challenged the courts’ ability to adapt the 
law coherently to controversies arising from those new developments. 
 9 143 N.E.2d 673 (Ill. 1957). 
 10 Id. at 676. Furthermore, “[t]he United States Supreme Court has held that ‘[a] State 
generally has a ‘manifest interest’ in providing its residents with a convenient forum for 
redressing injuries inflicted by out-of-state actors,’ particularly when these actors 
‘purposefully derive benefit from their interstate activities.” First Nat’l Bank Of Ames, 
Iowa v. Innovative Clinical & Consulting Servs., L.L.C., 598 S.E.2d 530, 532 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2004), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 620 S.E.2d 352 (Ga. 2005) (citing Burger 
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473(II)(A) (1985)).” 
 11 601 S.E.2d 381 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004). 
 12 Id. at 381. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. “Since Designs Unlimited failed to raise this argument below and the trial 
court’s ruling was accordingly limited to only whether Rodriguez was subject to 
jurisdiction pursuant to [GA. CODE ANN.] § 9-10-91(1), Designs Unlimited has waived 
any argument relating to its asserted enumeration.” 
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writ and code pleading of bygone days.15 And just as those artificial 
categories of writs and code pleading have given way to notice pleading 
guided by the federal and state rules of civil procedure, the artificial 
categories under which personal jurisdiction may be allowed should give 
way to a due-process-limits statute which incorporates guidance 
reflecting the actual factors and predicted outcome rules of International 
Shoe. A proposed model long-arm statute that does just that is discussed, 
infra, in Section IV. 
2. Practitioners and Judges Should Have a Long-Arm Statute that 
Allows for Predictable and Consistent Application 
The second reason a conceptual change in long-arm statutes is 
needed is more of a pragmatic matter than a question of politics and 
policy. Lawyers, judges, and people generally that those who use the 
long-arm statute in practice need one that, while allowing for personal 
jurisdiction to the limits of due process, gives guidance to allow for an 
application that is predictable and consistent. As discussed above many 
states have construed their statutes to extend to the limits of due process. 
Some, though, while stating that their policy is to construe the statute to 
the limits of dues process, have in application not done so, due to a literal 
reading of the long-arm statute and early misconceptions on the limit of 
due process. The result has been inconsistent decisions that appear to 
define the scope of long-arm jurisdiction differently under the same 
statute. An atypical inconsistency involves the tortious act and injury 
subsections, where the Georgia Supreme Court initially took an 
expansive view of “tortious act” and later a narrower view, followed by 
the federal courts (in diversity-of-citizenship cases) taking a very 
expansive view of the scope of long-arm jurisdiction under the state 
categorical statute.16 These inconsistent results are discussed next. 
                                                                                                             
 15 For a brief discussion of writ and code pleading and the problems that system 
created, see JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL 
PROCEDURE § 5.4, 250 (3d ed. West 1999). 
 16 See infra notes 95-100 and accompanying text. 
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B. A Case Study of Georgia’s Categorical Long-Arm Statute 
A study of Georgia’s long-arm statute17 illustrates the inconsistency 
and unpredictability that result from the inherent conflict in a categorical 
long-arm statute that does not, as written, provide personal jurisdiction to 
the limits of dues process despite the state legislature’s intent that the 
long-arm extend personal jurisdiction as far as possible. This section will 
detail this tension and resulting application issues. In doing so, it will 
first describe how the statute as worded does not provide for due process 
limits. Next, it will show how the history of amendments to the long-arm 
statute reflects the Georgia legislature’s desire to exercise jurisdiction to 
the limits of due process. Following that will be a description of the 
resulting inconsistent application of the long-arm statute by the Georgia 
courts due to this conflict – focusing primarily on the “transacts any 
business”, “tortious act”, and “tortious injury” subsections, and 
highlighting a specific example in Georgia’s long-arm statute of the 
problems caused by the codification of what is thought to be the limits of 
due process–the defamation exception of subsection (2) that prohibits 
exercise of long-arm jurisdiction in actions for libel or slander. Finally, 
the shortfall in the categorical approach will be delineated as classes of 
lawsuits have developed that were not anticipated in the 1950s and 1960s 
when categorical long-arm statutes were drafted–focusing on how new 
technologies and commercial practices, specifically Internet commerce, 
pose new personal jurisdiction problems for individuals and corporations 
who are harmed through this medium. 
                                                                                                             
 17 The statute reads: 
A court of this state may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nonresident 
or his executor or administrator, as to a cause of action arising from any of 
the acts, omissions, ownership, use, or possession enumerated in this Code 
section, in the same manner as if he were a resident of the state, if in person 
or through an agent, he: 
(1) Transacts any business within this state; 
(2) Commits a tortious act or omission within this state, except as to a cause 
of action for defamation of character arising from the act; 
(3) Commits a tortious injury in this state caused by an act or omission 
outside this state if the tort-feasor regularly does or solicits business, or 
engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial 
revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this state; 
(4) Owns, uses, or possesses any real property situated within this state; or 
(5) With respect to proceedings for alimony, child support, or division of 
property in connection with an action for divorce or with respect to an 
independent action for support of dependents, maintains a matrimonial 
domicile in this state at the time of the commencement of this action or, if 
the defendant resided in this state preceding the commencement of the 
action, whether cohabiting during that time or not. This paragraph shall not 
change the residency requirement for filing an action for divorce. 
GA. CODE ANN. § 9-10-91 (West 2004). 
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1. How the Statute as Worded Does Not Provide Due Process 
Limits 
A literal reading of the Georgia long-arm statute shows that it is not 
coextensive with the limits of due process in at least two areas. First, the 
preamble states that a “court of this state may exercise personal 
jurisdiction over any nonresident . . . as to a cause of action arising from 
any of the acts, omissions, ownership, use, or possession enumerated in 
this Code section.”18 The arising from language, of course, limits the 
statute to specific personal jurisdiction.19 Then, the designation of 
                                                                                                             
 18 § 9-10-91. 
 19 See Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 420 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that due process does not require that the cause of 
action “arise out of” but rather, and more expansively in the jurisdictional sense, merely 
“be related to” the nonresident defendant’s forum contacts). However, despite the 
limitation of the long-arm to specific jurisdiction, an alternative method is available that 
in effect allows for general jurisdiction over foreign corporations. Because the definition 
of “nonresident” as it pertains to the long-arm statute does not include foreign 
corporations which are authorized to do or transact business in the state, then by negative 
implication those foreign corporations that are authorized to transact business in Georgia 
have been held to be “residents” for purposes of personal jurisdiction. Allstate Ins. Co. v. 
Klein, 422 S.E.2d 863, 864-865 (Ga. 1992).  
  Under the long-arm statute, a nonresident is “a corporation which is not organized 
or existing under the laws of this state and is not authorized to do or transact business in 
this state at the time a claim or cause of action under Code Section 9-10-91 arises.” GA. 
CODE ANN. § 9-10-90 (West 2004) (emphasis added). The Georgia Supreme Court has 
not overlooked the significance of the language: 
It is apparent from the language of this definition that a corporation which is 
“authorized to do or transact business in this state at the time a claim” arises 
is a “resident” for purposes of personal jurisdiction over that corporation in 
an action filed in the courts of this state. As a resident, such a foreign 
corporation may sue or be sued to the same extent as a domestic 
corporation. Therefore, a plaintiff wishing to sue in Georgia a corporation 
authorized to do business in Georgia is not restricted by the personal 
jurisdiction parameters of § 9-10-91, including the requirement that a cause 
of action arise out of a defendant’s activities within the state. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 422 S.E.2d at 865. It is questionable, however, to assume that when a 
foreign corporation does not meet the definition of nonresident, it must ipso-facto be 
deemed a resident foreign corporation upon which service can be made as with any other 
resident. The Georgia Supreme Court addressed the issue of the constitutionality of the 
definition of nonresident in the long-arm statute, stating that “it appears that the definition 
does not run afoul of the ‘minimum contacts’ requirement of procedural due process.” Id. 
at 865, n.3. Yet, without a due-process-minimum-contacts analysis, a finding of general 
jurisdiction could potentially exceed the scope of due process. For example, if a foreign 
corporation registers to do business in Georgia, because it is anticipating conducting 
business operations there, it may not have the continuous and systematic contacts 
required for Quadrant III general jurisdiction (See the discussion in Section III, infra, for 
the reconceptualization of International Shoe’s jurisdictional rules into a Cartesian-
coordinate-plane metaphor.) But, by virtue of registering in the state, that corporation can 
nonetheless be subject to service of process on a cause of action unrelated to any 
activities within the state, even though those activities are insufficient to sustain general 
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categories further limits the exercise of personal jurisdiction to less than 
the limits of due process. Subsections (2) and (3), when read as the 
Legislature enacted them, further constrain the exercise of personnel 
jurisdiction within the already constrained scope of specific jurisdiction 
laid out in the preamble. Subsection (2) applies only where a nonresident 
commits a tortious act within the state. It is further limited by an explicit 
exclusion of defamation causes of action.20 Subsection (3), allows for 
jurisdiction over a nonresident who causes injury in the state by an act 
outside the state. Yet it is then limited by requiring nonresidents to have 
significant contacts with the state to be amenable to personal jurisdiction. 
And subsection (1), which reads broadly (but still constrained by the 
preamble’s limits of specific personal jurisdiction), had early on been 
narrowed in application boldly by the Georgia Supreme Court in a 
somewhat cabined gloss of the quality of the contacts that the 
nonresident defendant needed to have with the state, and also by the 
federal court interpretation that it applies to contract actions only.21 The 
                                                                                                             
jurisdiction. A strained fiction of “consent” to general jurisdiction might be advanced, yet 
such a broad consent as a consequence of a narrow registry law hardly seems any longer 
reasonable or plausible, if it ever was so, in the era of globalization and e-commerce.  
  From a more doctrinal viewpoint, the constitutionality of such “doing business” 
statutes was discussed by Professors Teply and Whitten when analyzing the splintered 
opinions of the United States Supreme Court in Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 
(1990), which unanimously upheld the constitutionality of exercising personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant who is served with process while temporarily within the 
state. TEPLY AND WHITTEN, supra note 6, at 212-16, 219-20. In upholding its 
constitutionality, however, the justices were divided as to the reasons: the four justice 
plurality held that the minimum contacts test does not apply to traditionally accepted 
methods of obtaining jurisdiction – those that were available when the Due Process 
Clause was adopted and are still in use; one justice wrote that the Fourteenth Amendment 
gave the Court authority to examine even traditional methods for validity; and four 
justices stated that the minimum contacts test should be applied to every case. TEPLY AND 
WHITTEN, supra note 6, at 213-14.  Thus, it appears that the “doing business” statutes in 
Georgia and other states can not be applied independently of a minimum contacts 
analysis. See TEPLY AND WHITTEN, supra note 6, at 220 (explaining that when a state 
employs a pre-International Shoe method to assert personal jurisdiction, “an alternate 
analysis under the minimum contacts test must be employed to determine whether the 
assertion of jurisdiction will satisfy that test”). 
 20 Sections II.B.3.c and II.B.4, infra, discuss the defamation exclusion of subsection 
(2). 
 21 Scott v. Crescent Tool Co., 296 F. Supp. 147, 152 (N.D. Ga. 1969). See infra 
Section II.B.3.a (discussing subsection (1)). This interpretation was apparently not 
challenged in subsequent actions in the state appellate courts, since later cases sought 
jurisdiction under subsection (1) based on contract causes of action only, until Whitaker 
v. Krestmark of Ala., Inc., 278 S.E.2d 116 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981), overruled, Innovative 
Clinical & Consulting Servs., L.L.C. v. First Nat’l Bank of Ames, 620 S.E.2d 352 (Ga. 
2005). In Whitaker, the Georgia Court of Appeals explicitly adopted the contract-action-
only interpretation given in Scott, stating that although “such an analysis has never been 
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inadequacy of these restrictive glosses in the face of modern business 
reality recently compelled the Georgia Supreme Court to overrule them 
in Innovative Clinical and Consulting Services, L.L.C. v. First National 
Bank of Ames. The result, however, is to leave a shifting, and 
inconsistent, history of statutes, interpretation, followed by re-
interpretation, engraved upon the Georgia long-arm-statue. The 
Innovative case may also engender its own problems, for its rejection of 
limits other then the bounds of due process does not square with “arising 
under” limitation of the statute’s preamble.22 
On the other hand, while some of the categories expressed in the 
long-arm stature are not coterminous with due process limits (because of 
the limitations of subsections (1),23 (2), and (3)), subsections (4) and (5), 
do appear to reach to the currently understood limits of due process, even 
in the face of the “arising from” language in the statute’s preamble. One 
whose only contact with the state is the ownership, use, or possession of 
real property (subsection (4))24 would not be amenable to suit for a cause 
of action not arising out of that contact under due process limits. 
Similarly, a nonresident would not be amenable to suit for an alimony, 
child support or modification action (subsection (5))25 where the 
nonresident had not lived in the state while married or while becoming 
responsible for a child.26 Thus, in any particular case, whether the long-
arm statute extends to the limits depends on which category a dispute 
falls in. And it is certain that the long-arm statute taken as a whole does 
not extend to the limits of due process. 
                                                                                                             
expressly enunciated by the courts of this state, it is entirely consistent with the decisions 
of this court and of the Supreme Court.” Whitaker, 278 S.E.2d at 118. 
 22 Innovative Clinical & Consulting Servs., L.L.C. v. First Nat’l Bank of Ames, 620 
S.E.2d 352 (Ga. 2005) (rejecting the long-standing judge-made contact and contract 
limitations and holding that subsection (1) should be interpreted literally, limited only by 
due process, and expressly overruling all prior cases that failed to do so). The 
implications of this recent holding are discussed in Sections II.B.3.a–c and II.B.4, infra. 
 23 Although subsection (1) is now to be interpreted literally, it is still limited to 
specific jurisdiction by the “arising from” language. See supra note 18 and accompanying 
text. 
 24 GA. CODE ANN. § 9-10-91 (West 2004). While the new broad interpretation of 
subsection (1) does not make subsection (4) completely superfluous, there is certainly 
considerable overlap between the two subsections now, because most disputes related to 
real estate are based on the transaction of business within the state. 
 25 § 9-10-91. 
 26 The Georgia Supreme Court appeared implicitly to recognize that subsection (5) 
reaches the limits of due process, when, in an action for modification of child support, the 
court employed a due process analysis only, not mentioning the long-arm statute in 
upholding personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Chung-A-On v. Drury, 580 S.E.2d 
229 (Ga. 2003). 
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2. History of Long-Arm Statute Amendments Shows Desire by 
Georgia Legislature to Exercise Jurisdiction to Limits of Due 
Process 
Like cleaning away eons of soot from the bright colors of 
Michelangelo’s Sistine Chapel frescos, we now look to see the clarity of 
legislative intent that became obscured by layers of judicial gloss applied 
over five decades. The amendments made to the original long-arm 
statute27 throughout the years show an effort by Georgia’s legislature to 
provide for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents to the maximum 
extent tolerated by due process. One obvious motivation for legislative 
tinkering with the Georgia long-arm statute is that the limits of federal 
due process, as construed by United States Supreme Court decisions, 
were found to be broader than what was commonly understood by 
lawyers and legislators at the time of categorical long-arm’s first iteration 
in Illinois, which Georgia subsequently embraced in enacting that pattern 
statute a decade later.28 
The Georgia legislature’s intent was tested early when an 
interpretation problem with the long-arm statute occurred shortly after its 
1966 enactment. A federal district court held that the statute did not 
apply to nonresident corporations, because the language refers to a 
“nonresident or his executor or administrator.”29 Since only natural 
                                                                                                             
 27 1966 Ga. Laws 343, § 1. The statute originally only had three categories and did 
not have a definition for nonresident. The original subsections (a), (b), and (c) correspond 
to the current subsections (1), (2), and (4). For those subsections, see supra note 17. The 
subsections will be referred to by their current designation. A separate section was added 
that defines nonresident, which is currently GA. CODE ANN. § 9-10-90 (see infra notes 29-
31 and accompanying text). 
 28 See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzeiwicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) (non-resident 
franchisee amenable to personal jurisdiction in breach of contract action based on 
franchisee’s deliberately reaching out to franchisor and entering into a carefully 
structured long-term agreement, despite having not physically entered the state); McGee 
v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (non-resident insurance company amenable to 
personal jurisdiction in breach of contract action based on single insurance contract with 
resident of state, because insurer had substantial contact with state through the policy). 
Cases where state Supreme Courts recognized the expanding limits include: Keefe v. 
Kirshenbaum & Kirshenbaum, P.C., 40 P.3d 1267, 1273 (Colo. 2002) (upholding 
personal jurisdiction over non-resident law firm partly based on its earlier cases which 
had taken an expansive view of due process limits and stating that the “subsequent 
jurisprudence of the [U.S.] Supreme Court has confirmed rather than brought into 
question the reliability of those outcomes . . . .”); Gray v. Am. Radiator & Standard 
Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761, 764 (Ill. 1961) (noting that since International Shoe “the 
requirements for [personal] jurisdiction have been further relaxed”); Beck v. Spindler, 99 
N.W.2d 670, 675 (Minn. 1959) (stating in breach of contract action that “the trend toward 
greater liberality in permitting state courts to take jurisdiction in this type of case 
continues. And well it should.”). 
  In fact, the Illinois statute itself was the product of cobbling together outcomes in a 
variety of earlier cases: according to the research of the authors of Dictum Run Wild, 
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persons have an executor or administrator, the court reasoned that the 
long-arm statute does not apply to corporations30 Because such a 
limitation would significantly undermine the efficiency of the long-arm 
statute in securing remediation for Georgia residents against nonresident 
businesses, the Georgia General Assembly wasted little time in 
responding to that holding by amending statutory language explicitly to 
encompass legal entities in addition to natural persons corporations.31 
The next test of the legislature’s intent involved the interpretation 
of the “commits a tortious act within this state” portion of subsection 
(2).32 In O’Neal Steel Inc. v. Smith, Smith brought a tort action against 
O’Neal Steel after he was injured in Georgia while unloading “H” beams 
when a metal clamp holding the beams together broke.33 Because the 
beams had been manufactured and packaged by O’Neal Steel in 
Alabama, the issue was whether a tortious act had occurred within the 
state as called for in subsection (2).34 The court compared the reasoning 
of the broader “Illinois Rule”35 and the narrower “New York Rule,”36 
                                                                                                             
supra note 3 at 504, subsection (1) was based on International Shoe and Travelers Health 
Association v. Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Comm., 339 U.S. 643 (1950); subsection (2) 
language chosen based on fact that constitutional challenges to nonresident motorist  
statutes and single-act tort statutes had been rejected; subsection (3), concerning 
ownership of real property, relied partially on similar Pennsylvania statute; and 
subsection (4), concerning insurance contracts, relied on fact that similar statutes in other 
states had been sustained. 
 29 Wilen Mfg. Co. v. The Standard Prod. Co., C.A. No. 10532 (N.D. Ga. 1967). 
 30 Id. This holding was later reversed by the Fifth Circuit, after the amendment had 
already been made. Wilen Mfg. Co., Inc. v. The Standard Prod. Co., 409 F.2d 56 (5th Cir. 
1969). However, the Fifth Circuit’s holding was undermined later that year when the 
Georgia Supreme Court held in another case that the long-arm statute did not apply to 
corporations prior to the amendment. Bauer Int’l. Corp. v. Cagle’s, Inc., 171 S.E.2d 314 
(Ga. 1969) (holding also that the amendment could not be applied retroactively to a 
dispute arising prior to the amendment). 
 31 1968 Ga. Laws 1419; GA. CODE ANN. § 24-117 (now GA. CODE ANN. § 9-10-90 
(West 2004)). The amendment included in the definition of “nonresident” “a corporation 
which is not organized or existing under the laws of this state and is not authorized to do 
or transact business in this state at the time a claim or cause of action under Code Section 
9-10-91 arises.”  GA. CODE ANN. § 9-10-90 (West 2004). 
 32 O’Neal Steel, Inc. v. Smith, 169 S.E.2d 827 (Ga. Ct. App. 1969), remanded on 
other grounds, 171 S.E.2d 519 (Ga. 1969), vacated and rev’d on other grounds, 172 
S.E.2d 479 (Ga. Ct. App. 1970). 
 33 Id. at 828. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Derived from Gray v. Am. Radiator & Standard, 176 N.E.2d 761 (Ill. 1961), where 
the Illinois Supreme Court, in construing the similarly worded subsection of its long-arm 
statute, held that the nonresident’s tortious act could not be separated from the accident, 
and thus the “tortious action” could be considered to have occurred in Illinois, where the 
plaintiff resided and was injured, though the water heater valve at issue was negligently 
manufactured in Ohio. 
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opting for the latter interpretation.37 “The plain language of our statute 
requires that the tortious act be committed within the state . . . . If our 
legislature meant something other than what is plainly indicated by the 
words used, it could have used language appropriate to indicate a 
different intent.” 38 The court pointed out that “our legislature did not 
choose to adopt the language of the Uniform Interstate and International 
Procedure Act,”39 which contained a subsection providing for tortious 
injuries occurring within the state caused by an act outside the state. The 
court then invited the legislature to amend the long-arm if it so desired; 
“‘Any plea for further expansion of its scope, however desirable such 
expansion may seem, is a matter for the legislature rather than the 
courts.’”40 The court also pointed out that the New York legislature had 
done so after the New York Court of Appeals rejected the “Illinois 
                                                                                                             
 36 Derived from Feathers v. McLucas, 209 N.E.2d 68 (N.Y. 1965), where the New 
York Court of Appeals held that the tortious act must be physically committed within the 
state according to the plain language of its similarly worded subsection. 
 37 O’Neal Steel, 169 S.E.2d at 829-30. 
 38 Id. at 831. 
 39 Id. See Unif. Interstate & Int’l Procedure Act § 1.03 (1962), 13 U.L.A. 361-62 
(1986). The act was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws in 1962, seven years after the Illinois long-arm statute, and was adopted by 
several states. TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 6, at 218. Section 1.03 stated: 
(a) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts 
directly or by an agent, as to a [cause of action] [claim for relief] arising 
from the person’s 
(1) transacting any business in this state; 
(2) contracting to supply services or things in this state; 
(3) causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this state; 
(4) causing tortious injury in this state by an act or omission outside this 
state if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other 
persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used 
or consumed or services rendered, in this state; [or] 
(5) having an interest in, using, or possessing real property in this state [; or 
(6) contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within this 
state at the time of contracting]. 
(b) When jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this Section, only a 
[cause of action] [claim for relief] arising from acts enumerated in this 
Section may be asserted against him. 
Id. Portions of the Uniform Act were modeled on the Illinois long-arm statute: “The 
drafters of the Act identified sections 1.03(a)(1), 1.03(a)(5), and 1.03(a)(6) as ‘derived 
from’ or ‘similar to’ the Illinois statute.” McFarland, Dictum Run Wild, supra note 3, at 
n.14 (citing Handbook of the Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Uniform State Laws & 
Proceedings, 1962 Nat’l Conf. Comm’n Unif. St. L. 81-82, 222-223). The Uniform Act 
“was later withdrawn as obsolete.” McFarland, Dictum Run Wild, supra note 3, at 495 
(citing Handbook of the Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws & 
Proceedings, 1977 Nat’l Conf. Comm’n Unif. St. L. 118). 
 40 O’Neal Steel, 169 S.E.2d at 832 (quoting Feathers v. McLucas, 209 N.E.2d 68, 80 
(N.Y. 1965)). 
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Rule.”41 The Georgia legislature responded within a year; it added the 
current subsection (3)42 to the long-arm statute, in yet another 
demonstration of its intent to exercise personal jurisdiction to the limits 
of due process as they were then understood. Subsection (3)’s wording 
was virtually identical to the subsection of the Uniform Act quoted by 
the O’Neal Steel court.43 At that time, the more stringent contacts 
required by the subsection were thought to be necessary under due 
process;44 thus, the Georgia legislature expanded the scope to what it 
believed were the limits of due process after the narrow interpretation of 
subsection (2) by the O’Neal Steel court.45 
The legislature again demonstrated its policy to provide for the 
maximum ability to obtain personal jurisdiction over nonresidents when 
it amended the definition of nonresident to encompass those who had 
been residents of Georgia at the time the cause of action accrued, but had 
subsequently moved from the state. The Georgia courts had determined 
that a defendant had to be a nonresident at the time of the occurrence of 
the cause of action, and such rulings compelled a legislative response to 
protect the due-process limits to the legislation’s purpose. When first 
announcing this interpretation, the Georgia Supreme Court observed, 
with a tincture of irony, that “[t]he ordinary signification of the term 
‘nonresident’ would seem to be mutually exclusive with the ordinary 
                                                                                                             
 41 Id. at 832 n.10. 
 42 1970 Ga. Laws, p. 443, § 1. Enacted originally as GA. CODE ANN. § 24-113.1(c) 
(now GA. CODE ANN. § 9-10-91 (2006)). 
 43 O’Neal Steel, 169 S.E.2d at 831 (quoting § 1.03(a)(4) of the Uniform Act, supra 
note 37). Cf. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-10-91(3), supra note 17. 
 44 See TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 6, at 218-19 (discussing the Uniform Act’s 
“tortious injury” subsection and stating: “Obviously, the Act was drafted under the 
impression that tortious acts committed outside the state would require greater contact to 
satisfy the International Shoe test.”) 
 45 The Georgia Supreme Court echoed this view, stating that “[s]ubsection ([3]) . . . 
was obviously enacted to legislatively ‘get around’ the legal reasoning on which the” 
O’Neal Steel decision was based. Coe & Payne Co. v. Wood-Mosaic Corp., 195 S.E.2d 
399, 400 (Ga. 1973) (adopting the “Illinois Rule” for subsection (2) in cases where the 
cause of action accrued prior to the enactment of subsection (3)). 
  Also noteworthy is that subsection (1), with its “transacts any business” language, 
was apparently not considered to be applicable. It would seem that the Legislature had 
either agreed with, or at least conceded, the federal court’s interpretation in Scott v. 
Crescent Tool Co., 296 F. Supp. 147 (N.D. Ga. 1969), that subsection (1) applied to 
contract actions only.  Otherwise that subsection could have applied in cases such as 
O’Neal Steel, where the nonresident defendant commits a tortious act outside the state 
causing injury in the state arising out of its transaction of business within the state–and 
subsection (3) would have been unnecessary. Consequently, the Georgia Supreme 
Court’s recent pronouncement that subsection (1) is not restricted to contract actions, in 
Innovative Clinical & Consulting Services, L.L.C. v. First Nat’l Bank of Ames, 620 
S.E.2d 352 (Ga. 2005), seems to conflict with the Legislature’s understanding of 
subsection (1) when it enacted subsection (3). 
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signification of the word ‘resident.’ The [long-arm] statute in question 
clearly does not apply.”46 This interpretation held for several years, until 
shortly after the Georgia Court of Appeals’ decision in Smiley v. 
Davenport.47 This case involved a malpractice action against a military 
doctor who was residing in Georgia at the time the alleged malpractice 
occurred in the state.48 The plaintiff had originally obtained personal 
jurisdiction over the doctor in her first suit, while the doctor was still 
living in the state, but then dismissed her suit without prejudice a few 
months after the doctor moved from the state.49 The Plaintiff later refiled 
her suit in Georgia and served the doctor in Texas,50 but the Georgia 
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss 
for lack of personal jurisdiction, because the doctor had been a resident 
of Georgia at the time the cause of action occurred.51 Within a year of 
this decision, the legislature moved to secure this holding into statutory 
law: It enacted the amendment which added to the definition of a 
nonresident one who was a resident at the time the cause of action 
accrued and subsequently moved from the state.52 
The final significant amendment made to Georgia’s long-arm 
statute was the addition of subsection (5), sometimes called the 
“domestic-relations” long-arm statute.53 Once again, the legislature 
responded to a shortfall in the originally-enacted long-arm statute in 
order to provide Georgia’s citizens the ability to obtain personal 
jurisdiction allowed by the limits of due process. The triggering event 
was the Supreme Court of Georgia’s opinion in Warren v. Warren.54 In 
                                                                                                             
 46 Thompson v. Abbott, 174 S.E.2d 904, 908 (Ga. 1970). The Georgia Supreme 
Court had also held in a pre-long-arm statute case that Georgia’s Non-Resident Motorist 
Act could not be constitutionally applied to one who was a resident at the time of the 
accident. Young v. Morrison, 137 S.E.2d 456 (Ga. 1964) (striking down the Legislature’s 
expansion of the Non-Resident Motorist Act to those who had moved from the state 
subsequent to an accident). Thus, after these rulings, if a plaintiff was injured in an 
automobile accident by a resident who later moved out of the state, personal jurisdiction 
could not be obtained over the tortfeasor in Georgia under either statute. 
 47 229 S.E.2d 489 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976). 
 48 Id. at 490. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. at 492-93. 
 52 1977 Ga. Laws 586-87; GA. CODE ANN. § 24-117 (Now, GA. CODE ANN § 9-10-
90). The Georgia Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the amendment in 
Crowder v. Ginn, 286 S.E.2d 706 (Ga. 1982). In doing so, the Court overruled Young v. 
Morrison, 137 S.E.2d 456 (Ga. 1964), “because Young relied upon the views of the 
Supreme Court of the United States expressed in the early case of Pennoyer v. Neff rather 
than upon the more modern views of that court set forth in International Shoe.” Crowder, 
286 S.E.2d at 706. 
 53 GA. CODE ANN. § 9-10-91(5) (West 2004). 
 54 287 S.E.2d 524 (Ga. 1982). 
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that case, the wife sued her nonresident husband for divorce, alimony, 
custody, child support, and to have their separation agreement declared 
void.55 She attempted to obtain personal jurisdiction under subsection 
(1), but the Court held that the “transacting any business” category did 
not apply to matters relating to divorce.56 The court, however strongly 
exhorted the legislature to add a domestic relations category to the long-
arm statute, pointing out that a number of states had done so, but 
“[u]nfortunately, Georgia has not.”57 The legislature responded a year 
later by adding subsection (5) to the long-arm statute.58 
These amendments show a desire to exercise jurisdiction to the 
maximum extent possible.59 Significantly, the legislature never amended 
the statute to restrict its extraterritorial reach. Nor did the legislature act 
to limit any expansive interpretation that the courts had given to the 
statute60-indeed, all of the amendments expanded the scope of the statute. 
                                                                                                             
 55 Id. at 525. 
 56 Id. at 526. The Court did, however, hold that the separation agreement could be 
considered the transaction of business, and thus the husband was amenable to personal 
jurisdiction under subsection (1) for the separation agreement issue. Id. 
 57 Id. In a later case, the Court summarized the situation leading to the enactment of 
subsection (5): 
[I]n Warren v. Warren, we noted with disapproval the fact that other states 
had enacted domestic relations Long-Arm Statutes, but our legislature had 
failed to do so. Within a year, the General Assembly enacted subsection (5) 
of [GA. CODE ANN.] § 9-10-91, the domestic relations subsection of our 
Long-Arm Statute. Subsection (5) was patterned after the Florida statute that 
we had studied and approved in Whitaker v. Whitaker,  230 S.E.2d 486 (Ga. 
1976)], six years earlier. 
Smith v. Smith, 330 S.E.2d 706, 707 (Ga. 1985) (upholding the constitutionality of 
subsection (5)). 
 58 1983 Ga. Laws 1304, § 1. 
 59 “Both the 1968 and the 1970 Amendments seem clearly to be evidence of the 
intent of the Georgia Legislature to expand the statute to the fullest extent possible.” 
Griffin v. Air South, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 1284, 1288 (N.D. Ga. 1971). 
 60 For cases that took an expansive view of the long-arm statute (with no subsequent 
legislative action to narrow the scope), see, for example, Nippon Credit Bank, Ltd. v. 
Matthews, 291 F.3d 738 (11th Cir. 2002) (finding the long-arm statute supports general 
jurisdiction and omitting “cause of action arises from” language in its quote of the 
statute); Horsley v. Feldt, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1374 (N.D. Ga 2000) (upholding personal 
jurisdiction in defamation suit, reasoning that the defamation exception in long-arm 
statute was no longer applicable); Scott v. Crescent Tool Co., 296 F. Supp. 147 (N.D. Ga. 
1968) (adopting the “Illinois Rule” in holding that the “tortious act” subsection (2) 
applies to acts committed outside the state which cause injury in state); Regante v. 
Reliable-Triple Cee of N. Jersey, Inc., 308 S.E.2d 372 (Ga. 1983) (nonresident assignee 
of promissory note for real property with no other ties to the state amenable to personal 
jurisdiction under the “ownership of real property” heading in subsection (4) in action 
where assignment alleged to be invalid); Schuehler v. Pait, 238 S.E.2d 65 (Ga. 1977) 
(reversing trial court and holding that nonresident plaintiff can use the long-arm statute in 
action against nonresident defendant); Hart v. DeLowe Partners, Ltd., 250 S.E.2d 169 
(Ga. Ct. App. 1978) (finding personal jurisdiction under “real property” subsection (4) in 
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This continuing legislative history of Georgia’s long-arm statute 
harmonizes with the history of its model, the Illinois long-arm statute.61 
At the time the Georgia legislature enacted its statute, the Illinois 
Supreme Court had already stated that the intent of the Illinois legislature 
was to exercise personal jurisdiction to the limits of due process,62 and 
the Illinois legislature responded to any future judicial parsimony by 
limiting the boundaries of the statute with quick and decisive 
amendments.63 
3. The Resulting Inconsistent Application by Georgia Courts Due to 
the Conflict 
The result of the conflict between the literal reading of the long-arm 
statute and the legislative intent has been inconsistent application by the 
Georgia courts. One reason for the seemingly contradictory “limits of 
due process” claim is the courts’ (and hence the legislature’s) early 
beliefs of what were the limits of due process. Although the concept of 
specific and general personal jurisdiction was first articulated in 1966,64 
this concept was not widely embraced until the United States Supreme 
                                                                                                             
suit on promissory note for purchase of property against original nonresident promisor, 
who subsequently sold the property to the  corporation which defaulted on the note, and 
thus did not own the property when suit commenced). 
 61 In 1955, the Illinois long-arm statute provided for personal jurisdiction for a cause 
of action arising from: “(a) The transaction of any business within this State; (b) The 
commission of a tortious act within this State; (c) The ownership, use, or possession of 
any real estate situated in this State; (d) Contracting to insure any person, property or risk 
located within this State at the time of contracting.” 1955 Ill. Laws 2283, § 1. Georgia’s 
long-arm statute, when originally enacted, provided three categories: “(a) Transacts any 
business within this state; (b) Commits a tortious act or omission within this state, except 
as to a cause of action for defamation of character arising from the act; or (c) Owns, uses, 
or possesses any real property situated within this state.” 1966 Ga. Laws 343, § 1. The 
rationale for adding the defamation exclusion (which the Illinois long-arm did not 
contain) is discussed, infra, in Section II.B.3.c. 
 62 “As we observed in Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill.2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 [(1956)], the 
statute contemplates the exertion of jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the extent 
permitted by the due-process clause.”  Gray v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 
176 N.E.2d 761, 763 (Ill. 1961). Georgia’s long-arm statute was enacted in 1966. 
 63 Compare Green v. Advance Ross Elecs. Corp., 427 N.E. 2d 1203, 1206-08 (Ill. 
1981) (rejecting extension of interpretation of the “tortious act within the state” category 
of long-arm jurisdiction to encompass nonresident defendant’s alleged breaches of 
fiduciary duty that took place outside of Illinois but allegedly caused a diminution of 
funds of a corporation organized or headquartered in Illinois) with Ill. Rev. Stat., ch.110, 
2-209 (a)(7), (11), & (12) (1989 amendments by Illinois Legislature to add categories for 
exercise of long-arm jurisdiction by Illinois Courts, including making or performing “any 
contract or state” or promise substantially connected with the performing officer or 
director duties of any corporation either incorporated in or headquartered in Illinois). 
 64 Arthur T. Von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A 
Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121 (1966). 
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Court “endorsed the categories of specific and general jurisdiction as two 
distinct types of in personam jurisdiction” in 1984.65 Consequently, in 
Georgia, the “arising from” requirement was not seen as limiting the 
long-arm because personal jurisdiction in the context of distinct specific 
and general jurisdiction had not been integrated into the courts’ analyses. 
Shellenberger v. Tanner provides a prime example of the effects of 
indeterminacy in establishing constitutional due process limits on judicial 
interpretation of categorical long-arm statutes such as Georgia’s.66 In that 
case, the Georgia Court of Appeals discussed International Shoe and 
subsequent cases to create a three-part test for determining constitutional 
due process limits. A misinterpretation is evident in the second prong of 
its test:  
From International Shoe’s “skeleton” and the subsequent 
“fleshing out” cases can be gleaned three “rules” by which to 
judge the power of a forum state to exercise jurisdiction over a 
nonresident defendant. They are: . . . (2) The plaintiff must have 
a legal cause of action against the nonresident, which arises out 
of, or results from, the activity or activities of the defendant 
within the forum . . . .67 
This statement highlights the mistaken notion by many courts at that time 
that the cause of action must always arise directly out of the nonresident 
defendant’s activities to meet constitutional due process. Of course, 
International Shoe did not require that. Chief Justice Stone explicitly 
recognized that a nonresident defendant could have such extensive, 
regular, and systematic contacts with the forum so as to be a virtual 
citizen of the forum by virtue of the nonresident defendant’s dominating 
presence.68 That point was driven home by the United States Supreme 
Court’s decision in Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.,69 which 
upheld personal jurisdiction where the claim did not relate to the 
nonresident defendant’s activities in the forum. The Shellenberger Court, 
however, helped perpetuate the notion that the long-arm statute was to be 
construed to due process limits as that court understood those limits 
when it stated that the Supreme Court of Georgia’s decision in Coe & 
                                                                                                             
 65 Linda Sandstrom Simard, Hybrid Personal Jurisdiction: It’s Not General 
Jurisdiction, or Specific Jurisdiction, but Is It Constitutional?, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
559, 565 (1998) (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 
nn.8-9 (1984) as the case where the United States Supreme Court first recognized the 
concept). 
 66 227 S.E.2d 266 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976). 
 67 Id. at 272 (emphasis added). 
 68 International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318. 
 69 342 U.S. 437 (1952). 
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Payne Co. v. Wood-Mosaic Corp.70 had “indicated that jurisdiction over 
nonresidents who commit a ‘tortious act’ in Georgia shall be extended to 
the maximum limits permitted by due process.”71 
Other notable cases involving problematic, or inconsistent, judicial 
interpretation of the long-arm statue based on shifting views of the 
Constitutional limits have primarily involved subsections (1), (2) and (3) 
of the long-arm statute.72 Judicial treatment of subsection (1) will be 
discussed first, followed by a discussion of subsections (2) and (3) 
together due to the interrelatedness in their application. 
a. Subsection (1): “Transacts any Business” Category. 
Until the recent change by the Supreme Court of Georgia,73 
subsection (1) had been consistently interpreted as applying to contract 
actions only. Consequently, the inconsistency in application by the 
Georgia state courts regarding subsection (1) primarily involves the 
required contacts with the state. This part will first detail the application 
issues with an analysis of two Supreme Court of Georgia and two 
Georgia Court of Appeals cases. It will then discuss how the federal 
court decisions are inconsistent with the state court decisions as well as 
with the statutory language. Finally, the recent decision by the Georgia 
Supreme Court,74 which overruled all the cases that had limited the 
application of subsection (1) to contract causes of action and physical 
contacts only, will be discussed. 
What constitutes “transacts any business” (and hence what falls 
within the category) was construed liberally in Davis Metals, Inc. v. 
Allen,75 but the contacts required with the state were then construed 
narrowly in O. N. Jonas Co. v. B & P Sales Corp.76 In Davis Metals, 
Davis Metals sued Allen, a former employee, for breaching a 
noncompete covenant after Allen moved to Alabama and started a 
competing business. The trial court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and 
                                                                                                             
 70 195 S.E.2d 399 (Ga. 1973), overruled on other grounds by Anderson v. Deas, 632 
S.E.2d 682 (Ga. 2006). 
 71 Shellenberger, 227 S.E.2d at 273. The perpetuation can be seen in the numerous 
subsequent federal court decisions citing this case, as well as Coe & Payne Co., for the 
notion that Georgia’s long-arm statute has been construed to extend to the limits of due 
process. Also, it indirectly did so with the numerous federal courts citing other federal 
court decisions which had relied on Shellenberger. 
 72 See supra Section II.B. 
 73 See supra Section II.B.1; see also supra, note 22. 
 74 Innovative Clinical & Consulting Servs., L.L.C. v. First Nat’l Bank of Ames, 620 
S.E.2d 352 (Ga. 2005). 
 75 198 S.E.2d 285 (Ga. 1973). 
 76 206 S.E.2d 437 (Ga. 1974). But see Innovative Clinical & Consulting Servs, 
L.L.C. v. First Nat’l Bank of Ames, 620 S.E.2d 352 (Ga. 2005). 
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the Court of Appeals affirmed, stating that the “‘liability here, if any, did 
not arise from any business transaction in Georgia, but instead from the 
defendant’s competing outside Georgia in the State of Alabama.’”77 In 
reversing the dismissal, the Supreme Court of Georgia emphasized that 
the focus on where the business competition occurred was misplaced. 
The focus, instead, should be on the contract, which was entered into in 
Georgia, and not the place where ultimately it may have been breached: 
The act that gives birth to a cause of action because of the 
competition carried on in Alabama is the contract entered into by 
the parties in the State of Georgia. The Georgia contract gives the 
appellant a cause of action if a breach occurs, and it is immaterial 
if the breach occurs within or without the State of Georgia.78 
The Court went on to state that “the trend of the opinions is to construe 
long arm ‘transacting any business’ statutes most liberally and to uphold 
the jurisdiction of the court of the plaintiff’s residence in actions, arising 
either directly or indirectly, out of such transactions.”79 Thus, the 
category appeared to be as broad as the limits of due process. 
Despite the expansive application given the “transacting any 
business” language in Davis Metals, the Supreme Court of Georgia did 
place limits that, in effect, narrowed the scope to something less than the 
limits of due process in O. N. Jonas Co. by restricting the application of 
subsection (1) so as to require more forum contacts than those that would 
suffice to meet the minimum contacts standard.80 That case involved a 
contract dispute with a nonresident defendant who had purchased goods 
from a Georgia corporation. In holding there was no personal 
jurisdiction, the Court distinguished Davis Metals, stating “in that case a 
contract between the parties had been executed and partially performed 
within the State of Georgia, the contract itself provided that it was to be 
interpreted and construed pursuant to the laws of Georgia, and the cause 
of action against the nonresident arose solely by breach of this Georgia 
contract.”81  In contrast, in O.N. Jonas Co., “there were no negotiations 
or contracts entered into in Georgia with respect to the goods that are the 
subject matter of these actions. Purchase orders for the goods originated 
                                                                                                             
 77 Davis Metals, 198 S.E.2d at 287. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id at 287-88. 
 80 For example, a district court sitting in Georgia would later hold that “the Georgia 
long-arm statute . . . is narrower than constitutional due process and thus requires more 
contacts with the forum than constitutional due process.” Evans v. Am. Surplus 
Underwriters Corp., 739 F. Supp. 1526, 1533 (N.D. Ga. 1989). 
 81 O.N. Jonas Co., 206 S.E.2d at 439. 
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outside of the state.”82 The Court suggested that these are not contacts at 
all, reasoning: 
The goods were shipped FOB shipping point, such shipping point 
being in Georgia, and . . . that is the only contact that appellees 
had with this state with respect to the goods purchased by them. 
We hold that this is an insufficient “contact” with the State of 
Georgia to comply with the requirement of transacting “any 
business within this state” . . . .83 
Although agents of the defendant had visited the plaintiff’s plant in 
Georgia, because they had not initiated the purchase order while there, 
this was not deemed to be a contact: “The evidence showed that none of 
the goods involved in these actions was purchased by the appellees 
during their agents’ visit to appellant’s Georgia plant.”84 Thus, whereas 
in Davis Metals personal jurisdiction was found because the employee 
had entered into the contract in Georgia, if the contract is not 
consummated in Georgia, even if the nonresident defendant submitted 
the purchase order and agents visited the state in connection with the 
purchase, then personal jurisdiction does not arise under subsection (1). 
Based on this ruling, since the purchase orders were made by telephone 
or mail, Georgia courts had, until recently, held that telephonic, mail, 
and, later, e-mail communications from a nonresident defendant were not 
sufficient to create personal jurisdiction under subsection (1).85 Those 
                                                                                                             
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id at 438. 
 85 See, e.g, Catholic Stewardship Consultants, Inc. v. Ruotolo Assocs., Inc., 608 
S.E.2d 1 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004); First Nat’l Bank Of Ames v. Innovative Clinical & 
Consulting Servs., L.L.C., 598 S.E.2d 530 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004), aff’d in part and vacated 
in part, 620 S.E.2d 352 (Ga. 2005); First Nat’l Bank Of Ames v. Innovative Clinical & 
Consulting Servs., L.L.C., 598 S.E.2d 530 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004), aff’d in part and vacated 
in part, 620 S.E.2d 352 (Ga. 2005); ETS Payphone, Inc. v. TK Indus., 513 S.E.2d 257 
(Ga. Ct. App. 1999); Burt v. Energy Servs. Inv. Corp., 427 S.E.2d 576 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1993); Commercial Food Specialties, Inc. v. Quality Food Equip. Co., 338 S.E.2d 865 
(Ga. Ct. App. 1985); Graphic Mach., Inc. v. H. M. S. Direct Mail Serv., Inc., 281 S.E.2d 
343 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981). Of course, the United States Supreme Court has not restricted 
the exercise of personal jurisdiction to only physical contacts with the defendant, 
specifically holding that mail and telephone contacts are sufficient: 
 Jurisdiction in these circumstances may not be avoided merely because 
the defendant did not physically enter the forum State. Although territorial 
presence frequently will enhance a potential defendant’s affiliation with a 
State and reinforce the reasonable foreseeability of suit there, it is an 
inescapable fact of modern commercial life that a substantial amount of 
business is transacted solely by mail and wire communications across state 
lines, thus obviating the need for physical presence within a State in which 
business is conducted. So long as a commercial actor’s efforts are 
“purposefully directed” toward residents of another State, we have 
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cases where personal jurisdiction was upheld involved circumstances 
where the contract was consummated in Georgia, or the nonresident was 
purposely directing activity toward Georgia for economic benefit while 
either physically within the state or sending physical items into the 
state.86 
However, the Georgia Court of Appeals later expanded the scope of 
the long-arm by allowing for a new type of contact (at least with respect 
to bank plaintiffs) in Georgia Railroad Bank & Trust Co. v. Barton.87 
The court did so by shifting the focus from whether the contract was 
consummated in Georgia to whether the nonresident purposefully availed 
his or herself of the protections of Georgia law by doing some act in the 
state and whether there was a “substantial effect” in the forum from the 
contact. The “substantial effect” criterion was adopted from the three-
part test the Court of Appeals had extrapolated from International Shoe 
[in Shellenberger v. Tanner,88 which involved a tort claim]. In Barton, 
the nonresident defendant had obtained a $125,000 loan from the 
plaintiff bank and then defaulted.89 Relying on, inter alia, the holding in 
O.N. Jonas Co., Inc., supra, Barton argued that because he signed the 
promissory notes in South Carolina, and had only visited the forum a few 
times to negotiate the loan and its repayment, he did not have the 
required contacts with the forum.90 The Court, however, citing 
Shellenberger, stated that “‘[a] single event may be a sufficient basis if 
its effects within the forum are substantial enough . . . .’”91 Because 
Barton “knowingly and purposefully availed himself of the financial 
resources of a Georgia banking institution” and “the economic effect of a 
                                                                                                             
consistently rejected the notion that an absence of physical contacts can 
defeat personal jurisdiction there. 
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985). 
 86 See, e.g., Genesis Research Inst., Inc. v. Roxbury Press, Inc., 542 S.E.2d 637 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 2000) (negotiation within state of terms of contract upon which cause of action 
based is a sufficient contact); SES Indus., Inc. v. Intertrade Packaging Mach. Corp., 512 
S.E.2d 316 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (nonresident buyer from manufacturer initiated contact 
with plaintiff, and traveled to Georgia plant to inspect the item and finalize and sign the 
contract); Bosworth v. Cooney, 274 S.E.2d 604 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980) (nonresident 
defendant negotiated and executed escrow contract in Georgia); Hollingsworth v. Cunard 
Line, Ltd.., 263 S.E.2d 190 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979) (one factor in upholding personal 
jurisdiction over cruise line was its distribution of ticket stock to travel agencies in 
Georgia); Brooks Shoe Mfg., Inc. v. Byrd, 241 S.E.2d 299 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977) 
(nonresident shoe manufacturer participated in Georgia trade show for three consecutive 
years with intent to reap economic benefit). 
 87 315 S.E.2d 17 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984). 
 88 227 S.E.2d 266 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976); see supra notes 62-63 and accompanying 
text. 
 89 Ga. R. Bank & Trust Co. v. Barton, 315 S.E.2d 17, 18 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984). 
 90 Id. at 19. 
 91 Id. 
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default of $125,000 would be ‘substantial’”, this established “legally 
sufficient contacts.”92 The Court summarily distinguished O.N. Jonas, 
stating that the “contacts in the instant case differ both qualitatively and 
quantitatively from those in Jonas . . . .”93 It is hard to see much of a 
difference, because one could say the nonresident buyer in O.N. Jonas 
had purposefully availed itself of the manufacturing resources of a 
Georgia manufacturer and that the lack of payments to O.N. Jonas had a 
substantial economic effect (assuming the amount owed to the plaintiff 
was substantial). 
A more fundamental problem, however, is with the use of the test 
articulated in Shellenberger. In that case, the Court of Appeals gave two 
different three-part tests: the first was a test for meeting the International 
Shoe constitutional due process requirements;94 the second was a test for 
meeting the tortious act requirement of the long-arm statute’s subsection 
(2).95 In Barton, the court relied on the first test, selectively picking out 
the portion of the first prong relating to “substantial” effects, while 
ignoring another part of that prong—i.e., that it “is not necessary that the 
defendant or his agent be physically within the forum, for an act or 
transaction by mail may suffice”96—which directly contradicted prior 
holdings of the Georgia Supreme Court that mail contacts are 
insufficient. Thus, Barton’s expansion of the contacts scope of 
subsection (1) was based on selecting a portion of the Shellenberger test 
that was meant to define constitutional due process limits and 
incorporating it into the judicial construction of the long-arm statute. 
This holding was followed in Robertson v. CRI, Inc.,97 where a 
nonresident personal guarantor of a $400,000 loan for a corporation of 
which he was an officer was found to have sufficient contacts for 
personal jurisdiction, although he had signed the guarantee in California: 
“[A]s in Barton, Robertson could be characterized as having availed 
himself of the resources of a Georgia financial institution, and the loan 
could be characterized as substantial, thus showing the purposeful 
activity in Georgia required to satisfy the first prong of the test.”98 
Therefore, at least where a bank loan is involved, the contact requirement 
of subsection (1) is broader under the Georgia Court of Appeals’ 
holdings than it has been construed in other contexts—without any 
                                                                                                             
 92 Id. at 20. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Shellenberger, 227 S.E.2d at 272. 
 95 Id. at 273. 
 96 Shellenberger, 227 S.E.2d at 272. 
 97 601 S.E.2d 163 (Ga. App. 2004). 
 98 Id. at 166. 
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principled justification offered to explain the difference. This is 
inconsistent with the Georgia Supreme Court’s holdings that required 
consummation of the contract in the state. 
Of course, application of any long-arm statute goes on in two 
parallel court systems. State-law claims heard in federal court under the 
diversity-of-citizenship category of federal subject matter jurisdiction 
can partake of the forum state’s long-arm statute as a means of affecting 
extraterritorial service of process on nonresident defendants, 99 since 
Congress has not enabled a general federal long-arm statute. While 
courts of limited subject matter jurisdiction, federal courts have generally 
proven to be far less demure about expansive positions on their personal 
jurisdiction. Thus, the federal courts, sitting in their diversity-of-
citizenship jurisdiction, with a few exceptions,100 have expanded the 
scope of subsection (1) to the limits of due process. Most federal courts 
skip the long-arm analysis altogether, relying on somewhat loose dicta 
from the state courts in Georgia to the effect that the long-arm extends to 
the limits of due process, and thereby only addressing due process 
concerns.101 Other federal courts purport to be applying the categorical 
approach of the long-arm statute, but construe it in a way that extends it 
to the limits of due process. Nippon Credit Bank, Ltd. v. Matthews102 is a 
typical example. There, the federal court constructed a detailed defense 
of how the long-arm statute provided for general jurisdiction. In doing so 
                                                                                                             
 99 See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e)(1) & (h)(1) (providing that service upon individuals, 
corporations and associations may be made “pursuant to the law of the state in which the 
district court is located. . . . ”). 
 100 The exceptions include: Swafford v. Avakian, 581 F.2d 1224 (5th Cir. 1978) 
(nonresident’s only contacts with Georgia were telephone calls and letters; citing 
Shellenberger’s statement that activity under subsection (1) needs to be more extensive 
than activity under subsection (2)); Fulghum Indus., Inc. v. Walterboro Forest Prod., Inc., 
477 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1973) (although nonresident defendant conducted business in 
Georgia, the breach of contract was unrelated to that business); Evans v. Am. Surplus 
Underwriters Corp., 739 F. Supp. 1526, 1533 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (finding the long-arm to be 
“narrower than constitutional due process and thus requir[ing] more contacts with the 
forum than constitutional due process.”); Fowler Prods. Co. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of 
Tulsa, Inc., 413 F. Supp. 1339 (M.D. Ga. 1976). 
 101 See, e.g., Francosteel Corp. v. M/V Charm, 19 F.3d 624 (11th Cir. 1994) (skipping 
the long-arm application and stating that general jurisdiction is available in Georgia); 
Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Woodall, 304 F. Supp. 2d 1364 (S.D. Ga. 2003); Peridyne 
Tech. Solutions, L.L.C. v. Matheson Fast Freight, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 1366 (N.D. Ga. 
2000) (straight due process analysis, after citing several cases holding that long-arm 
extends to due process limits); Allegiant Physicians Servs., Inc. v. Sturdy, 926 F. Supp. 
1106 (N.D. Ga 1996) (while acknowledging Georgia Supreme Court’s restrictive holding 
in Gust, cites Francosteel for the proposition that, at least for contract claims, the long-
arm reaches to the limits of due process); Marival, Inc. v. Planes, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 201 
(N.D. Ga. 1969) (the first to state the long-arm extends to due process limits). 
 102 291 F.3d 738 (11th Cir. 2002). 
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the Eleventh Circuit selectively quoted from the long-arm statute, 
conspicuously omitting the “as to a cause of action arising from”103 
language: 
The Georgia long-arm statute provides for the exercise of 
“personal jurisdiction over any nonresident . . . if in person or 
through an agent, he: (1) Transacts any business within this state; 
. . . or (4) Owns, uses, or possesses any real property situated 
within this state.”.104 
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit’s holding that the long-arm statute allows for 
general personal jurisdiction basically recasts the statute to mean 
something that appears quite different from what it says. 
It may be helpful, before addressing the Georgia Supreme Court’s 
latest rulings, to summarize the varying interpretative canons: While the 
“transacts any business” category is to be construed liberally, the 
Georgia Supreme Court narrowed it by requiring the contract to have 
been consummated in Georgia and by holding that telephone and mail 
communications from the nonresident, as well as isolated visits in 
relation to the contract, did not aggregate to the threshold of minimum 
contacts. The Court of Appeals have expanded the scope, at least for 
bank plaintiffs, by shifting the focus from the place of contract 
consummation to whether the nonresident had purposefully availed itself 
of the protections of Georgia law and if the contact had a substantial 
effect in the forum. The federal courts, despite the boundaries given in 
cases following Erie Railroad Co. v. Thompkins,105 have expanded the 
reach of these subsections to the limits of due process, including even 
general jurisdiction, through an interpretative process that selectively 
ignores portions of the statute. 
In Innovative Clinical and Consulting Services, L.L.C. v. First 
National Bank of Ames,106 the Georgia Supreme Court, though, has 
seemingly laid to rest these differing interpretations as to this aspect of 
Georgia’s long-arm statute. The case involved claims of breach of 
contract, fraud, and conversion by Innovative Clinical and Consulting 
Services, L.L.C. (ICCS), a Georgia resident, against First Nat. Bank of 
Ames (the bank), located in Iowa. The bank had taken a security interest 
in a lease agreement that ICCS had made as lessee with a financing 
                                                                                                             
 103 GA. CODE ANN. § 9-10-91 (West 2004). 
 104 Nippon Credit Bank, Ltd. v. Matthews, 291 F.3d 738, 746 (11th Cir. 2002) 
(quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 9-10-91). 
 105 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 106 620 S.E.2d 352 (Ga. 2005). 
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corporation, which was a customer of the bank.107 Relying on the prior 
judicial holdings that subsection (1) only applied to contract actions, the 
Georgia Court of Appeals applied subsection (1) to the breach of contract 
claim only, finding that, even if the taking of a security interest in the 
lease constituted transacting business in Georgia, ICCS’s breach of 
contract claim was not “remotely related to the security interest taken by 
the bank.”108 From this Court of Appeals ruling, the Georgia Supreme 
Court granted certiorari “to address perceived inconsistencies in our 
precedents defining the scope of personal jurisdiction that Georgia courts 
may exercise over nonresidents pursuant to . . . the Georgia long-arm 
statute.”109 After affirming an earlier holding that subsections (2) and (3) 
are to be interpreted literally,110 the court stated that, to be consistent, 
subsection (1) should also be interpreted literally.111 Consequently, 
because “[n]othing in subsection (1) limits its application to contract 
cases” or “requires the physical presence of the nonresident in Georgia or 
minimizes the import of a nonresident’s intangible contacts with the 
State,”112 the court held these limitations no longer apply and, therefore, 
subsection (1) reaches “to the maximum extent permitted by procedural 
due process.”113 As a result, the court “overrule[d] all prior cases that 
fail[ed] to accord the appropriate breadth to the construction of the 
‘transacting any business’ language”114 of subsection (1). The court then 
vacated and remanded the case to the Georgia Court of Appeals to 
consider whether personal jurisdiction may be obtained under subsection 
(1) based on the new interpretation.115 On remand, the Court of Appeals 
upheld the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant bank, 
stating that the bank’s “postal, telephone, and other intangible Georgia 
contacts” were sufficient under the new broader interpretation of 
subsection (1).116 
                                                                                                             
 107 First Nat’l Bank of Ames v. Innovative Clinical & Consulting Servs., L.L.C., 598 
S.E.2d 530, 532 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004). 
 108 Id. at 534. 
 109 Innovative Clinical & Consulting Servs., 620 S.E.2d at 353. 
 110 Id. at 354. The twists and turns of the interpretations of subsections (2) and (3), 
culminating in the decision to apply them separately and literally in Gust v. Flint, 356 
S.E.2d 513 (Ga. 1987), are discussed, infra, in Section II.B.3.b. 
 111 Id at 355. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. (quoting Coe & Payne Co. v. Wood-Mosaic Corp., 195 S.E.2d 399, 401 (Ga. 
1973)). 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. at 356. 
 116 First Nat’l Bank of Ames v. Innovative Clinical & Consulting Servs., L.L.C., 634 
S.E.2d 88, 89 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006). The court also held that the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction was within the limits of constitutional due process, because “the bank’s 
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This expansion of subsection (1) makes subsection (3) superfluous. 
Now when a nonresident tortfeasor commits a tortious act resulting in 
injury within the state, personal jurisdiction is available under subsection 
(1). Subsection (3), with its stricter business contact requirements, would 
appear unnecessary. The Innovative Clinical holding appears also to 
ignore the problem of the defamation exception in subsection (2). That 
exception was included when the long-arm statute was originally 
enacted. It seems unlikely that the Legislature would have made this 
exception in subsection (2), without also limiting subsection (1), if 
subsection (1) is truly as broad in scope as declared in Innovative 
Clinical. Far more plausible is the notion that the Legislature did not 
contemplate that subsection (1) would be applicable to tort actions. In the 
wake of Innovative Clinical, the defamation exception of subsection (2) 
appears now only applicable where one defames another while not 
transacting business in the state. Similarly, subsection (4) now appears of 
limited relevance, because most causes of action relating to the 
ownership or use of real property usually arise out of the transaction of 
business. 
In any event, the interpretative inconsistencies of the previously 
discussed state court cases have now been surmounted by a new 
interpretation, the incredibly broad scope of extraterritorial personal 
jurisdiction which, as discussed above, has been attributed by the federal 
courts to Georgia’s long-arm statute. However, it remains to be seen 
whether the Eleventh Circuit will retract its interpretation that the statute 
extends to general jurisdiction. This does not seem likely, because the 
Georgia Supreme Court stated that subsection (1) now reaches to the 
limits of due process117 (even though in actuality it does not – it is still 
limited by the “arising from” language to specific personal jurisdiction). 
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit will likely adhere to its sweeping gloss on the 
statute and allow general personal jurisdiction due to the Georgia 
Supreme Court’s dictum in Innovative Clinical, just as it did in Nippon 
Credit Bank, Ltd. v. Matthews.118 
With the opening of subsection (1) to tort actions, another issue will 
be the scope of the “transacts any business” language in relation to 
products that enter Georgia through the stream of commerce and cause 
injury. This is a particularly relevant inquiry given the split in the United 
States Supreme Court’s decision in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior 
                                                                                                             
‘business’ was not brought to Georgia through a ‘unilateral action’ of ICCS.” Id. (citing 
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U. S. 462, 474-475 (1985)). 
 117 Innovative Clinical & Consulting Servs., L.L.C. v. First Nat’l Bank of Ames, 620 
S.E.2d 352, 355. 
 118 291 F.3d 738 (11th Cir. 2002). 
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Court of California119 on what constitutes purposeful availment in those 
circumstances. In Asahi, Justice O’Connor, with three justices joining 
her, wrote that the purposeful availment necessary for minimum contacts 
requires more than just an awareness by the defendant “that the stream of 
commerce may or will sweep the product into the forum State. . .”120—it 
requires “[a]dditional conduct of the defendant [that] may indicate an 
intent or purpose to serve the market in the forum State . . . .”121 Justice 
Brennan, with three justices joining him, disagreed with the “additional 
conduct” requirement, writing that a defendant’s placing of a product in 
the stream of commerce with an awareness “that the final product is 
being marketed in the forum State”122 is all that is necessary to meet the 
purposeful availment test for minimum contacts. Hence, at some point, 
the Georgia courts will need to decide whether to require the “additional 
conduct” or not.123 The principles of corrective justice and enterprise 
regulation discussed in Section III, infra, and incorporated into our 
model long-arm statute in Section IV, infra, will help to guide the courts 
in this decision. 
b. Subsections (2) and (3): The “Tortious Act” and “Tortious 
Injury” Categories 
Subsections (2) and (3)124—the “tortious act” and “tortious injury” 
categories—will be discussed next. The inconsistency in application 
initially involved whether subsection (2) should be interpreted as the 
“Illinois Rule” or the “New York Rule.” Later application 
inconsistencies involved the contact requirements of subsections (2) and 
(3). 
As previously discussed,125 in O’Neal Steel the Georgia Court of 
Appeals rejected the “Illinois Rule,” holding that under subsection (2) 
personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant attaches only when 
the tortious act (or conduct) as well as the injury occurs in the state. 
Consequently, the legislature adopted subsection (3).126 Despite the 
apparent distinction between subsections (2) and (3), as reflected by the 
Georgia legislature’s amendment, the Supreme Court of Georgia 
                                                                                                             
 119 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
 120 Id. at 112. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 123 See, e.g., Parry v. Ernst Home Ctr. Corp., 779 P.2d 659, 666-67 (Utah 1989) 
(holding that “[w]ithout a showing of ‘additional conduct,’ we are unable to find that the 
eventual sale of a product in Utah justifies personal jurisdiction.”). 
 124 GA. CODE ANN. § 9-10-91 (2004). 
 125 See supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text. 
 126 See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
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subsequently adopted the “Illinois Rule” interpretation of subsection (2) 
in Coe & Payne Co. v. Wood-Mosaic Corp.127 “[T]he negligence 
occurring outside the state cannot be separated from the resulting injury 
occurring within the state,” the court wrote, adding that “[i]n other 
words, a ‘tortious act’ is a composite of both negligence and damage, and 
if damage occurred within the state then the tortious act occurred within 
the state within the meaning of subsection [(2)] of the Long Arm 
Statute.”128 As many courts and commentators observed, this holding 
appeared to make subsection (3) superfluous.129 Accordingly, courts 
using the expansive Coe & Payne interpretation began finding personal 
jurisdiction under subsection (2) where the act occurred outside the state, 
making subsection (3) seemingly unnecessary.130 
But then, at its first opportunity, the Georgia Supreme Court 
established the relevance of subsection (3) in Clarkson Power Flow, Inc. 
v. Thompson.131 In that case, the court reaffirmed the adoption of the 
“Illinois Rule” in Coe & Payne, but noted “that limitations similar to 
those present in subsection [(3)] are constitutionally mandated under 
subsection [(2)].”132 This holding appeared to turn the tables and make 
subsection (2) superfluous. The Court said as much when it stated that 
“[w]e thus conclude that there is no essential difference between 
subsections [(2)] and [(3)].”133 Thus, although personal jurisdiction could 
be obtained under subsection (2) over a nonresident who commits an act 
or omission outside the state resulting in an injury inside the state (á la 
the liberal “Illinois Rule”), the application was substantially restricted by 
requiring the same high level of contacts that are part-and-parcel of 
subsection (3). 
                                                                                                             
 127 195 S.E.2d 399 (Ga. 1973) (upholding personal jurisdiction over nonresident 
manufacturer whose adhesive allegedly caused fire which killed workers and damaged 
building in Georgia). 
 128 Id. at 400-01. 
 129 For example, the Northern District of Georgia explained: 
Admittedly, the effect of this liberal application of subsection [(2)] is to 
virtually read subsection [(3)] out of existence and render it superfluous, 
since it adds nothing to the extent of in personam jurisdiction available 
under subsection [(2)], while seemingly imposing an additional and more 
stringent test of business contracts with the forum state. 
Thornton v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 397 F. Supp. 476, 480 n.3 (N.D. Ga. 1975) 
(citing several Georgia journals and publications supporting this view). 
 130 See, e.g., Greenfield v. Portman, 221 S.E.2d 704 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975); Delta 
Equities, Inc. v. Larwin Mortgage Investors, 211 S.E.2d 9 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974); Davis v. 
Haupt Bros. Gas Co., 206 S.E.2d 598 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974); Lincoln Land Co. v. Palfery, 
203 S.E.2d 597 (Ga. Ct. App. 1973). 
 131 260 S.E.2d 9 (Ga. 1979). 
 132 Id. at 11. 
 133 Id. 
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Two subsequent decisions by the Georgia Supreme Court, however, 
reasserted the applicability of subsection (2) by separating it from 
subsection (3) and returning to a literal interpretation of both subsections, 
which is the controlling interpretation of the two subsections today by 
the Georgia state courts. The first decision, Bradlee Management 
Services, Inc. v. Cassells,134 involved a defamation action against a 
nonresident reporter who prepared a report on nursing home abuse. That 
report implicated the plaintiff’s nursing home when shown on the local 
news.135 The court of appeals had reversed the trial court’s denial of a 
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, holding “that 
subsection [(3)] . . . cannot be interpreted to provide jurisdiction over 
nonresident defendants in defamation cases because of the exclusion of 
defamation cases in subsection [(2)].”136 The court of appeals based its 
decision on the holding in Clarkson Power Flow, “‘that there is no 
essential difference between subsections [(2)] and [(3)].’”137 The 
Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed, but for different reasons. The court 
implied that personal jurisdiction could be obtained in a defamation 
action using subsection (3), recognizing two federal district court cases 
in Georgia which had held “that under subsection [(3)] of our Long Arm 
Statute Georgia courts do have jurisdiction over nonresident defendants 
in defamation cases when there exist requisite minimum contacts other 
than the commission of the tort itself.”138 In this particular case, though, 
the court noted “the specified minimum contacts required by subsection 
[(3)] are not present as to defendant Cassells here.”139 Thus, as one court 
later observed, “the Bradlee decision in fact departs from Clarkson 
Power Flow because it reads subsections (2) and (3) separately.”140 
The second decision by the Supreme Court of Georgia, Gust v. 
Flint,141 involved a tort claim for fraud against a Wisconsin resident who 
had kept the plaintiff’s deposit for the purchase of a truck the defendant 
had advertised in a trade publication after the plaintiff refused to accept a 
substitute truck. The defendant’s only contacts with the state were the 
advertisement and subsequent phone calls with the plaintiff concerning 
                                                                                                             
 134 292 S.E.2d 717 (Ga. 1982). 
 135 Id. at 718-19. 
 136 Id. at 720. 
 137 Id. (quoting Clarkson Power Flow, Inc. v. Thompson, 260 S.E.2d 9 (Ga. 1979)). 
 138 Id. (citing Process Control Corp. v. Witherup Fabrication & Erection, Inc., 439 F. 
Supp. 1284 (N.D. Ga 1975) and Southard v. Forbes, Inc., Civ. No. 74-1984A (N.D. Ga. 
Mar. 25, 1975). 
 139 Id. 
 140 James Whiten Livestock, Inc. v. W. Iowa Farms, Co., 750 F. Supp. 529, 533-34 
(N.D. Ga. 1990). 
 141 356 S.E.2d 513 (Ga. 1987). 
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the sale of the truck. The court of appeals had reversed the trial court’s 
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. In doing so, it acknowledged the ruling 
in Clarkson Power Flow that subsections (2) and (3) are essentially the 
same. However, the court stated that since the Supreme Court of Georgia 
had not expressed an intention to renounce the principle adopted in Coe 
& Payne—that the long-arm statute be construed to the maximum extent 
of due process—it could find personal jurisdiction under subsection 
(2).142 The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed with a terse analysis, 
simply stating that the case was controlled by a “literal construction of 
Georgia’s long-arm statute.”143 The court observed, “[w]e need not 
discuss the relative merits of a ‘New York rule’ or an ‘Illinois rule;’” 
rather, “[t]he rule that controls is our statute, which requires that an out-
of-state defendant must do certain acts within the State of Georgia before 
he can be subjected to personal jurisdiction. Where, as here, it is shown 
that no such acts were committed, there is no jurisdiction.”144 
After these two cases, it was apparent that Georgia courts would 
interpret subsections (3) and (2) separately and literally, and that is what 
the appellate courts did.145 Yet, Georgia courts recognized the disparity 
                                                                                                             
 142 Flint v. Gust, 351 S.E.2d 95 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986), rev’d, 356 S.E.2d 513 (Ga. 
1987). 
 143 Gust, 356 S.E.2d at 514. 
 144 Id. One justice observed, however, that “[f]or my part, I fail to see why Georgia 
would not want its courts to have the maximum jurisdiction permissible within 
constitutional due process.” Id. at 130 (Gregory, J., concurring). Thus, there was 
recognition from the court that this decision made it such that the long-arm statute was 
now not being interpreted to the limits of due process, despite the previous statement in 
Coe & Payne. 
 145 For cases supporting this separate and literal interpretation, see Catholic 
Stewardship Consultants, Inc. v. Ruotolo Assocs., Inc., 608 S.E.2d 1 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) 
(analyzing theft of propriety information claim under subsection (3) because the alleged 
act occurred outside the state and finding personal jurisdiction lacking since the 
defendant did not regularly conduct business in the state), cert. denied, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 
401 (May 23, 2005); First Nat’l Bank of Ames  v. Innovative Clinical & Consulting 
Servs., L.L.C., 598 S.E.2d 530 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (following Gust with reservations in 
dismissing fraud claim analyzed under subsection (3), because alleged tortious act 
occurred outside state by defendant that did not regularly do business in the state), aff’d 
in part and vacated in part, 620 S.E.2d 352 (Ga. 2005); Worthy v. Eller, 594 S.E.2d 699 
(Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (asserting personal jurisdiction over intentional infliction of 
emotional distress claim against Alabama attorney analyzed under subsection (3), 
because alleged act originated in Alabama; claim dismissed due to lack of the contacts 
required by that subsection) cert. denied, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 514 (June 7, 2004); ETS 
Payphone, Inc. v. TK Indus., 513 S.E.2d 257 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (analyzing the 
determination of personal jurisdiction under subsection (3) because defendant committed 
alleged tortious act outside the state; dismissed due to lack of the contacts required by 
that subsection; performing no analysis under subsection (2)); Metzler v. Love, 428 
S.E.2d 384 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) (personal jurisdiction denied because the defendant did 
not commit the tortious act within the state as required by subsection (2) and did not have 
the contacts required under subsection (3)); Showa Denko K.K. v. Pangle, 414 S.E.2d 
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between the Supreme Court of Georgia precedents which had stated that 
the long-arm statute extends to the limits of due process and the holding 
in Gust. For example, on remand in Gust, the Court of Appeals pointed 
out that in Coe & Payne, 
the Supreme Court had expressed the view that our long-arm 
statute authorized the exercise of jurisdiction over nonresident 
defendants “to the maximum extent permitted by procedural due 
process.” In its decision in the present case, the Supreme Court 
would appear to have abandoned that view and to have adopted 
the position that our long-arm statute is not susceptible to such an 
interpretation. However, since Coe & Payne was not overruled, 
clarification of the Supreme Court’s position on this important 
issue will have to await a future litigation.146 
That clarification finally arrived eighteen years later when the 
Supreme Court of Georgia held that in Gust it had “rejected” Coe & 
Payne Co., as well as other cases, and had “reinstated the difference 
between subsections (2) and (3) established by the literal language of the 
statute.”147 More significant than the clarification, however, was the 
expansion of subsection (1) to tort actions, as discussed, supra, in 
Section II.B.3.b, which has made subsection (2) of limited application 
and subsection (3) superfluous.148 Subsection (2) appears to have a 
distinct function only where a nonresident commits a tort in the state that 
does not arise out of the transaction of business. Likewise, subsection 
(3), due to its business contact requirements, appears now completely 
subsumed within the broader “transacts any business” contact 
requirement of subsection (1). Thus, while reiterating the separateness of 
                                                                                                             
658 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (upholding personal jurisdiction under subsection (3) due to 
defendant’s agent’s contacts with the state) (reaffirming separate and literal interpretation 
of subsections (2) and (3), but also announcing a literal interpretation of subsection (1) 
which expands that subsection to the limits of due process by allowing personal 
jurisdiction over any nonresident who transacts any business in Georgia). 
 146 Flint v. Gust, 361 S.E.2d 722, 723 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987). 
 147 Innovative Clinical & Consulting Services, L.L.C. v. First Nat’l Bank of Ames, 
620 S.E.2d 352, 354 (Ga. 2005). In Innovative Clinical, the court made a point to note 
that the legislature had chosen not to expand the statute to the limits of due process since 
the holding in Gust. This might strike the reader as somewhat ironic, given the history of 
amendments that the legislature enacted to expand the statute as limitations were 
encountered through early federal and state court decisions, as discussed in Section 
II.B.2, supra, and given the dicta by the court itself in many cases stating the state’s 
policy was to reach the limits of due process. Even after Gust, which purported to 
abandon the “Illinois Rule,” the court in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Klein, 422 S.E.2d 863 (Ga. 
1992), reiterated in a footnote the same limits of due process policy. Thus, it is quite 
possible that the court’s own history of dicta that the long-arm statute reached due 
process limits influenced legislative somnolence on delivering a legislative coup de gras. 
 148 Supra notes 106-16 and accompanying text. 
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subsections (2) and (3), the Court, in Innovative Clinical, supra, made 
the point moot when it expanded subsection (1) such that subsection (3) 
has no necessary application. 
This somewhat confusing litany of judicial interpretation of 
Georgia’s long-arm statute has been made more complicated by the 
federal courts, which held shortly after the enactment of the long-arm 
statute that it was coterminous with due process limits and adopted the 
“Illinois Rule” for subsection (2).149  And, despite the holding in Gust, 
the federal courts in Georgia, particularly after the Eleventh Circuit’s 
decision in Francosteel Corp. v. M/V Charm,150 have continued to 
interpret the long-arm statute to the limits of due process, and thus ignore 
the contacts requirement of subsection (3),151 with a few exceptions.152 
                                                                                                             
 149 The district court in Georgia (which was the first court to interpret the long-arm’s 
“tortious act” language) adopted the “Illinois Rule,” holding that the place of the injury is 
where the tortious act occurs. Scott v. Crescent Tool Co., 296 F. Supp. 147 (N.D. Ga. 
1968) (upholding personal jurisdiction in negligence action against nonresident 
manufacturer of punch machine that injured resident plaintiff). Coming to this 
conclusion, the court looked to Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 
176 N.E.2d 761 (Ill. 1961), which interpreted an Illinois statute similarly to the Georgia 
statute at issue. The court stated that “[s]ince the Georgia legislature might have had the 
Gray case . . . in mind when it wrote a very similar statute for Georgia, there is good 
reason to think that the highest court in the state would similarly interpret the Georgia 
statute.” Scott, 176 N.E.2d at 156-57. The court offered several justifications for adopting 
the broader interpretation, including the following (which are just as relevant today): 
[I]f the court decided that the negligence here could not be considered 
within § [9-10-91(2)], a gaping hole in Georgia’s long-arm statute would be 
left. Cases of negligent manufacture outside the state are numerous and will 
continue to grow in number with the increased tempo of interstate business 
being done by corporate enterprise. The purpose of the statute is to protect 
Georgia residents from the torts of foreign corporations suffered within this 
state. The beneficiaries of this act would be ill-protected if they were forced 
to go to distant places to sue for injuries committed within this state by 
negligently manufactured goods from outside. Georgia should not be a safe 
haven for the negligence of foreign corporations sending goods into the 
state. This court will not impute to the Georgia legislature, nor to the 
Georgia courts, a desire to leave Georgia citizens unprotected in such an 
important, and growing, area of litigation. 
Id. at 157. 
 150 19 F.3d 624 (11th Cir. 1994) (stating in dictum that general jurisdiction is available 
under Georgia’s long-arm statute). 
 151 Delong Equip. Co. v. Washington Mills Abrasive Co., 840 F.2d 843, 848-49 (11th 
Cir. 1988) (stating that subsections (2) and (3) have been “interpreted to the maximum 
limits of due process . . .” without mentioning Gust, decided eight months earlier, and 
instead applying the Shellenberger test, which it states applies to both subsections (2) and 
(3)); Barton S. Co. v. Manhole Barrier Sys., Inc., 318 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (N.D. Ga. 2004) 
(analyzing internet tort action under due process analysis because long-arm extends to 
limits of due process, but also finding lack of personal jurisdiction under due process); 
Horsley v. Feldt, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1374, 1377 (N.D. Ga. 2000) (citing Francosteel, and 
also stating that the Georgia Supreme Court after Gust reaffirmed due process limits 
policy of long-arm in Allstate v. Klein, 422 S.E.2d 863 (Ga. 1992), in holding that courts 
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Initially, some federal district courts followed the newly restrictive 
approach of the Georgia Supreme Court.153 However, after Francosteel, 
where the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed its view that the long-arm statute 
went to the limits of due process, most federal courts, while 
acknowledging Gust and the uncertainty of the extensiveness of the long-
arm statute in some cases, construed the long-arm to the limits of due 
process and went straight to a due process analysis154—despite the fact 
that Francosteel was a breach of contract action that cited only breach of 
contract cases from the Georgia courts in evaluating the due process 
limits of the long-arm statute. Because Francosteel did not limit its 
assertion, as prior cases had, to contract actions and subsection (1) of the 
long-arm statute, federal courts appear ro have overlooked this important 
qualification and simply applied Francosteel’s gloss to tort actions, 
                                                                                                             
“may pass over analysis of the statute and exercise jurisdiction where the constitutional 
requirements are satisfied.”); Peridyne Tech. Solutions, L.L.C. v. Matheson Fast Freight, 
Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d. 1366, 1369 (N.D. Ga. 2000) (“Although there has been some 
disagreement as to whether the Georgia long-arm statute extends to the maximum extent 
of due process for all claims, numerous district courts in the Eleventh Circuit have held in 
recent decisions that the Georgia long-arm statute confers personal Jurisdiction to the full 
extent permitted by the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution” and thus 
can go straight to due process analysis regarding all claims); Allegiant Physicians Servs., 
Inc. v. Sturdy Mem’l Hosp., 926 F. Supp. 1106, 1112-1113 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (recognizing 
controversy over whether long-arm extends to due process limits; although Eleventh 
Circuit in Francosteel continued to construe long-arm to due process limits, it was a 
contract action and did not specify whether it also applied to tort actions; however, in this 
case due process limits not met so no need to decide whether long-arm statute extends to 
due process limits for tort actions); Urspruch v. Greenblum, 968 F. Supp. 707 (S.D. Ga. 
1996) (although refers to subsection (3), no mention of Gust and states the long-arm is 
coextensive with due process, citing Francosteel and thus extending to tort actions 
Francosteel’s statement regarding the long-arm’s coextensiveness with due process 
limits); Howell v. Komori Am. Corp., 816 F. Supp. 1547, 1552 n.9 (N.D. Ga. 1993) 
(“Subsections two and three have the same analytical framework to determine whether 
jurisdiction is proper.” Thus the court simply determines whether either the act or injury 
occurred in Georgia and then applies due process analysis). 
 152 Weinstock v. Gannett, Inc., No. 1:00-CV-2935-ODE, 2001 WL 1147214 (N.D. 
Ga. June 20, 2001) (recognizing a distinction between subsections (2) and (3)—finding 
personal jurisdiction lacking in libel action due to defamation exception of subsection (2), 
and because defendant did not have contacts required by subsection (3)); James Whiten 
Livestock, Inc. v. W. Iowa Farms, Co., 750 F. Supp. 529, 532-534 (N.D. Ga. 1990) 
(Gust, together with Bradlee, established that subsections (2) and (3) are separate and to 
be construed literally; reasoning that Gust impliedly overruled Clarkson Power Flow’s 
holding that the same contacts of subsection (3) are mandated for subsection (2)); Cable 
News Network, Inc. v. Video Monitoring Servs. of Am., Inc., 723 F. Supp. 765, 769-70 
(N.D. Ga. 1989) (interpreting “the Gust opinion as renouncing the broad reading of 
subsection (2) in favor of a literal reading . . .” thus, holding that only subsection (3) 
applies in this case because defendant’s alleged act of copyright infringement occurred 
outside state). 
 153 See supra note 152. 
 154 See supra note 151. 
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ruling that the long-arm was coextensive with due process despite 
Gust.155 And, when the Georgia Supreme Court in a footnote in Allstate 
Insurance Co. v. Klein,156 restated that the policy of the long-arm statute 
is to obtain personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the limits 
of due process, federal courts zeroed in on that statement to limit the 
Gust ruling, initially for contract actions, but then also for tort actions.157 
In taking the Allstate court’s statement out of context, these federal 
courts have overlooked the fuller context of the ruling in Allstate, in 
which the Georgia Supreme Court held that the long-arm statute did not 
apply because Allstate was a resident foreign corporation and, thus, 
amenable to suit as any other resident of the state, making the footnote 
dicta.158  Relying on this dicta and the Francosteel case, which involved 
a contract claim, federal courts expanded the policy of due process limits 
to all the subsections (categories) of the Georgia long-arm statute. This 
expansion process by the Eleventh Circuit culminated in Nippon Credit 
Bank, Ltd. v. Matthews, which was the first case where the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction under Georgia’s long-arm statute was actually 
upheld under a general jurisdiction theory.159 
c. The Defamation Exclusion of Subsection (2) 
The defamation exclusion further highlights the trouble resulting 
from categorical long-arm statutes codifying and thus freezing in place 
what is thought to be the limits of due process at the time, and the 
resulting inconsistent application. It is out of date, based on a Fifth 
Circuit line of cases in the 1960s decided prior to the enactment of the 
long-arm, which held that First Amendment concerns required greater 
showing of contacts to satisfy due process in defamation cases against 
nonresidents.160 The rationale was that, because First Amendment 
concerns required a heightened burden of proof,161 then these same 
                                                                                                             
 155 See, e.g., Urspruch v. Greenblum, 968 F. Supp. 707 (S.D. Ga. 1996). 
 156 422 S.E.2d 863, 865 n.1 (Ga. 1992). 
 157 See, e.g., Horsley v. Feldt, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1374 (N.D. Ga. 2000). 
 158 Allstate, 422 S.E.2d at 865. 
 159 See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text. 
 160 “It would appear that subsection [(2)]’s exclusion of causes of action for 
defamation of character is based on a line of decisions rendered by the Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals.” Bradlee Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Cassells, 292 S.E.2d 717, 720 (Ga. 1982). 
One of the Fifth Circuit cases was New York Times Co. v. Connor, 365 F.2d 567, 572 
(5th Cir. 1966) (ruling that there were not sufficient contacts for an Alabama federal 
court to exercise personal jurisdiction over the New York Times, because “First 
Amendment considerations surrounding the law of libel require a greater showing of 
contact to satisfy the due process clause than is necessary in asserting jurisdiction over 
other types of tortious activity”). 
 161 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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concerns required a greater level of contacts under due process. 
However, this rationale was rejected by the United States Supreme Court 
in Calder v. Jones162 and Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.163 The Calder 
Court rejected “the suggestion that First Amendment concerns enter into 
jurisdictional analysis,” explaining that “[t]he infusion of such concerns 
would needlessly complicate an already imprecise inquiry,”164 and thus 
the Keeton Court “categorically [rejected] the suggestion that invisible 
radiations from the First Amendment may defeat jurisdiction otherwise 
proper under the Due Process Clause.”165 Thus, the conclusion appears 
inescapable that the defamation exclusion is an anachronism imposing a 
now-unnecessary limitation on Georgia’s long-arm statute. 
Eventually, the federal district court in the Northern District of 
Georgia completely disregarded the defamation exclusion, reasoning 
that, after Calder, the Georgia courts would uphold personal jurisdiction 
in defamation suits.166 The court held that “[t]he ‘effects’ test affirmed in 
Calder is alive and well and Defendants’ motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s 
claims in this case based upon personal jurisdiction are squarely 
controlled thereby.”167 One might legitimately ask if the federal court, in 
light of Erie, might have respected federalism as well as separation of 
powers by restraining itself to commending a re-examination of the 
defamation exception to the attention of the legislature, rather than 
effectively “amending” the statute by a judicial gloss that ignores the 
defamation exclusion.168 
Despite the “Erie-guess” by the federal district court that Georgia 
courts would disregard the defamation exclusion which makes 
unfounded assumptions that the Georgia appellate courts do not defer to 
the legislature, the Georgia Court of Appeals subsequently dismissed a 
defamation suit for lack of personal jurisdiction due to the defamation 
                                                                                                             
 162 465 U.S. 783 (1984). 
 163 465 U.S. 770 (1984). 
 164 Calder, 465 U.S. at 790. 
 165 Keeton, 465 U.S. at 780, n.12. 
 166 Horsley v. Feldt, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1374 (N.D. Ga. 2000) (upholding personal 
jurisdiction where anti-abortion activist sues for defamation due to statements defendants 
made on national television after plaintiff put crossed-out picture of murdered abortion 
doctor on his website), aff’d on other grounds, 304 F.3d 1125 (11th Cir. 2002). 
 167 Id. at 1379. 
 168 Further adding to the inconsistency, the following year, another district court judge 
held that a nonresident defendant was not amenable to personal jurisdiction under 
subsection (2) due to the defamation exception. See Weinstock v. Gannett, Inc., No. 1:00-
CV-2935-ODE, 2001 WL 1147214 (N.D. Ga. June 20, 2001) (recognizing, however, that 
personal jurisdiction could be obtained in a defamation suit under subsection (3), but 
holding that defendant did not have the contacts required by that subsection). 
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exclusion in Worthy v. Eller.169 The Court did not refer to Horsley, or 
even to Bradlee Management Services, Inc.’s acknowledgement of a 
limited exception to the defamation exclusion through subsection (3). In 
Worthy, though, the only contact was that the defamatory cause of action 
arose out of the defamatory act—there were not sufficient additional 
contacts that would allow application of subsection (3) to avoid the 
defamation exclusion of subsection (2).170 
The contradictory interpretations of the defamation exclusion 
further highlight the necessity of a fairer, more predictable long-arm 
statute to apply which does not lead to differing interpretations, such that 
a plaintiff’s right to relief turns on the court the plaintiff brings suit in.171 
4. Limitations of the Statute in Light of Internet Commerce 
As the personal jurisdiction jurisprudence of Internet commerce 
disputes evolves, courts must have a long-arm statute sufficiently flexible 
to adapt to the evolution so that its residents are not unfairly excluded 
from redressing grievances in their own state’s courts from injuries 
inflicted by nonresidents using this rapidly growing medium. Indeed, 
otherwise the ability to resolve the exploding number of cases arising 
from e-commerce will be hindered in ways reminiscent of the problems, 
before International Shoe, in obtaining personal jurisdiction over 
nonresident defendants engaged in interstate commerce172—without  
resorting to ad hoc legal fictions or a plethora of clumsy “exceptions” to 
find personal jurisdiction to allow in-state plaintiffs to enjoy a domestic 
forum. 
There are several differing interpretations of how to analyze 
personal jurisdiction in cases involving the Internet which are beyond the 
scope of this article.173 The purpose of discussing the effect of the 
                                                                                                             
 169 594 S.E.2d 699 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (defamation and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress action by husband against attorney representing wife in divorce 
action).. 
 170 Id. at 700-01. 
 171 The recent holding by the Georgia Supreme Court in Innovative Clinical & 
Consulting Services, L.L.C. v. First National Bank of Ames, 620 S.E.2d 352 (Ga. 2005), 
expanding subsection (1) to tort actions, will seemingly result in anomalous outcomes in 
exercising personal jurisdiction for defamation causes of action – if the defamatory act 
arises from the transaction of business, then personal jurisdiction will be available under 
subsection (1); but if the act does not arise from the transaction of business, then 
subsection (2) applies and its defamation exception will prevent the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction. No principled reason has been suggested for such a distinction. 
 172 See e.g., Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923); 
Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917). 
 173 See e.g., Denis T. Rice & Julia Gladstone, An Assessment of the Effects Test in 
Determining Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 58 BUS. LAW. 601 (2003); Nicholas R. 
Spampata, King Pennoyer Dethroned: A Policy-Analysis-Influenced Study of the Limits of 
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Internet on personal jurisdiction in this section is to highlight shortfalls 
of categorical long-arm statutes, such as Georgia’s, which restrict 
residents’ ability to redress injuries in their home state that arise in the 
milieu of the evolving commercial and other Internet activity of 
nonresidents. 
The recent expansion of subsection (1) by the Georgia Supreme 
Court,174 which rejected both the contract-only restriction and the 
requirement for physical contacts by the nonresident defendant with the 
state, has greatly increased the amenability of a nonresident to personal 
jurisdiction in causes of actions arising from the transaction of business 
over the Internet. Consequently, because the Court’s decision now allows 
for obtaining specific personal jurisdiction to the limits of due process, 
there is greater need for principled guidance to ensure this power is 
applied predictably and fairly—in other words, due to the expansion of 
subsection (1), the focus has changed 180 degrees from a lack of 
sufficient protection for residents harmed from the transaction of 
business over the Internet (due to the previous contract-only and physical 
contact requirement), to a concern now that courts and the bar have at 
their disposal a way to analyze and to justify the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction without reaching past the limits of due process. Additionally, 
considerations such as whether the business was transacted in the state 
(where the website is located on an out-of state server, for example) will 
test long-arm statute notions of what constitutes “transacting any 
business within the state.” 
Despite the expansion of subsection (1), residents are still not fully 
protected in their ability to obtain long-arm jurisdiction over nonresident 
defendants in cases arising in the context of internet activity. There are 
circumstances where the technicalities of business transactions are not 
involved that will necessarily require the employment of subsection (2), 
with all its corresponding limitations, to obtain personal jurisdiction.175 
The literal reading of subsection (2) by the Georgia state courts, which 
requires the tortious act to be committed within the state, severely limits 
the ability of injured residents to obtain personal jurisdiction over 
                                                                                                             
Pennoyer v. Neff in the Personal Jurisdictional Environment of the Internet, 85 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1742 (2000); Allan R. Stein, Symposium, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: 
Seeing Due Process Through the Lens of Regulatory Precision, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 411 
(2004); Note, A “Category-Specific” Legislative Approach to the Internet Personal 
Jurisdiction Problem in U.S. Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1617 (2004); Note, No Bad Puns: 
A Different Approach to the Problem of Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet, 116 
HARV. L. REV. 1821 (2003). 
 174 See supra notes 106-117 and accompanying text. 
 175 Because, as discussed previously, subsection (3) is now effectively superfluous, it 
is not necessary to discuss its limitations here. 
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nonresidents who commit “cybertorts.” Using the Georgia state courts’ 
literal reading, it is doubtful whether one located outside the state who 
hacks into a computer in the state and deletes or damages files, sends a 
virus, otherwise invades privacy, or commits a trespass to chattels 
involving a resident’s computer or server, would be amenable to personal 
jurisdiction in Georgia, since the tortious act arguably takes place on the 
tortfeasor’s computer outside the state. Additionally, the defamation 
exclusion is a further limitation: a plaintiff would have no recourse in 
Georgia courts under subsection (2) to a nonresident’s posting of 
defamatory material on a website that could be accessed in Georgia and 
thus cause effects in Georgia. Hence, it is evident even from a cursory 
review that the long-arm statute in its current iteration is likely not 
sufficient to ensure a resident’s ability to obtain personal jurisdiction for 
Internet-related torts where the transaction of business is not involved. 
Given their activist roles as glossators upon the long-arm statute, 
however, the federal courts in Georgia would seem unlikely to let 
express statutory language stand in the way of the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction, given their assertion that the long-arm statute reaches to the 
limits of due process. The question would become, however, as it does 
with all judicial activism, how far are the federal courts willing to go in 
their departure from the moorings of the legislated word? And it is this 
question that raises a serious problem of indeterminacy in predicting with 
any reasonable accuracy, the contours of internet-based personal 
jurisdiction in diversity cases where Georgia law would provide the long-
arm statute for the service of the federal court’s process and upon which 
the validity of the ultimate judgment under Full Faith and Credit 
principles would depend. 
The first internet-tort case in Georgia involving a nonresident 
defendant was litigated in a federal court, which upheld personal 
jurisdiction.176 In that case, the plaintiff, a computer consulting 
corporation, entered into a consulting agreement with the defendant 
trucking corporation, which was located in California.177 In providing the 
service, the corporations “repeatedly used their respective computer 
systems to interface and exchange information.”178 When the plaintiff 
demanded payment, the defendant corporation terminated the plaintiff’s 
                                                                                                             
 176 Peridyne Tech. Solutions, L.L.C. v. Matheson Fast Freight, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 
1366 (N.D. Ga. 2000). Plaintiff’s counsel stated in an interview that the “ruling mark[ed] 
the beginning of Internet case law in Georgia.” R. Robin McDonald, Internet Reach 
Allows Calif. Firm to be Sued Here, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REPORTER., Oct. 19, 2000, at 
1. 
 177 Peridyne Technology, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 1368. 
 178 Id. at 1369. 
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services, and an employee of the defendant corporation allegedly hacked 
into the plaintiff’s computer system, inflicting damage on the plaintiff’s 
server and, inter alia, stealing and deleting files.179 The plaintiff brought 
several state law claims and federal computer fraud claims against the 
corporation and employee. Defendants, predictably, challenged whether 
the district court could exercise personal jurisdiction over them by means 
of service effectuated pursuant to the Georgia long-arm statute.180 The 
court went straight to a due process analysis, stating that the Georgia 
long-arm statute had been construed to reach the limits of due process.181 
The court first noted “that the defendants should not be permitted to take 
advantage of modern technology via the Internet or other electronic 
means to escape traditional notions of jurisdiction.”182 In upholding 
personal jurisdiction, the court emphasized the location of the servers in 
Georgia as a key factor to a characterization of the tortious activity as 
having “occurred” in Georgia, and, based on that characterization, ruled 
consequently that the “plaintiff’s claims arise out of or relate to the 
defendants’ activities, albeit largely electronic, directed at Georgia.”183 
A federal court holding that would seemingly allow for personal 
jurisdiction in internet-related “defamation” actions was given in Horsley 
v. Feldt.184 That case, as previously discussed,185 allowed personal 
jurisdiction in a defamation action involving defamatory remarks on 
television.186 The Horsley court, however, also approvingly cited a 
Virginia federal district court’s finding of personal jurisdiction over a 
nonresident who posted defamatory remarks on a website which caused 
reputational harm to the Virginia plaintiff in Virginia where he lived and 
worked.187 Therefore, it seems likely that the Georgia federal courts 
would do the same, despite the defamation exclusion of subsection (2).188 
                                                                                                             
 179 Id. 
 180 Id. 
 181 Id. 
 182 Id. at 1371 (citing Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell. Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 419 (9th Cir. 
1997) (internal quotations omitted). 
 183 Id. at 1372. The Georgia state courts would likely now also uphold personal 
jurisdiction under subsection (1), since the claims arose out of the employer’s transaction 
of business in the state with the plaintiff. 
 184 128 F. Supp. 2d 1374 (N.D. Ga. 2000). 
 185 Id. See also  supra notes 166-68 and accompanying text. 
 186 This outcome should now be the same in Georgia’s state courts, since the claim 
arose from the transaction of business, thus allowing the newly expanded subsection (1) 
to be employed. 
 187 Horsley, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1374 (N.D. Ga. 2000) (citing Bochan v. La Fontaine, 68 
F. Supp. 2d 692, 702 (E.D. Va. 1999)). 
 188 The Virginia case did not involve the transaction of business, so in Georgia such a 
case would require application of subsection (2). Georgia’s state courts would then have 
to apply the defamation exception and dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. 
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Yet, just because the federal courts have ruled first on these 
internet-based personal jurisdiction issues does not, of course, bind the 
Georgia courts. Indeed, under Erie principles, Georgia courts—as they 
have done in the past in other long-arm jurisdiction issues—may decide 
that the legislated language of the long-arm statute affords a narrower 
scope of extraterritorial jurisdiction in internet-based cases. Likewise, the 
rulings of individual district court judges do not actually bind the district 
court to follow these interpretations of the long-arm statute in future 
cases, no matter how advisable it may be for the district court to do so. 
And until the Eleventh Circuit weighs in on the scope of internet-based 
personal jurisdiction under Georgia law, there may well be considerable 
indeterminacy in the scope of extraterritorial personal jurisdiction 
countenanced by federal courts in internet-based cases. Thus, even under 
the best of circumstances, leaving the development of internet-based 
personal jurisdiction law to ad hoc, case-by-case glosses or on 
“applications” of a telephone-and-mimeograph-era categorical long-arm 
statute invites a level of indeterminate and expensive, contour-setting 
litigation that militates strongly for a complete reconceptualization of the 
long-arm statute by the Georgia legislature. That reconceptualization 
should start with a firm rejection of a “patchwork” regime that is 
incompatible with the rapidly evolving Internet world. After the recent 
holding by the Georgia Supreme Court, the Legislature should take the 
opportunity to exchange the old “patched-up” statute for one that 
provides due-process-limits protection to residents while providing 
guidance for principled, fair and predictable outcomes rooted in the 
fundamental rules established in International Shoe. 
In the next two sections, the authors walk through the 
reconceptualization and legislation that they believe are needed to 
resolve the inconsistencies and indeterminacy they have exposed in 
Section II. A proposed long-arm statute that would do much to minimize 
inconsistencies and eliminate indeterminacy is discussed in Section IV. 
The visual reconceptualization of long-arm jurisdiction from which the 
model long-arm is derived is explored in Section III. 
III. VISUAL RECONCEPTUALIZATION 
Thus far, we have explained the operation of typical long-arm 
statutes at the rule-based level. Looking at specific cases decided under 
our chosen long-arm statute examples (i.e., Georgia’s), we have 
established the unnecessary deficiencies of the old-style categorical long-
arm statutes. The authors’ evaluations have been made from the 
assumption that the statutes would operate better—more efficiently and 
fairly—if they reached to the limits of due process. Before proceeding 
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further to deal with the practical implications of our claim, the authors 
believe it is appropriate to establish more than the proposition that a due-
process-limits approach to long-arm statutes will produce “better 
outcomes,” for better-outcomes rationales offer only an instrumentalist 
perspective. As one of the authors has argued elsewhere, 
“instrumentalism is insufficient to meet our long-term jurisprudential 
needs.”189 Thus, the authors also believe it is necessary to establish that 
due-process-limits personal jurisdiction is supported at a higher level of 
principle—the important concepts that underlie every legitimate legal 
rule. The due-process-based long-arm jurisprudence of International 
Shoe is strongly supported by the relevant underlying principles, as we 
demonstrate below.190 
The analytic framework for discerning the foundation of juridical 
jurisdiction, commonly called “personal jurisdiction,” is focused on a 
single word encapsulating manifold and interlaced concepts, issues, and 
policies: power.191 The power in question is that “of a state to apply its 
                                                                                                             
 189 Jeffrey A. Van Detta, The Irony Of Instrumentalism: Using Dworkin’s Principle-
Rule Distinction To Reconceptualize Metaphorically A Substance-Procedure Dissonance 
Exemplified By Forum Non Conveniens Dismissals In International Product Injury 
Cases, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 425, 427-428 (2004) [hereinafter Van Detta, The Irony of 
Instrumentalism]. 
 190 Van Detta, The Irony of Instrumentalism, supra note 189; Jeffrey A. Van Detta, 
Justice Restored: Using a Preservation-of-Court-Access Approach to Replace Forum 
Non Conveniens in Five International Product-Injury Case Studies, 24 NW. J. INT’L. L. & 
BUS. 53 (2003) [hereinafter Van Detta, Justice Restored]. 
 191 John B. Oakley, The Pitfalls of “Hint and Run” History: A Critique of Professor 
Borchers’s “Limited View” of Pennoyer v. Neff, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 591 (1995); 
TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 6, at 164. The origins of modern personal jurisdiction 
doctrine are rooted in “the concept that governments had territorial power over persons 
and things within their boundaries.”  TEPLEY & WHITTEN, supra note 6, at 125. This is 
reflected in the most famous personal jurisdiction opinion of them all, Pennoyer v. Neff. 
95 U.S. 714 (1878). See Adrian M. Tocklin, Pennoyer v. Neff: The Hidden Agenda of 
Stephen J. Field, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 75 (1997). In Pennoyer, Justice Field made it 
clear that his “territorial rule” is based on the enterprise regulation principle: 
 To prevent any misapplication of the views expressed in this opinion, it 
is proper to observe that we do not mean to assert, by anything we have 
said, that a State may not authorize proceedings to determine the Status of 
one of its citizens towards a non-resident . . . . The jurisdiction which every 
State possesses to determine the civil status and capacities of all its 
inhabitants involves authority to prescribe the conditions on which 
proceedings affecting them may be commenced and carried on . . . .  
 . . . Nor do we doubt that a State, on creating corporations or other 
institutions for pecuniary or charitable purposes, may provide a mode in 
which their conduct may be investigated, their obligations enforced, or their 
charters revoked . . . . 
Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 734-35. The American model of personal jurisdiction that arose 
with Pennoyer has come under attack from numerous scholars, particularly on the 
constitutionalization of personal jurisdiction doctrine. It is true that the doctrine is less 
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local law.”192 The classic expression of state power is the minimum 
contacts rules articulated in International Shoe v. Washington.193 Those 
rules are based on the internal structure of the litigation — they describe 
a fixed number of scenarios based on an internal structure composed of 
facts about the defendant, the litigation, and the forum.194 The 
relationship among this triumvirate of variables can conveniently be 
called a litigation event,195 and the litigation event is created by the 
common intersection at their domains, as illustrated on the following 
page by Diagram 1. 
                                                                                                             
than perfect, and that the Supreme Court’s struggle to articulate workable common-law 
jurisdictional rules has left analytic holes and excessive judicial intervention due to the 
heavily factual nature of the multi-factored legal tests that courts employ. However, 
efforts to separate personal jurisdiction from the regulatory powers of the state, as much 
of the scholarship in this area of late has been devoted to attempting, is misplaced. For 
example, some commentators see Pennoyer’s influence differently—as undermining 
rather than strengthening personal jurisdiction law by placing the defendant’s in forum 
physical presence in a posture of primacy. Harold L. Korn, Rethinking Personal 
Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Multistate Mass Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2183, 2190-
92 (1997). In terms of defendants located outside of the forum, this is certainly true, but 
that observation is insufficient to undermine the territorial personal jurisdiction. To the 
contrary, the territorial principle still has validity for if it is not the defendant’s contacts 
that justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction, then it may be the plaintiff’s contacts—
i.e., residence in and injury in the state—that give rise to the kinds of regulatory interests 
that justify application of jurisdiction and substantive law. Van Detta, The Irony of 
Instrumentalism, supra note 187, at 472 n.125. Pennoyer and the sovereignty model of 
personal jurisdiction continue to be the theoretical underpinnings that justify the core of 
most assertions of jurisdiction by state courts. See Stewart Jay, “Minimum Contacts” as a 
Unified Theory of Personal Jurisdiction: A Reappraisal, 59 N.C. L. REV. 429, 434, 473 
(1981) (International Shoe is neither an exception to nor an overruling of Pennoyer, but 
is “representative of a different basis for approaching jurisdiction”); Arthur M. Weisburd, 
Territorial Authority and Personal Jurisdiction, 63 WASH. U. L.Q. 377 (1985) (arguing 
that, because assertions of jurisdiction are exercises of sovereignty, limits on judicial 
power must be derived from limits on the sovereignty of the states). But see Harold S. 
Lewis, Jr., The Three Deaths of “State Sovereignty” and the Curse of Abstraction in the 
Jurisprudence of Personal Jurisdiction, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 735-36 (1983) 
(criticizing the role of sovereignty and state interests in personal jurisdiction doctrine). 
 192 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 24 (1971). 
 193 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 194 Id. at 317-18. 
 195 For a complete discussion of the nature and significance of the concept of 
“litigation event,” see Van Detta, The Irony of Instrumentalism, supra note 189, at 441-
47. 
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DIAGRAM 1 
Constitutional Limits on Personal Jurisdiction: The Domain of Minimum 
Contacts196 
 
                                                                                                             
 196 See  Int’l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317–18 (1945); Patricia Youngblood, 
Constitutional Constraints on Choice of Law: The Nexus Between World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson and Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 50 ALB. L. REV. 1, 3-11 
(1985). 
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X
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The intersection of the three fact domains in a common domain of 
overlapping operative facts produces a subset of minimum contact facts 
that create a litigation event and have significance for the operation of 
juridical jurisdiction rules. As Professor Youngblood pointed out in 
1985, International Shoe “identified two jurisdictional variables of 
primary relevance” that function as the basis for the minimum contacts 
rules: [1] “the quantity or frequency of the defendant’s forum acts” 
which “distinguishes continuous and systematic forum contacts from 
single or occasional forum contacts”; and [2] “the relationship these acts 
bear to the cause of action upon which the plaintiff sues.”197 
There are four possible combinations for describing the litigation 
event using these variables, as Professor Youngblood illustrated using 
the graphic metaphor of the Cartesian coordinate plane represented in 
Diagram 2.198 Diagram 3 illustrates that each of the four quadrants of 
Professor Youngblood’s Cartesian metaphor is an archetypical litigation 
event to which one of the four general rules articulated in the 
International Shoe opinion directly corresponds. 
                                                                                                             
 197 Youngblood, supra note 196, at 5. 
 198 Id. at 6. 
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DIAGRAM 2 
 Cartesian Metaphor for Personal Jurisdiction Rules199 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 199 Youngblood, supra note 196, at 6. 
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DIAGRAM 3 
Detailed Cartesian Metaphor for Personal Jurisdiction: Correlation with 
International Shoe200 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 200 Correlation legend between quadrants and rules as stated in International Shoe Co. 
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
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         Professor Youngblood notes that litigation events in Quadrants I or 
IV “compel[] a particular conclusion” about whether the litigation event 
falls within the rules of juridical jurisdiction.201 By contrast, she observes 
that litigation events within Quadrant II or III sit in gray areas of the 
rules: 
[T]here exists one supporting and one debilitating jurisdictional 
factor. In Quadrant II cases, involving single or occasional acts 
and a cause of action connected to those acts, the propriety of the 
jurisdictional exercise will depend upon the quality of the 
defendant’s forum acts. In Quadrant III, the constitutional 
propriety of a jurisdictional exercise . . . depends upon the 
quantity of the defendant’s forum [connections].202 
 
Significantly, the forum court may assert jurisdiction where a corporate 
defendant is incorporated in the forum, makes its headquarters in the 
forum, or “does”—rather than merely “transacts”—“business” in the 
forum.203 Professor Youngblood’s graphic depiction of the litigation 
                                                                                                             
 201 Youngblood, supra note 196, at 7. 
 202 Id. at 7-8 (citations omitted). 
 203 International Shoe instructs us that a Quadrant III analysis becomes transformed 
into a conclusion of general jurisdiction when corporate activities become “so substantial 
and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings 
entirely distinct from those activities.” 326 U.S. at 318. General jurisdiction exists when 
the forum state has “a regulatory relationship with the defendant sufficient to justify 
jurisdiction over any and all claims.” Mary Twitchell, Why We Keep Doing Business 
With Doing Business Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 171, 171-72, 205 (2001). 
Professor Twitchell notes that “doing business” jurisdiction is a form of general personal 
jurisdiction that applies when “the state would be justified in deciding a claim that is 
wholly unrelated to the defendant’s forum contacts.” Id. at 172. General jurisdiction 
clearly applies to the forum states in which a corporate defendant is either incorporated or 
has its principal place of business. Id. at 171-72.  
  Professor Sarah Cebik has tied general jurisdiction over corporate defendants to 
sovereign interests in regulating the conduct of a corporation which it incorporated, 
which develops corporate policy within the forum (i.e., headquarters or autonomous 
branch office functions), or which conducts “core activities” in the forum. Sarah R. 
Cebik, A Riddle Wrapped in a Mystery Inside an Enigma: General Personal Jurisdiction 
and Notions of Sovereignty, 1998 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 1, 33, 36, 40 (1998). This is another 
way of saying that general jurisdiction based upon any of the three factual bundles 
present in a litigation event is most persuasively supported by the enterprise regulation 
principle. Van Detta, The Irony of Instrumentalism, supra note 189, at 477 n.135. As 
Professor Cebik describes it, “an ‘interest’ in the defendant [sufficient for general 
jurisdiction] is legitimate if the state would have a reason to be concerned about the rights 
and duties of the defendant under any circumstances.” Cebik, supra, at 33. 
  For other views of the scope and application of the general jurisdiction rule, see, 
for example, Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. 
REV. 723 (1988); Friedrick K. Juenger, The American Law of General Jurisdiction, 2001 
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 141 (2001); Allan R. Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate 
Federalism in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEX. L. REV. 689, 722, 741, 758 
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event as rules of juridical jurisdiction is firmly rooted at the level of 
principle.204 Indeed, each of the rules depicted by the four Quadrants 
directly corresponds to the interaction of the corrective justice and 
enterprise regulation principles.205 The principles apply to the basic 
                                                                                                             
(1987) (finding close connection between “doing business” general jurisdiction and the 
most significant interest test for applying forum law). 
 204 Burnham v. Superior Court implicitly recognized the significance of the enterprise 
regulation principle for the rules of juridical jurisdiction: 
[A] “totality of the circumstances” test [] guarantee[s] what traditional 
territorial rules of jurisdiction were designed precisely to avoid: uncertainty 
and litigation over the preliminary issue of the forum’s competence. It may 
be that those evils, necessarily accompanying a freestanding 
“reasonableness” inquiry, must be accepted at the margins, when we 
evaluate nontraditional forms of jurisdiction newly adopted by the States. 
But that is no reason for injecting them into the core of our American 
practice, exposing to such a “reasonableness” inquiry the ground of 
jurisdiction that has hitherto been considered the very baseline of 
reasonableness, physical presence. 
495 U.S. 604, 626-27 (1990) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The physical presence 
of the defendant in a forum that forms “the very baseline of reasonableness” (to use 
language of personal jurisdiction) explains the power of the finding that a defendant is 
subject to the personal jurisdiction of the forum. Id. at 627. Assignment of a “litigation 
event” to the rule of Quadrants I, II, or III and satisfaction of that rule is more than a 
conclusion that a court is empowered to hear a particular dispute. It is also a finding that 
the state’s substantive law may regulate the actions of the parties. The stronger the case 
for personal jurisdiction, the stronger the case for applying the forum state’s law. James 
Martin, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 78 MICH. L. REV. 872; Courtland H. 
Peterson, Proposals of Marriage Between Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 14 U.C. 
DAVIS. L. REV. 869 (1981); Youngblood, supra note 196, at 50-51. Indeed, as Professor 
Youngblood has observed, there are a “myriad of values . . . linking judicial and 
legislative jurisdiction.” Youngblood, supra note 196, at 38. As Professor Korn has 
observed, “[i]n the United States, . . . the permissible extrastate reach of each state’s law 
is circumscribed by federal constitutional limitations—analogous to those governing the 
reach of its judicial jurisdiction—commonly referred to as constraints on each state’s 
‘legislative jurisdiction.’” Harold L. Korn, Rethinking Personal Jurisdiction and Choice 
of Law in Multistate Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2183, 2196 (1997). Professor Stein has 
defined legislative jurisdiction as “[t]he sphere of a state’s substantive rule making 
authority, its ‘legislative jurisdiction,’” and notes that legislative jurisdiction “is tied to its 
interest in regulating activity within its borders.”  Stein, supra note 201, at 742. 
 205 In this sense, personal jurisdiction doctrine leads cleanly to an underlying 
observation that connects personal jurisdiction to regulatory power via the due process 
clause. Indeed, “a forum’s assertion of jurisdiction constitute[s] the imposition of its 
sovereign’s regulatory machinery.” See, e.g., Harold G. Maier & Thomas R. McCoy, A 
Unifying Theory for Judicial Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 249, 
273-76 (1991); Philip F. Cramer, Note, Constructing Alternative Avenues of 
Jurisdictional Protection: Bypassing Burnham’s Roadblock Via § 1404(A), 53 VAND. L. 
REV. 311, 325-26 (2000) (discussing “a unified theory of jurisdiction based on the idea of 
jurisdiction as not place but rather the imposition of a regulatory regime”); see also Harry 
B. Cummins, Comment, In Personam Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Manufacturers in 
Product Liability Actions, 63 MICH. L. REV. 1028 (1963); Allan R. Stein, Styles of 
Argument and Interstate Federalism In the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEX. L. REV. 
689 (1987); Arthur M. Weisburd, Territorial Authority and Personal Jurisdiction, 63 
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human areas of endeavor that produce the three broad categories of civil 
law subjects out of which a plethora of most modern non-criminal law 
grow: torts, contracts, and property law. Moreover, these principles are 
sufficiently generous in scope to take within them both individual, as 
well as corporate and other business associational, activities that 
typically give rise to issues and claims classifiable under long-recognized 
divisions of tort law, contract law, property law, or combinations of 
them. By far, however, the greatest significance of both long-arm statutes 
as well as these principles lies in their application to claims that are 
rooted in business activity – particularly the commerce of the most 
prevalent business associations of them all, the corporation, in its 
dealings with business entities, groups, individuals, and the public 
generally. 
Corrective justice is the “principle that requires compensating 
individuals for injury caused to their persons and property when 
corporations engage in commercial activity that creates a nonreciprocal 
risk to those individuals.”206 Enterprise regulation is the “principle that 
sovereigns should regulate conduct of corporations that they either create 
or assist by fostering a business environment in which corporations may 
operate.”207 These two principles are related in that “[t]he enterprise 
                                                                                                             
WASH. U. L.Q. 377 (1985) (arguing that, because assertions of jurisdiction are exercises 
of sovereignty, limits on judicial power must be derived from limits on the sovereignty of 
the states). This “unified standard for both general and specific jurisdiction not only 
recognizes that imposition of the appropriate regulatory regime should be the real issue, 
but it also acknowledges the merging of choice of jurisdiction with choice of law.” 
Cramer, 53 VAND. L. REV. at 333. Included in this “machinery” is the substantive law 
(including choice of law rules) that implement the state’s legislative policies—the very 
fabric that controls the conduct of the state’s individual and corporate citizens. Professor 
Heiser has effectively summarized this relationship as the natural implication of the 
multi-branch system of government in the American model: 
[T]he assertion of personal jurisdiction is not merely the assertion of the 
right to decide a case between the parties at a given geographical location. 
Rather, as Maier and McCoy explain, the selection of the forum is the 
selection of an “entire decision-making regime.” Constitutional controls on 
personal jurisdiction, Maier and McCoy astutely observe, “determine the 
legitimacy of the forum as a decision maker and thus the legitimacy of 
imposing that forum’s policy choices” on the parties. What is at stake in the 
constitutional restriction on personal jurisdiction is whether it is unfair for 
the forum to select and apply the legal policies that will govern the 
relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant as to the cause of action. 
Convenience in terms of geographic location is not much of a concern, and 
will be increasingly less so as technology makes interstate litigation even 
easier than it already is. 
Walter W. Heiser, A “Minimum Interest” Approach to Personal Jurisdiction, 35 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 915, 935-37 (2000) (footnotes omitted). 
 206 Van Detta, The Irony of Instrumentalism, supra note 189, at 442. 
 207 Id. at 442–43. 
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regulation principle makes it legitimate for a sovereign to act to affect the 
corrective justice principle.”208 While their interaction implicates both 
substantive and procedural rules,209 of interest to us is how this 
interaction corresponds to the procedural rules of personal jurisdiction—
namely, that a court may exercise jurisdiction over a defendant only if 
the forum sovereign has a legitimate interest in regulating the 
defendant’s conduct. 
The correspondence between the four Quadrants and the interaction 
of the corrective justice and enterprise regulation principle is effectively 
illustrated in Diagram 4. In Quadrant I, each litigation event falls within 
the domains of both the corrective justice and enterprise regulation 
principles. In contrast, Quadrant IV comprises those litigation events 
within the domain of the corrective justice principle, but outside of the 
enterprise regulation principle—in other words, the plaintiff has suffered 
a wrong, but the forum in question cannot adjudicate or remedy the 
wrong. Significantly, the two “gray area” litigation events described by 
Quadrant II and III sit on the limbs of intersection between the domain of 
the corrective justice and the enterprise regulation principles. As limb-
dwellers, those litigation events in Quadrant II or III may fall either 
inside the common domain of the two principles210—or outside of the 
                                                                                                             
 208 Id. at 443. 
 209 Id. at 441. 
 210 The personal jurisdiction rules of International Shoe already imbed a shorthand 
forum non conveniens analysis—not as elaborate as the Gilbert factors but directed at the 
same kind of facts. See Jacquelyn Duval-Major, One-Way Ticket Home: The Federal 
Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens and the International Plaintiff, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 
650, 664-65 & nn.105-20 (1992); Allan R. Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the 
Redundancy of Court-Access Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 781, 803-05 & nn.88-92 
(1985); Margaret G. Stewart, Forum Non Conveniens: A Doctrine in Search of a Role, 74 
CAL. L. REV. 1259, 1266 & nn.23-117 (1986). As to Quadrant III cases where 
corporations are sued in a home state, however, Chief Justice Stone clearly assumed that 
no FNC-type analysis would apply when a corporation was sued where it resides. An 
“‘estimate of the inconveniences’ which would result to the corporation from a trial away 
from its ‘home’ or principal place of business is relevant” to determine whether the 
demand the court makes based on the defendant’s contacts with the forum “make it 
reasonable . . . to require the corporation to defend the particular suit” in the forum. Int’l 
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945). Indeed, it is quite plausible that the 
convenience factors were not meant to come into play when minimum contacts are 
established in Quadrants II and III. To the contrary, the convenience factors do not 
“short-circuit” the exercise of personal jurisdiction in cases where there are minimum 
contacts. The convenience factors merely function as a means of articulating why a 
Quadrant II or III case that does not present sufficient forum contacts not be dismissed 
because such cases fall outside of the domain illustrated in Diagram 1. So complete is the 
analysis under the convenience branch that Professor Heiser observes that sufficient 
minimum contacts for sovereignty purposes generally guarantee that there will be no 
“manifest and grave” inconvenience, and that the convenience branch analysis effectively 
renders the FNC analysis moot: 
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common domain and solely within the corrective justice principle’s 
domain. 
                                                                                                             
In light of the current level of communication and litigation technology, 
such due process violations should rarely occur. Inconvenience to the 
defendant should only be sufficient to defeat personal jurisdiction on an 
individualized basis, but does not provide justification for broad invalidating 
rules such as “minimum contacts.” 
Heiser, supra note 205, at 935-36. 
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DIAGRAM 4 
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IV. MODEL LONG-ARM STATUTE 
A. Option For Reform: Why a Due-Process-Limits Long-Arm Statute 
Guided by Predicted-Outcome Rules of  International Shoe is the Better 
Choice 
It is evident from the reconceptualization in Section III that at the 
level of principled theory, long-arm jurisdiction practiced within the 
parameters of International Shoe serves critical state interests. The 
state’s interests in providing a forum to protect its citizens from harm, or 
to at least secure compensation for their injuries and to regulate business 
activity affecting their citizens, have their theoretical underpinnings in 
the corrective justice and enterprise regulation principles. As we have 
demonstrated, the International Shoe approach to long-arm jurisdiction is 
an elegant and congruent expression of those principles through positive 
law. Therefore, rather than continuing to build long-arm statutes on 
outdated proto-models211 (such as the classic Illinois, New York, and 
Georgia long-arm statutes), or to open long-arm jurisdiction to the limits 
of due process without specific statutory guidance as to what those limits 
are (forcing litigants to divine limits from Delphic appeals courts 
pronouncements on an ad hoc basis), the authors advance a different 
                                                                                                             
 211 Some commentators argue for a return to categorical-based long-arms. Professor 
McFarland concludes that the better policy choice is for states to adopt categorical long-
arm statutes. McFarland, supra note 3, at 536-37.  However, as we showed in Section II, 
supra, the states desire to exercise personal jurisdiction to the limits of due process. 
Therefore, it does not make sense to limit long-arm statutes to specifically enumerated 
categories which will inevitably cause unfair results for a resident plaintiff as the 
categorical approach fails to keep up with new circumstances and rapidly evolving 
Internet-based technologies. Nor do we concur that the only other available option is to 
“adopt the worst of both worlds by adding a catch-all, no-limits clause to an enumerated-
acts long-arm statute.” Id. at 537. A state should, instead, have a due-process-limits long-
arm statute with principled-based guidance for its application. 
  Other scholars have proposed recently not merely a return to categorical long-arm 
statutes, but would seek to federalize this approach to establish uniformity. Accordingly, 
these writers propose using a draft Hague treaty as the model for a federal statute which 
all states would be required by Congress to adopt. KEVIN M. CLERMONT & KUO-CHANG 
HUANG, Converting the Draft Hague Treaty into Domestic Jurisdictional Law, in A 
GLOBAL LAW OF JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS: LESSONS FROM THE HAGUE 191 (John J. 
Barcelo III & Kevin M. Clermont eds., Kluwer Law International 2005). In addition to 
the reasons already discussed for not perpetuating categorical long-arm statutes, this 
proposal has additional drawbacks when examined through the lens of federalism. Not 
only would the states be giving up control over a traditionally state procedural matter to 
the federal government, but they would be doing so based on a treaty involving 
compromises with and among other nations. In essence, foreign preferences in 
international personal jurisdiction would end up dictating purely interstate personal 
jurisdiction matters (where there is no foreign-citizen defendant involved). It is doubtful 
that states would be agreeable to such a loss of sovereignty, nor that it would address the 
enterprise regulation and corrective justice needs examined above. 
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approach. That approach is to create a long-arm statute that in its terms 
embodies the relevant limits, considerations, and factors that define the 
limits of due process, as distilled from the jumble of decided cases. 
Here, for example is how such a twenty-first century statute might 
be drafted in Georgia: 
Title 9, Chapter 10, of the Georgia Civil Practice Act, as 
codified, shall be amended to add a new section to be numbered 
“9-10-100.” The text of 9-10-100 follows: 
9-10-100 [1]: It shall be the policy of the State of Georgia that 
jurisdiction under this section shall be exercised to the limits 
provided under due process as delineated by the decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court.212 
9-10-100 [2]: Definitions: 
A. Prejudice shall mean that the defendant cannot enjoy the 
opportunity to present a defense that satisfies the minimum 
standards of due process of law in the U.S. Constitution. To 
demonstrate prejudice, a defendant must by a preponderance of 
the evidence establish that it would be a manifest miscarriage of 
justice for trial to be held in the plaintiff’s chosen forum. In order 
to establish such a manifest miscarriage, defendant must show 
that: 
1. It would be deprived of access to evidence 
necessary to preserve a substantial right; or 
2. The cost of the litigation in the forum is so 
disproportionate to the defendant’s financial and 
physical resources that defendant would be deprived 
of the opportunity to be heard; or 
                                                                                                             
 212 Of course, some state constitutions may have been construed to provide greater 
due-process protections than those afforded under the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions 
defining the contours of federal due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
If that is the case in a particular state, the legislature would need to take two additional 
steps. First, evaluate case law to determine whether state due process rights have been 
invoked to protect nonresident defendants from overreaching exercise of personal 
jurisdiction by that state’s courts. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Van Detta, Comment, Compelling 
State Interest Jurisprudence of the Burger Court: A New Perspective on Roe v. Wade, 50 
ALB. L. REV. 675 (1986) (discussing state constitutions as independent sources of 
government protection of individual rights, and the potential for greater protection 
sometimes afforded in state constitutions). Second, if state due process is found to figure 
into the jurisdictional equation, then a legislature would need to decide how to craft this 
section to address the level of due process, or similar, state constitutional protection 
afforded to nonresidents who find themselves defending a case in the courts of that state. 
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3. The forum state has no legitimate, regulatory 
interest in the defendant’s conduct that might be 
advanced by adjudication in the forum; or 
4. It would violate the defendant’s rights under an 
international treaty ratified by the United States or to 
which the United States is a signatory. 
In determining prejudice to the defendant of a trial in the forum, 
the fact there may be other fora in which the action may be filed 
shall be accorded no consideration. 
B. Minimum contacts shall mean the operative facts that describe 
a relationship between the defendant and the forum. These 
operative facts are those that define “the litigation event,” which 
includes all of the facts out of which the relationship between the 
defendant, the forum, and the cause of action arose. 
C. Defendant shall mean a non-resident natural person or 
juridical entity who is not a citizen or resident of the State of 
Georgia at the time a lawsuit is commenced in a state or federal 
court in Georgia. 
D. Cause of action shall mean any set of facts admissible in 
evidence that creates a claim for relief under applicable law. 
E. Arising out of, when used in reference to a cause of action in 
this section, shall refer to the circumstances in which a 
defendant’s minimum contacts form the common set of operative 
facts, the litigation event, that also give rise to the plaintiff’s 
cause of action. 
F. Every use of the masculine pronoun shall include the feminine 
pronoun. 
9-10-100 [3] Exercise of Personal Jurisdiction by the Courts of 
this State Over Defendants Neither Resident In Nor Served 
Within the State 
A. General Rule of Court Access  
In all civil cases, a court of the State of Georgia — 
(i) may exercise personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant consistent with the sovereignty 
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requirements of the U.S. Constitution as expressed in 
Section 3.B, infra; and 
(ii) shall not dismiss a case under this section unless 
the defendant makes one of the showings specified in 
Section 3.C, infra. 
B. Minimum Contacts and Limits of State Sovereignty Over 
Defendants 
1. In all cases in which it is shown a defendant has 
systematic and continuous minimum contacts with the 
forum and the plaintiff is suing on one or more causes 
of action arising out of those contacts, it is 
conclusively presumed that the courts of the state 
have personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 
2. In all cases in which it is shown that a defendant 
has only single or occasional minimum contacts with 
the forum and the plaintiff is suing on one or more 
causes of action arising out of those contacts, a 
presumption arises that defendant is subject to 
personal jurisdiction in the courts of the state. The 
defendant may rebut that presumption through 
admissible evidence that clearly and convincingly 
dispels this presumption to the satisfaction of the 
forum court. 
3. In all cases in which it is shown that a defendant 
has continuous and systematic minimum contacts 
with the forum state, and plaintiff’s cause of action 
does not arise out of those contacts, the inquiry shall 
be whether the defendant’s activities physically 
within a state, or directed to persons within the state 
by electronic communications, are so substantial and 
of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes 
of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from 
those activities. Personal jurisdiction shall be found 
when the plaintiff— 
i. establishes that defendant is either incorporated in 
the forum or maintains a principal residence, a 
functional headquarters, or a branch office in the 
forum; or 
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ii. establishes that the defendant’s contacts with the 
forum demonstrate that defendant has engaged in such 
a continuous and systematic course of “doing 
business” in the forum as to support the conclusion 
that it is virtually present in the forum; or 
iii. establishes that one of his causes of action are 
related to the defendant’s forum contacts and 
defendant would not be prejudiced by maintenance of 
the entire suit within the forum. 
4. In all cases in which it is shown that a defendant 
has only single or occasional minimum contacts with 
the forum and the plaintiff’s cause of action does not 
arise out of those facts, the absence of personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant is established as a 
matter of law. 
5. The showings described in this section shall be 
made by a preponderance of admissible evidence, 
except as specifically stated otherwise. 
C. Grounds for Dismissal Upon Defendant’s Showing of 
Prejudice 
1. In all cases in which a defendant has systematic and 
continuous minimum contacts with the forum and the 
plaintiff is suing on one or more causes of action 
arising out of those contacts, it is conclusively 
presumed that defendant cannot establish prejudice 
and that personal jurisdiction may properly be 
exercised. 
2. In all cases in which a defendant has only single or 
occasional minimum contacts with the forum and the 
plaintiff is suing on one or more causes of action 
arising out of those contacts, a presumption arises that 
defendant is not prejudiced by the maintenance of 
action in the forum and that personal jurisdiction may 
properly be exercised. The defendant may rebut that 
presumption through admissible evidence that clearly 
and convincingly establishes prejudice. 
3. In all cases in which a defendant has continuous 
and systematic minimum contacts with the forum and 
plaintiff’s cause of action does not arise out of those 
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contacts, a presumption arises that defendant is 
prejudiced by maintenance of the action in the forum 
and that personal jurisdiction is therefore not properly 
exercised. The plaintiff may rebut that presumption 
through admissible evidence that: 
i. establishes that defendant is either incorporated in 
the forum or maintains a principal residence, a 
functional headquarters, or a branch office in the 
forum; or 
ii. establishes that the defendant’s contacts with the 
forum demonstrate that defendant has engaged in such 
a continuous and systematic course of “doing 
business” in the forum as to support the conclusion 
that it is virtually present in the forum; or 
iii. establishes that one of his causes of action are 
related to the defendant’s forum contacts and 
defendant would not be prejudiced by maintenance of 
the suit within the forum. 
4. In all cases in which a defendant has only single or 
occasional minimum contacts with the forum and the 
plaintiff’s cause of action do not arise out of those 
facts, prejudice to defendant requiring dismissal of the 
case shall be conclusively presumed. 
5. The showings described in this section shall be 
made by a preponderance of admissible evidence, 
except as specifically stated otherwise. 
COMMENTS TO SECTION 9-10-100 
Comment to Section 9-10-100[2]A: The definition of prejudice 
is a consolidation of the factors given in the “convenience” 
branch (“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice”) 
of the International Shoe test as articulated in World-Wide 
Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) and tweaked, for 
international elements, by Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. 
Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102 (1987). The intent is 
to make more concise and coherent the factors given in those two 
cases, based on the notion that the real point of the 
“convenience” branch of International Shoe (as delineated by 
Justice White in World-Wide Volkswagen) is not really so much 
“reasonableness” or “convenience” or “traditional notions, etc.”, 
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but that it instead boils down to prejudice. The prejudice factors 
given in this section also incorporate the overlapping factors 
from forum non conveniens analysis, recognizing that both 
analyses are essentially the same. As one commentator noted, 
because the forum non conveniens 
private and public interest factors, taken together, 
overlap to a large degree with the reasonableness 
factors from the personal jurisdiction test, as 
articulated by the [United States Supreme] Court . . . 
it would appear that the court is required in nearly all 
cases to apply the same factors twice; once as part of 
the personal jurisdiction inquiry, and again as part of 
the forum non conveniens balancing test.213 
Comment to Section 9-10-100[2]B: Traditionally, minimum 
contacts have been defined instrumentally by the concept of 
purposeful availment. For example, synthesizing much case law 
on the subject, it appears that courts count defendant-forum 
contacts as “minimum contacts” where it was reasonably 
foreseeable to the defendant that the defendant’s conduct would 
affect a person, business entity, property, or another legally 
protected interest within the forum. However, such terminology 
misfocuses the inquiry. It suggests that the courts must divine the 
intent of the defendant in creating contacts, and must apply a tort-
type standard of foreseeability in deciding whether a connection 
between the defendant and the forum state should be classified as 
“foreseeably” affecting an interest in the forum state. We, 
however, think that such inquiries border on the metaphysical, 
and they import tort-type notions of proximate cause into an 
inquiry where they are inappropriate. Proximate cause seeks to 
impose judicial policy-making limits on the extent of tort 
liability, by, in effect, cutting off the natural consequences of a 
factual cause analysis by empowering fact-finders to declare that 
causation, although logically linked, must be cut off at some 
point, on the grounds of an amorphous and ill-defined policy on 
limiting liability.  Concomitantly, importing that standard into 
personal jurisdiction analysis has the effect of deflecting the 
inquiry to a mode of constricting jurisdiction in all civil cases on 
the basis of a tort-type policy limitation for liability. This is 
inappropriate. In fact, it gives double-duty, in torts cases, and 
consequential damages cases in contract law, to a proximate 
                                                                                                             
 213 Lonny Hoffman, Forum Non Conveniens—State and Federal Movements, ALI-
ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS: CIVIL PROCEDURE AND LITIGATION TECHNIQUES IN 
FEDERAL AND STATE COURT 441, 441 (Feb. 2002). 
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cause analysis, which is already available to curtail liability in the 
substantive phase of the case. It is inappropriate to deny plaintiffs 
a forum on that basis, particularly since personal jurisdiction is 
primarily based on two concepts that are connected, yet in 
constant tension: [1] the convergence of the corrective justice and 
enterprise regulation principles and [2] the avoidance of 
unbearable prejudice on non-resident defendants. That tension is 
best resolved on the basis of treating all contacts as relevant 
under the “litigation event” approach, rather than isolating certain 
contacts from the litigation event as determinative and elevating 
them in importance over the cumulative effect of the whole and 
disadvantaging the plaintiff if those particular paradigm facts 
don’t fall within a zone of foreseeability. It is more appropriate to 
find a broad power of personal jurisdiction when the entire 
factual scenario points to appropriate exercise of personal 
jurisdiction, without superimposing substantive law concepts of 
liability limitation through the importation of a pseudo-proximate 
cause standard into the personal jurisdiction analysis. Rather, that 
question is better addressed in the forum courts as part of the 
“merits” of the claims themselves by means of traditional 
proximate cause analysis, which relates more to foreseeability of 
extent of liability, rather than of being haled into court. That is 
not to say the foreseeability is not a component of personal 
jurisdiction under the due process clause; it is merely to say that 
foreseeability is implicit in the treatment of minimum contacts as 
defined by the litigation event concept, rather than by a parsing 
analysis that allows courts to pick and choose carelessly or 
inconsistently among facts in the litigation event, view them out 
of context, and then make a plenary, outcome determinative 
pronouncement that they are either “foreseeable” or 
“unforeseeable” to a particular defendant. Such ad hoc 
characterization unnecessarily introduces dissonance into 
personal jurisdiction law, and provides an excessively pro-
defendant jurisprudence, when, in fact, as was demonstrated by 
one of the authors in another writing,214 the contacts should be 
viewed holistically as part of a larger bundle of facts we call “the 
litigation event.” 
                                                                                                             
 214 Van Detta, The Irony of Instrumentalism, supra note 189, at 443-44. 
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V.  APPLICATION TO REPRESENTATIVE CASES ORIGINALLY DECIDED 
UNDER A CATEGORICAL LONG-ARM STATUTE 
As Don Quixote is reported by Cervantes to have said once, 
profoundly, “the proof of the pudding is in the eating.”215 Pointing out 
the deficiencies in categorical long-arm statutes, extolling the virtues of 
the International Shoe parameters as a principled antidote to the ills 
caused by categorical long-arm statutes, and proposing a codification of 
the due-process-limit rules set out in International Shoe but largely 
overlooked or misunderstood by the courts, simply serves to set the table 
for the work of this section. In this section, we eat our pudding by 
examining the practical consequences of our work. We do this by 
answering two questions: (1) Would our proposed long-arm statute make 
a difference in cases in which personal jurisdiction would have been 
constitutionally exercised—but was denied due to the doctrinal penury 
inherent in categorical long-arm statutes? (2) If our proposal would make 
a difference, what kind of difference would it make—and would this be a 
desirable difference in outcomes? 
In considering the second half of this second inquiry, we will make 
specific reference to the corrective justice and enterprise regulation 
principles discussed in Section III. Our operating premise is that the 
Model Long-Arm statute will produce more than greater consistency and 
predictability in litigation outcomes. It will also produce outcomes that 
advance the corrective justice and enterprise regulation principles upon 
which the modern conceptualization of personal jurisdiction is 
founded.216 
In this section, the Model Long-Arm statute will be applied to 
representative Georgia cases to illustrate how it should work in practice 
to accomplish the goals of providing maximum exercise of personal 
jurisdiction with guidance that allows for more predictable and consistent 
jurisdiction determinations. The chosen cases are organized by the four-
quadrant approach to reifying the International Shoe rules, which, as 
discussed in Section III, supra, are derived directly from Chief Justice 
Stone’s carefully chosen words. Within each quadrant, we will first 
discuss the chosen case’s outcome under the Georgia long-arm statute 
and then discuss the application of the Model Long-Arm statute, 
explaining why each case was placed in that particular quadrant. The 
four quadrants correspond to subsections [3](B)(1)-(4) of the Model 
Long-Arm statute in Section IV, supra. Consequently, applying the 
                                                                                                             
 215 MIGUEL DE CERVANTES SAAVEDRA, DON QUIXOTE, 419 (Peter Motteux trans., 
Random House 1941) (1615). 
 216 See supra note 204 and accompanying text; see also Van Detta, The Irony of 
Instrumentalism, supra note 189; Van Detta, Justice Restored, supra note 190. 
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Model Long-Arm statute and placing each case within a particular 
quadrant entails a two-part inquiry:217 (1) Whether the defendant’s forum 
activities were continuous and systematic, or single or occasional—as 
determined by the quantity and frequency of said forum activities; and 
(2) whether or not the cause of action upon which the plaintiff sues arises 
from those defendant forum activities. Once a case is placed in one of the 
quadrants (or one of the subsections [3](B)(1)–(4)), then it must be 
determined whether exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with 
“notions of fairplay and substantial justice.”218 This is accomplished in 
the Model Long-Arm statute through application of subsections 
[3](C)(1)-(3) and the definition of “prejudice” given in subsection [2](A). 
Finally, following the Model Long-Arm statute application is a 
discussion of how its application would advance both the principles of 
corrective justice and enterprise regulation in the particular case. 
The cases to be considered were selected based on the following 
criteria: 
1) Quadrants: representative cases that fit within each of the four 
quadrants were selected. 
2) Using the Georgia long-arm statute: the case must either have 
been decided by a state court, or a federal court that applied the Georgia 
long-arm statute (rather than going straight to a due process analysis), so 
the differences with the Model Long-Arm statute could be illustrated. 
3) Characterization of contacts: cases were selected where the 
greater clarity of characterizing the quality and/or quantity of contacts, 
and/or their relationship to the cause of action sued on, would have 
produced either a different personal jurisdiction outcome, or articulated 
the outcome in a clearer and more defensible basis to promote the 
development of a more coherent and consistent course of assertion of 
long-arm jurisdiction by Georgia courts. 
Two cases from each of the four quadrants will be analyzed. 
Diagram 5 illustrates within which quadrant each chosen case falls. 
                                                                                                             
 217 Derived from the “two jurisdictional variables of primary relevance” previously 
discussed, supra note 197 and accompanying text. 
 218 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
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A. Quadrant I—Continuous and Systematic + Connected Cause of Action 
Subsection [3](B)(1) of the Model Long-Arm corresponds to 
Quadrant I. In such cases, the state’s interest in providing a forum for a 
cause of action that occurred within the state against a defendant who has 
substantial contacts with the state strongly implicates both the corrective 
justice and enterprise regulation interests. The Georgia cases within this 
quadrant uphold personal jurisdiction under the Georgia long-arm statute 
because the cause of action arises from the defendant’s activities within 
the state as required in the preamble of the long-arm. There are few 
Georgia cases that fall within this quadrant, however. This is likely 
because nonresident defendants that have continuous and systematic 
contacts with Georgia are virtually always corporations, and such 
corporations usually have obtained authorization to transact business in 
the state.219 These corporations are not covered under Georgia’s long-arm 
statute, because corporations authorized to transact business in Georgia 
are specifically excluded from the definition of nonresident in the long-
arm statute—instead, they are considered to be resident foreign 
corporations and, thus, amenable to service of process on any cause of 
action like a resident.220 Thus, only those corporations that have 
continuous and systematic activities within the state, but yet are not 
required to register as doing business within the state are covered by 
Georgia’s long-arm statute. 
1. Hollingsworth v. Cunard Line, Ltd.221 
This case involved a breach of contract and fraud action against 
defendant cruise line by plaintiffs due to lack of promised activities and 
services on an around-the-world cruise.222 
a. Georgia Long-Arm Application 
Because subsections (1) and (3) of the Georgia long-arm statute 
were implicated, the Georgia Court of Appeals stated that it “need only 
consider whether the defendant transacted any business within the 
state.”223 The court cited the three-pronged test by the Georgia Supreme 
                                                                                                             
 219 As required by GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-1501 (West 2004). 
 220 See supra note 19 for discussion regarding corporations authorized to transact 
business in Georgia and their treatment under the long-arm statute. 
 221 263 S.E.2d 190 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979). 
 222 Id. at 192. 
 223 Id.  
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Court from Davis Metals v. Allen,224 and also the policy from Coe & 
Payne225 that personal jurisdiction be exercised over nonresidents to the 
maximum extent allowed by due process of law.226 Consequently, the 
court’s analysis under the long-arm amounted to a due process analysis. 
The court detailed Cunard Line’s business activities within the state–the 
advertising of the cruise in the state by a travel agency it hired, the use of 
travel agencies within the state, the sending of ticket stock to those 
agencies to print the contract tickets, and the sending of the contract to 
residents within the state227—which established that it was transacting 
business within the state. The court dismissed the notion that the 
independent travel agencies used by Cunard Line insulated it from local 
jurisdiction.228 The court also cited that portion of International Shoe 
which we have used to define Quadrant I: “‘‘Presence’ in the state in this 
sense has never been doubted when the activities of the corporation there 
have not only been continuous and systematic, but also give rise to the 
liabilities sued on, even though no consent to be sued or authorization to 
an agent to accept service of process has been given.’”229 In reversing the 
trial court’s dismissal, and holding the defendant amenable to service of 
process, the court concluded that “[i]t is undisputed that Cunard 
voluntarily availed itself of the right to conduct commercial activities 
within the State of Georgia on a continuing and systematic basis 
through” the several business activities previously listed.230   
b. Model Long-Arm Application 
The first inquiry is whether Cunard Line’s forum activities were 
continuous and systematic, or single or occasional–as determined by the 
quantity and frequency of said forum activities. In this case, as the 
Georgia Court of Appeals stated, the fact that Cunard Line was using 
travel agencies within the state to conduct its business is not a shield—
                                                                                                             
 224 198 S.E.2d 285 (Ga. 1973). 
 225 195 S.E.2d 399 (Ga. 1973). 
 226 Hollingsworth, 263 S.E.2d at 192-93. 
 227 Id. at 193. 
 228 The court held that 
with the liberalization of due process criteria [McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 
355 U.S. 220 (1957)], the jurisdictional distinction between agents and 
independent contractors has begun to fade. Courts treat persons who derive 
commission revenue [travel agencies], not in terms of agents or independent 
contractors, but they view their activities and status in a realistic commercial 
light. 
Id. at 193 (quoting Mulhern v. Holland Am. Cruises, 393 F. Supp. 1298, 1302 
(D.N.H. 1975)).” 
 229 Id. at 194 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945)). 
 230 Id. 
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the activities of an agent within the scope of the agency are clearly 
chargeable to the principle under elementary agency law. Consequently, 
there were numerous activities conducted in an ongoing frequency 
through the travel agencies, as discussed previously—in other words, the 
activities were continuous and systematic. 
The second inquiry is whether or not the breach of contract and 
fraud claims for the lack of the promised services and amenities arose 
from Cunard Line’s forum activities. The Hollingsworths responded to 
the advertising in Georgia, relied on brochures and promises by an agent 
of the availability of certain services and amenities, and purchased the 
tickets in Georgia.231 Thus, their cause of action arose from Cunard 
Line’s continuous and systematic activities within Georgia. Accordingly, 
this case falls within Quadrant I. 
Regarding any “prejudice” to the defendant, under subsection 
[3](C)(1) of the Model Long-Arm statute, in a Quadrant I case, it is 
conclusively presumed that the courts of the state have personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant. Therefore, Georgia courts can exercise 
personal jurisdiction over Cunard Lines under the Model Long-Arm 
statute—without the doubt and indeterminacy present in the limitations 
of a categorical long-arm statute. 
While the outcome is the same, applying the Model Long-Arm in 
this case gives a much “cleaner” analysis of why personal jurisdiction 
should be upheld. The focus on all the operating facts together as part of 
the litigation event sharpens the analysis, unlike the Georgia Court of 
Appeals’ analysis which pays lip service to the Georgia long-arm statute 
by quoting it (as though that is sufficient) and then employing a 
somewhat unpersuasive federal due process analysis that mixes together 
U.S. Supreme Court cases with a state court test which was created for 
application of the Georgia long-arm statute. 
c. How Applying the Model Long-Arm Statute Recognizes the 
Intersecting Domains of the Corrective Justice and Enterprise 
Regulation Principles 
The need to effectuate the corrective justice principle is strong in 
cases such as this where the corporate defendant is in complete control of 
the services provided to its customers who have relied on its promised 
services in their decision to purchase a ticket. The customers pay for the 
trip up-front, thus creating a nonreciprocal risk – the cruise line is paid, 
but the customers are at its mercy as to whether the promised services are 
                                                                                                             
 231 Id. at 191-92. 
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provided.232 The state has a strong interest in protecting consumers 
within its borders from suffering consumer fraud, especially where the 
corporation is conducting ongoing business within the state. Thus, in this 
case, the enterprise regulation principle clearly permits the state to act to 
effectuate corrective justice – in other words, this case inhabits that core 
domain where the corrective justice and enterprise regulation principles 
fully overlap.233 
2. Griffin v. Air South, Inc.234 
A wrongful death action against Air South and Beech Aircraft 
Corp. arose out of an aircraft crash in Georgia.235 The aircraft was 
operated by Air South and manufactured by Beech Aircraft.236 This 
appeal involved Beech Aircraft’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction.237 Beech Aircraft was a Delaware corporation with its 
principal place of business in Wichita, Kansas, but it sold the particular 
type of aircraft in question directly to customers in Georgia, while selling 
other aircraft through a distributor in Georgia.238 
a. Georgia Long-Arm Application 
The court began with a due process analysis after stating that 
Georgia’s long-arm statute had been held in a previous federal court 
decision to be coterminous with due process limits.239 The court cited 
several cases from other districts that had held that Beech’s distributor 
agreements gave such control to Beech that it was doing business within 
those states.240 Thus, the federal court held, Beech was also doing 
business within Georgia through its distributor. As a result, there were 
“sufficient contacts to satisfy the constitutional imperatives.”241 
Although the court had already said that Georgia’s long-arm 
reached due process limits, it then, curiously, stated that the long-arm 
statue needed to be analyzed next. In doing so, the court analyzed the 
                                                                                                             
 232 For an explanation of how Professor Fletcher’s theory of nonreciprocal risk 
exposure as a basis for tort liability informs personal jurisdiction analysis under the 
“litigation-event” approach, see Van Detta, The Irony of Instrumentalism, supra note 189, 
at 447-49. 
 233 See Diagram 4, supra p. 395. 
 234 324 F. Supp. 1284 (N.D. Ga. 1971). 
 235 Id. 
 236 Id. at 1286. 
 237 Id. 
 238 Id. 
 239 Id. at 1286-87. 
 240 Id. at 1287-88. 
 241 Id. at 1288. 
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history of the statute and restated the proposition that the long-arm was 
coterminous with due process limits.242 However, the court felt that it 
was still necessary to apply the long-arm statute’s limiting language as it 
went on to analyze subsections (2) and (3) and determined that 
jurisdiction was valid under both of them.243 Personal jurisdiction was 
valid under subsection (2), because, according to the court, its prior 
decision which had held that the “Illinois Rule” applied to that 
subsection was still valid—thus, Beech’s alleged negligence in 
manufacturing the aircraft outside the state which caused injury in the 
state was a sufficient basis upon which to predicate personal jurisdiction 
under that subsection.244 Similarly, the court said, personal jurisdiction 
was valid under subsection (3) because Beech was regularly doing 
business in Georgia.245 
b. Model Long-Arm Application 
The first inquiry is whether Beech Aircraft’s forum activities were 
continuous and systematic, or single or occasional. The operative facts 
were as follows: Beech sold the particular type aircraft directly to 
customers in Georgia.246 In addition, it sold all its other type aircraft 
through a distributor in Georgia.247 The distribution agreement Beech had 
with its distributors gave it such control that Beech should be considered 
to be doing business within the state. Therefore, Beech’s activities (its 
aircraft marketing and sales through the distributor) were continuous and 
systematic. 
The second inquiry is whether or not the wrongful death claim for 
the aircraft crash arose out of those forum activities. In this case, Beech 
sold the particular aircraft to the airline in Georgia.248 Thus, the wrongful 
death action arises out of Beech’s forum activity—the operative facts. As 
a result, the case falls within Quadrant I. 
Regarding “prejudice,” under subsection [3](C)(1) of the Model 
Long-Arm, once it is determined that a case falls within Quadrant I, it is 
conclusively presumed that the courts of the state have personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant. Therefore, Georgia courts can exercise 
                                                                                                             
 242 Id. at 1288-89. 
 243 Id. at 1289. 
 244 Id. 
 245 Id. at 1289-90. The court refers to the subsections as (a-c). For purposes of 
uniformity, this article refers to them as (1-3). 
 246 Id. at 1286. 
 247 Id. 
 248 Id. 
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personal jurisdiction over Beech Aircraft under the Model Long-Arm 
statute. 
Once again, although the result is the same, the analysis by the 
federal district court was internally contradictory and analytically 
dissonant—the court applied a due process analysis, but then, after 
restating that Georgia’s long-arm was coterminous with due process, the 
court parsed through the detailed interstices of the long-arm statute 
anyway.249 The Model Statute, on the other hand, proceeds in a 
systematic, consistent fashion to lead a court to determine that personal 
jurisdiction was validly exercised. It is this cleaning up of analytic 
dissonance in all varieties of litigation events presented in long-arm cases 
that is a critical objective of the Model Long-Arm Statute. By removing 
the dissonance, the analytic process becomes regularized and transparent, 
which far better equips courts to take on the kind of “tough” 
jurisdictional cases which, in the past, have either sent courts scrambling 
for glosses or patches, or simply ignoring the legislated language of the 
long-arm statute. Both phenomena produce dissonance and 
indeterminacy, the elimination of which in all litigation events with an 
extraterritorial element is a key objective of the Model Statute. 
c. How Applying the Model Long-Arm Statute Recognizes the 
Intersecting Domains of the Corrective Justice and Enterprise 
Regulation Principles 
As in the previous case, the need to effectuate the corrective justice 
principle is strong in this case. The necessity of the production of safe 
aircraft can not be overstated, given the pervasive use of aircraft for 
travel in today’s society. A poorly designed, manufactured, or 
maintained aircraft creates a nonreciprocal risk to those who fly and 
travel on aircraft – the high probability of loss of life due to an aircraft 
crash. Where, as here, a large number of such aircraft are sold within the 
state, the state has a strong interest to provide redress in order to allow 
effective enterprise regulation, as well as compensation for loss in 
accordance with the corrective justice principle. Thus, as the regulatory 
interest in Georgia is strong, this case falls in that core domain where the 
corrective justice and enterprise regulation principles fully overlap. 
B. Quadrant II—Single or Occasional Contact + Connected Cause of 
Action 
Subsection [3](B)(2) of the Model Long-Arm corresponds to 
Quadrant II. Cases fall in this quadrant when the defendant’s single or 
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2007] Extraterritorial Personal Jurisdiction for the 21st Century 413 
occasional forum activities give rise to the cause of action(s) on which 
the plaintiff is suing. These are by far the most numerous types of cases 
under Georgia’s long arm, a fact not surprising given the explicit “arising 
from” requirement in the statute. Due to the categorical nature of the 
long-arm, there are many cases for which personal jurisdiction is not 
currently available under the Georgia long-arm where it would be 
constitutional under due process to exercise personal jurisdiction within 
specific jurisdiction. 
1. Catholic Stewardship Consultants, Inc. v. Ruotolo Associates, 
Inc.250 
This case involved a breach of contract, theft of proprietary 
information, and misrepresentation suit against Ruotolo, a New Jersey 
corporation with no offices in Georgia.251 The parties had agreed to work 
together to provide stewardship campaigns for various parishes and 
dioceses throughout the country.252 While Catholic Stewardship 
Consultants (CSC) worked on proposals for other dioceses in its Georgia 
office, Ruotolo requested that CSC prepare a stewardship proposal for 
the Diocese of Camden in New Jersey, which CSC agreed to do and 
worked on at its Georgia office.253 Subsequently, Ruotolo secured a 
contract with the New Jersey diocese to the exclusion of the CSC.254 
a. Georgia Long-Arm Application 
After citing the long-arm statute, the Georgia Court of Appeals 
stated that the long-arm “confers jurisdiction over nonresidents to the 
maximum extent permitted by due process.”255 Despite this 
pronouncement, the Court of Appeals proceeded to apply Georgia’s 
long-arm statute and its corresponding less-than-due-process-limits 
restrictions on contacts. The Court of Appeals first analyzed whether 
Ruotolo transacted any business under subsection (1) of the long-arm 
statute and found personal jurisdiction lacking under that subsection, 
because no negotiations for the projects, including the one for New 
Jersey, were held in Georgia, and Ruotolo took no actions in Georgia that 
were related to the projects with the CSC.256 Ruotolo’s telephone and e-
mail communications directed at the plaintiff regarding the projects were 
                                                                                                             
 250 608 S.E.2d 1 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004). 
 251 Id. at 2-3. 
 252 Id. at 2. 
 253 Id. 
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 255 Id. at 3. 
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not sufficient activities under the Georgia courts’ prior interpretations.257 
Next, the Court of Appeals analyzed the theft of proprietary information 
and misrepresentation claims under subsection (3), holding that because 
“Ruotolo Associates did not engage in a persistent course of conduct in 
Georgia or derive substantial revenues from goods used or services 
rendered in Georgia,” personal jurisdiction was unavailable under that 
subsection as well.258 Thus, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial 
court’s dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. 
b. Model Long-Arm Application 
The first inquiry is whether Ruotolo’s forum activities were 
continuous and systematic, or single or occasional. While the agreement 
was not negotiated or consummated in Georgia, Ruotolo did direct 
communications at CSC by telephone and e-mail concerning the projects 
that CSC was preparing, as stated previously. Although Georgia courts 
hold these activities to be insufficient contacts, the United States 
Supreme Court has held they are sufficient, at least where they are 
purposefully directed toward a party in another state.259 Thus, these 
communications directed to CSC count as contacts under due process 
limits. Ruotolo had other isolated activities in Georgia which were not 
related to its agreement with CSC.260 Thus the communications, as the 
only legitimate contacts, can be classified as “occasional,” because they 
do not, standing alone, amount to “systematic or continuous” activities in 
the forum. 
The second inquiry is whether or not the cause of actions arose 
from Ruotolo’s forum activities. The breach of contract and theft of 
proprietary information occurred based on Ruotolo’s request for CSC’s 
work on the New Jersey diocese project, which CSC accomplished and 
sent to Ruotolo, and which Ruotolo then used to obtain a contract only 
for itself. Ruotolo contacted CSC using the telephone and e-mail about 
the stewardship projects as they were prepared by CSC in Georgia.261 
Therefore the cause of action arose from Ruotolo’s telephone and e-mail 
contacts with CSC. Consequently, the case falls within Quadrant II. 
                                                                                                             
 257 Id. 
 258 Id. at 6. 
 259 See supra note 85. 
 260 These activities were attending a trade show and performing a fundraising project 
for a Georgia school. Catholic Stewardship Consultants, 608 S.E.2d at 2-3.  
 261 Officer of defendant “made numerous electronic mail transmissions to CSC 
personnel which included comments on stewardship projects as they were prepared by 
CSC in Georgia . . . .” Id. at 3. 
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Under subsection [3](C)(2) of the Model Long-Arm, in a Quadrant 
II case the defendant is presumed to be amenable to personal jurisdiction 
and may rebut the presumption through admissible evidence that clearly 
and convincingly establishes prejudice (as defined in subsection [2](A)). 
It is unlikely that any of the four factors there would apply in this case. 
First, Ruotolo would not be deprived of access to evidence. Second, the 
cost of litigating in Georgia is not likely significantly disproportionate to 
Ruotolo’s resources. Third, as discussed next, in subsection c, infra, the 
state has a legitimate regulatory interest; and fourth, there is no 
applicable treaty. Thus, personal jurisdiction would be upheld under the 
Model Long-Arm statute in this case. 
This result illustrates the differing outcomes that occur due to the 
problems of making the critical characterization of a non-forum 
defendant’s contacts that have arisen under the régime of the categorical 
long-arm statute by the Georgia state courts. E-mail, phone calls, and 
facsimile contacts by a defendant were not sufficient contacts with the 
forum under Georgia’s long-arm statute, according to those rulings. But, 
as recognized under the Model Long-Arm statute, these contacts are of 
sufficient quality where the cause of action arises out of them. Further, 
these contacts should place the burden of challenging personal 
jurisdiction on the defendant, rather than place the burden on the plaintiff 
to meet the indeterminate and ad hoc pronouncements that have been 
given in wrestling with the unilluminating provisions of the current 
statute, which do not focus the courts on the most relevant 
considerations. 
c. How Applying the Model Long-Arm Statute Recognizes the 
Intersecting Domains of the Corrective Justice and Enterprise 
Regulation Principles 
In this case, the corrective justice principle is applicable in 
remedying a pecuniary injury experienced by a resident corporation from 
a nonresident corporation. Where one corporation seeks to take unfair 
advantage of another, the corporation taken advantage of needs a remedy 
through which it may obtain justice at home. Now that a substantial 
amount of business is done via the Internet and electronic 
communications, a state needs to be better equipped to protect residents 
doing business with distant parties. The enterprise regulation principle is 
applicable in the general sense that a state needs to effectuate corrective 
justice in order to discourage nonresident corporations from attempting 
to take unfair advantage of resident corporations, and to foster a better 
business climate – especially for smaller corporations, where it is 
important to limit the expenses that would otherwise occur from having 
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to litigate a claim in a distant forum. The foregoing reasons, along with 
the quality of the contacts (e-mail and telephone discussion from which 
the claim arises from) push this case from the limb-dweller status into the 
overlapping portion of the corrective justice and enterprise regulation 
principles.262 
2. Worthy v. Eller263 
This case involved a defamation and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress action264 by a husband against an Alabama attorney 
representing his wife in an Alabama divorce action.265 When the wife did 
not want her husband to pick up their three-year-old child from a day 
care center located just across the border in Columbus, Georgia, her 
attorney contacted the center which stated it would need a court order to 
deny the husband from picking up the child.266 The attorney faxed a fake 
court order to the center from Alabama and the center then called the 
police, who prevented the husband from seeing the child.267 
a. Georgia Long-Arm Application 
The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of 
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and ordered the case 
dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.  The court held that 
subsection (2) barred personal jurisdiction over the defamation claim.268 
The court then held that the defendant, who practiced in Alabama only, 
did not have the required contacts under subsection (3) for the intentional 
infliction of emotional distress claim, stating that telephone and facsimile 
were not sufficient contacts.269 The court did not analyze whether that 
claim would allow for jurisdiction under subsection (2), presumably 
because it did not consider the tortious act to have occurred in the state. 
b. Model Long-Arm Application 
The first inquiry is whether Worthy’s forum activities were 
continuous and systematic, or single or occasional. As discussed 
previously, Worthy telephoned and sent a facsimile to the center located 
                                                                                                             
 262 See Diagram 4, supra p. 395. 
 263 594 S.E.2d 699 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004). 
 264 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 312 (1965) (listing the elements of the 
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress). 
 265 594 S.E.2d at 700. 
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in Georgia. These were single or occasional contacts directed at Georgia 
by the nonresident defendant. 
The second inquiry is whether or not the defamation and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress claims arise out of Worthy’s forum 
activities. The telephone conversation with the center’s representatives 
and the facsimile sent to the center were the activities which gave rise to 
Eller’s claims. These facts fall easily within the litigation event as 
described in subsections (2)(B) and (2)(E) of the Model Long-Arm. 
Therefore, the cause of actions arose from Worthy’s forum activities and 
the case falls within Quadrant II. 
Under subsection (3)(C)(2) of the Model Long-Arm, in a Quadrant 
II case the defendant is presumed to be amenable to personal jurisdiction 
and may rebut the presumption through admissible evidence that clearly 
and convincingly establishes “prejudice” (as defined in subsection 
(2)(A)). It is unlikely that any of the four factors there would apply in 
this case. First, the defendant would not be deprived of access to 
evidence by litigating the suit in Georgia; second, the cost of the suit 
over the border in nearby Columbus would not be disproportionate to the 
Alabama attorney’s financial resources; third, Georgia has a legitimate 
interest in preventing false court orders from being sent into the state, 
causing severe emotional distress to forum-state residents, and tying up 
police resources; and fourth, there is not a treaty that applies in this 
situation. Therefore, Worthy would be amenable to personal jurisdiction 
in Georgia. 
The difference in result under the Model Long-Arm statute is due to 
the Georgia long-arm statute’s out-of-date defamation exception. Also 
Georgia’s long-arm statute lacks reach under subsection (2) when the 
tortious act is committed outside the state. These shortcomings, 
combined with the problems of properly characterizing the quality of 
telephone and facsimile contacts by Georgia courts, as described in the 
discussion of Catholic Stewardship Consultants v. Ruotolo Associates 
contribute to the resulting differences. 
c. How Applying the Model Long-Arm Statute Recognizes the 
Intersecting Domains of the Corrective Justice and Enterprise 
Regulation Principles 
Although no corporation is involved here, Eller’s claim involves a 
harm that occurred within Georgia as a result of the nonresident 
attorney’s action. A state certainly has an interest in regulating 
nonresidents conducting legal service-related business within the state, 
whether it is an individual attorney or a large law firm, and effectuating 
the corrective justice principle when such professionals engage in 
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(mis)conduct that damages the interests of Georgia residents. As such, 
this case comes within the area where the corrective justice and 
enterprise regulation principles overlap. 
 
C. Quadrant III—Continuous and Systematic Contacts, but Unconnected 
Cause of Action 
Quadrant III, which is equivalent to general jurisdiction, is 
represented by subsection (3)(B)(3) of the Model Long-Arm statute. 
Causes of action fall into this quadrant where the nonresident defendant 
has continuous and systematic activities within the state such that 
personal jurisdiction may be upheld in a cause of action unrelated to 
those activities. This is generally the case if the defendant is a 
corporation with a principal residence, a functional headquarters, or a 
branch office in the forum, or one which is “doing business” in the forum 
such that the state has an interest in regulating its rights and duties (under 
the enterprise regulation principle). There are no cases decided by 
Georgia state courts that have upheld personal jurisdiction under the 
long-arm statute within Quadrant III criteria due to the “arising from” 
requirement of Georgia’s long-arm statute.270 
Yet, Georgia does allow what amounts to Quadrant III general 
jurisdiction through the Georgia Business Corporation Act271 and the 
definition of nonresident in its long-arm statute.272 As a result, “a 
plaintiff wishing to sue in Georgia a corporation authorized to do 
business in Georgia is not restricted by the personal jurisdiction 
parameters of § 9-10-91, including the requirement that a cause of action 
arise out of a defendant’s activities within the state.”273 The effect of this 
holding is that once it is deemed that a corporation is authorized to do 
business in Georgia, it is then essentially subject to Quadrant III general 
personal jurisdiction–not, however, through the long-arm statute.274 
                                                                                                             
 270 However, the Eleventh Circuit upheld personal jurisdiction in a general jurisdiction 
or Quadrant III case, based on its position that Georgia’s statute is coterminous with the 
limits of due process. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text. 
 271 See GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-1501 (2006) (concerning when authority to transact 
business is required). 
 272 As discussed in note 19, supra. 
 273 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Klein, 422 S.E.2d 863, 865 (Ga. 1992). This case is discussed 
infra as one of the Quadrant III cases. 
 274 One court explained: 
The corporations over which Georgia might exercise jurisdiction fall into 
three categories: (1) domestic corporations, i.e., corporations organized and 
existing under the laws of Georgia; (2) resident foreign corporations, i.e., 
corporations organized and existing under the laws of another state but 
authorized to do business in Georgia ([GA. CODE ANN.] § 14-2-1501); and 
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Some might argue that since there are these vicarious means 
through which Georgia courts may effectively exercise general 
jurisdiction, there is no “problem” to be remedied here by a Model 
Statute. That is an instrumentalist perspective, however, that ignores the 
problems raised by the current régime. First, to rely on a patchwork of 
laws, external to the long-arm statute itself, to create a substitute for 
general personal jurisdiction invites considerable indeterminacy and 
ensures analytic dissonance. Second, it leaves discord between the state 
courts and the federal courts sitting in their diversity jurisdiction, for the 
federal courts have entertained full general personal jurisdiction under 
Georgia’s long-arm statute, even where the patchwork of external 
statutes might not cover a particular nonresident defendant. This second 
problem leads directly to the third, and perhaps most significant problem 
with continued reliance on the current régime for a synthetic general 
jurisdiction–there are holes, such as those illustrated by the Georgia 
court’s adherence to the “arising under” preamble of the long-arm 
contrasted with the federal court’s flat assertion of the availability of 
general personal jurisdiction, where a nonresident defendant may escape 
personal jurisdiction on a “non-arising-out-of” cause of action when it is 
not technically registered “to do” or “transact” business in Georgia. The 
Model Long-Arm statute would ameliorate the three problems with the 
current approach to general jurisdiction by allowing Quadrant III general 
jurisdiction. This also would eliminate the potential due process 
violations that may occur from failing to conduct a minimum contacts 
analysis.275 Two cases in which the exercise of personal jurisdiction was 
thwarted by the particular structure of the categorical long-arm statute 
are evaluated below. 
1. Allstate Insurance Co. v. Klein276  
This case involved an action by the insured against insurer to obtain 
insurance benefits allegedly due insured for automobile accident.277 
Klein, a nonresident of Georgia, was traveling through Georgia as a 
                                                                                                             
(3) nonresident foreign corporations, i.e., corporations organized and 
existing under the laws of another state and not authorized to do or transact 
business in this state ([GA. CODE ANN.] § 9-10-90). General jurisdiction can 
be exercised over domestic corporations and resident foreign corporations. 
However, jurisdiction is limited by the Long Arm Statute when dealing with 
nonresident foreign corporations. 
Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc. v. Sanders, 460 S.E.2d 94, 95 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (en 
banc) (internal citations omitted). 
 275 See supra note 19. 
 276 422 S.E.2d 863 (Ga. 1992). 
 277 Id. at 864. 
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passenger in his father’s car when he was injured in an automobile 
accident.278 The car was insured by Allstate under a New Jersey 
policy.279 When Allstate did not pay benefits that Klein alleged were due 
under Georgia’s no-fault statute, he sued Allstate in Georgia.280 
a. Georgia Long-Arm Application 
Klein did not employ the long-arm statute as a basis for personal 
jurisdiction. He instead argued that because Allstate is authorized to 
transact business in Georgia, and has an office and registered agent in the 
county where suit was brought, it is not a “nonresident” as that term is 
defined in the long-arm statute.281 Allstate, while admitting it was 
authorized to transact business in Georgia, argued that subsection (1) of 
the long-arm statute still applied, and that because “the contract was not 
entered into in Georgia and . . . there were no contacts within Georgia 
between Klein and Allstate with respect to the contract,” it was not 
amenable to personal jurisdiction.282 The trial court agreed and granted 
Allstate’s motion to dismiss.283 The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed, 
applying the long-arm statute and holding “that because ‘the claim in this 
case adequately results from or is linked to Allstate’s broad-based forum-
related insurance activities,’ the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a 
Georgia court over Allstate is justified.”284 The Georgia Supreme Court 
affirmed the reversal, but on the grounds that Klein had originally 
argued–that because Allstate was authorized to transact business in 
Georgia, it was considered a “resident” for purposes of service of 
process.285 Yet, in so ruling, the court did not give much consideration to 
whether that registration is really sufficient to satisfy due process 
requirements. The United States Supreme Court has held that all 
extraterritorial exercises of personal jurisdiction are subject to the 
International Shoe analysis.286 The United States Supreme Court has 
condemned using, e.g., stock registration or “situs-ing” rules as a legal 
fiction to stand in the place, virtually, of a nonresident defendant having 
constitutionally meaningful contacts with a forum.287 The Court has not 
accepted a case since Shaffer to reconsider whether other legal fictions—
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 284 Id. (citation omitted). 
 285 Id. at 865. 
 286 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
 287 Id.. at 213-17. 
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like a requirement of registration to merely transact business—supplies a 
constitutionally sufficient nexus upon which to predicate personal 
jurisdiction. Indeed, the Court last examined such a law—which is based 
on questionable notions of fictionalized, implied consent under the 
Pennoyer v. Neff régime–in an opinion by Justice Butler in 1927.288 
Eighty years, and a revolution in the views of personal jurisdiction, may 
well have entirely eroded such relics, which continue to stand primarily 
because no one has pushed hard enough to topple them. 
b. Model Long-Arm Application 
The first inquiry is whether Allstate’s forum activities were 
continuous and systematic, or single or occasional. As a nationwide 
insurance corporation, Allstate has several offices in the state of Georgia 
and does substantial business in the state. Thus, its forum activities in 
Georgia are continuous and systematic. 
The second inquiry is whether or not the cause of action arose from 
Allstate’s forum activities. In this case, the insurance policy on the car 
was made in New Jersey. Thus, the action to obtain personal injury 
benefits was not related to Allstate’s activities in Georgia, since the 
policy upon which the claim was based was made in New Jersey. 
Accordingly, under subsection (3)(B)(3) of the Model Long-Arm statute, 
a further inquiry is necessary to determine if the defendant’s contacts are 
so substantial and of such a nature to justify an action based on a cause 
of action not arising from its activities in Georgia. Allstate has a branch 
office in the county where suit was brought. Under subsection 
(3)B)(3)(i), having a branch office in the state may, or may not, be 
sufficient to exercise general personal jurisdiction in a Quadrant III 
situation. The constitutionally proper inquiry in such a case, then, will 
focus on the quality and quantity of the nonresident defendant’s forum 
activities,289 rather than upon glib notions of fictionalized consent under 
business regulation statutes. 
Regarding “prejudice,” under subsection (3)(C)(3)(a), the 
presumption that the defendant is prejudiced by maintenance of the 
action can be rebutted by the plaintiff if he establishes that the defendant 
has a branch office in the forum. Because Allstate has a branch office in 
Georgia, and in the county where suit was brought, the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction over Allstate would appear constitutionally 
permitted, but Allstate would have an opportunity to rebut this 
                                                                                                             
 288 Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927). 
 289 See, e.g., Perkins v. Benguet Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445-49 (1950) (examining 
in detail a Philippine corporation’s activities while in exile in Ohio during Japanese 
occupation of Philippines during World War II). 
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presumption factually, which it is not accorded under the “transacting 
business” registration statute approach. 
While the application of the Model Long-Arm statute arrives at the 
same result, it does so by a minimum contacts analysis, rather than 
relying on the fiction of a non-jurisdictional registration statute. By 
analyzing facts relevant to the litigation event, rather than short-
circuiting relevant analysis with what amounts to an unrebuttable 
presumption that personal jurisdiction exists, the Model Statute avoids 
potential due process violations, as previously discussed, when a 
minimum contacts analysis is not accomplished. 
c. How Applying the Model Long-Arm Statute Recognizes the 
Intersecting Domains of the Corrective Justice and Enterprise 
Regulation Principles 
Sometimes the corrective justice principle and enterprise regulation 
principle do not overlap into a common domain to justify jurisdiction 
over a nonresident defendant. Even when they do, the analysis 
undertaken by the court should be supported by the analytic framework 
of International Shoe. The Allstate court’s analysis skips this critical 
step, by resorting to an early twentieth century Pennoyer-era legal 
fiction. It may well be that the litigation event does fall at the parallax of 
the relevant working principles: insureds who have paid premiums to 
their insurer are faced with a nonreciprocal risk of the insurer not paying 
a claim as required, and as suggested by the highly regulated nature of 
the insurance business, a state has a strong reason to regulate insurers 
conducting business within it in order to effectuate corrective justice. 
Hence, in this case, Georgia may have a strong interest in adjudicating an 
alleged wrongful denial of a claim by an insurer within its borders. 
However, a relevant inquiry, under the rule of general personal 
jurisdiction articulated in the Model Statute, needs to be undertaken 
before general jurisdiction will yield transparent and coherent results. 
2. Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc. v. Sanders290 
Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc. (“PWC”) manufactured the engine 
that was used by a commuter aircraft which crashed in Kentucky.291 
Representatives of a passenger who was killed brought a products 
liability action against PWC in Georgia.292 
                                                                                                             
 290 460 S.E.2d 94 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (en banc). 
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a. Georgia Long-Arm Application 
The basis for the trial court’s denial of PWC’s motion to dismiss for 
lack of personal jurisdiction is not discussed. In finding a lack of 
personal jurisdiction and reversing, the Georgia Court of Appeals first 
analyzed whether PWC was a “resident” foreign corporation according 
to the definition of “non-resident” in the long-arm statute. It held that 
PWC was not a “resident,” because “PWC is not authorized to do or 
transact business in Georgia, does not have any offices or employees in 
Georgia, and does not have a registered agent for service of process in 
Georgia.”293 Thus, because PWC was a nonresident, the Court of 
Appeals analyzed whether the long-arm statute allowed for the exercise 
of personal jurisdiction. Since the aircraft crash occurred outside 
Georgia, the cause of action did not arise from the defendant’s activities 
within Georgia as required by the long-arm statute. Thus, “Georgia has 
no basis to assert jurisdiction over PWC, a nonresident foreign 
corporation, because the cause of action did not occur in Georgia, and no 
other basis exists therefor.”294 The dissent argued, however, that general 
personal jurisdiction was available over the defendant.295 
b. Model Long-Arm Application 
The first inquiry is whether PWC’s activities within Georgia were 
continuous and systematic, or single or occasional. PWC had not 
registered for authorization to transact business in Georgia, but it did 
business with at least two customers there, including three to four million 
dollars of business a year with one of those customers.296 Also, an 
affiliated company, P&WC Aircraft Services, Inc., operated a service 
station in Atlanta, Georgia, to which PWC shipped spare parts.297 
Additionally, PWC sent employees to the state for customer relations and 
marketing.298 These activities were more than merely occasional, but 
were ongoing, and continuous and systematic activities by PWC with the 
forum. 
The second inquiry is whether or not the cause of action arose from 
PWC’s forum activities. In this case, PWC manufactured its engines in 
Canada and the aircraft crash occurred in Kentucky. Therefore, the 
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products liability action did not arise from PWC’s activities within 
Georgia, and the case must be further analyzed under subsection 
(3)(B)(3). Under subsection (3)(B)(3)(ii), it must then be determined 
whether the continuous and systematic contacts are of such quantity as to 
support the conclusion that PWC is present in the forum. The numerous, 
ongoing contacts described above are such that, at least arguably, PWC 
should be considered present in Georgia. Therefore, the case appears to 
satisfy the minimum contact requirement of Quadrant III. 
Under subsection (3)(C)(3), in a Quadrant III case, there is a 
rebuttable presumption that the defendant is prejudiced by maintenance 
of the action within the forum. This presumption can be rebutted, 
however, under subsection (3)(C)(3)(b), if the plaintiff establishes that 
the defendant’s contacts with the forum demonstrate that the defendant 
has engaged in such a continuous and systematic course of “doing 
business” in the forum as to support the conclusion that it is present in 
the forum. This places an appropriate burden on the plaintiffs seeking to 
invoke general personal jurisdiction to compile a competently detailed 
and factually adequate record of the nonresident defendant’s forum 
activities. In this case, the numerous continuous and systematic contacts 
discussed above appear to be the kind of information required for a court 
to support the notion that PWC is “doing business” within Georgia. The 
proper analysis, therefore, focuses on a qualitative assessment of PWC’s 
in-state activities, which is the only defensible way to evaluate whether 
PWC would be prejudiced by maintenance of the action within Georgia, 
and personal jurisdiction would be validly exercised over the 
corporation. 
The difference in outcome under the Model Long-Arm statute 
illustrates how it properly characterizes the quantity of contacts as 
continuous and systematic, unlike the Georgia courts, which, due to the 
constraints of the Georgia long-arm statute, do not recognize the 
significance of the quantity of contacts when the cause of action does not 
arise out of them. 
c. How Applying the Model Long-Arm Statute Recognizes the 
Intersecting Domains of the Corrective Justice and Enterprise 
Regulation Principles 
The need for corrective justice in this type of case is strong. The 
manufacturer of an aircraft engine clearly creates a nonreciprocal risk to 
those traveling in an aircraft—the risk of death or serious injury due to 
an engine failure. Although the allegedly defective part was 
manufactured in Canada and the aircraft crash that the cause of action is 
based upon did not occur in Georgia, the state has an interest in 
2007] Extraterritorial Personal Jurisdiction for the 21st Century 425 
regulating PWC and effectuating the corrective justice principle because 
of the extent of business that PWC does within Georgia and the presence 
of its products in the air over the state. Admittedly, this is not a 
circumstance where the cause of action lies within the heart of the 
overlap between the corrective justice and enterprise regulation 
principles because the alleged tortious act and injury occurred outside the 
state, but the importance of ensuring that PWC’s products shipped into 
Georgia are safe helps to push this case from the limb into the area of 
overlap. 
D. Quadrant 4—Single or Occasional Contact + Unconnected Cause of 
Action 
Quadrant IV corresponds to subsection (3)(B)(4) of the Model 
Long-Arm statute. The cause of action falls within the domain of 
the corrective justice principle, but outside the enterprise 
regulation principle of the state. The plaintiff has suffered a wrong, 
but the forum state can not properly adjudicate or remedy the 
wrong. Personal jurisdiction is also lacking under the Georgia 
long-arm statute in such situations, because the cause of action is 
not related to any forum activity and additionally, in some cases, 
the defendant’s forum activities do not fit within the statute’s 
enumerated categories. 
1. Barton Southern Co. v. Manhole Barrier Systems, Inc.299 
Barton Southern Co., Inc., a Georgia company that sells manhole 
security devices, brought a trademark infringement action against 
Manhole Barrier Systems, Inc. (“MBS”), a New York company that also 
sells the devices, and against JFC Company. MBS, which had no 
customers in Georgia and had not solicited orders from Georgia, 
contacted Barton Southern requesting information about its products and 
ordered one of its devices.300 A few months later, after two more phone 
calls requesting price information, MBS ordered several more devices, 
and on another occasion contacted Barton Southern about distributing its 
devices in South America.301 In the meantime, JFC Company established 
a website whose name allegedly infringed Barton Southern’s registered 
trademark for its security devices and which had a link to MBS’s website 
that advertised its manhole protection devices.302 Barton Southern 
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brought the trademark infringement action against both companies, 
alleging they were working together to capitalize on its trademark.303 
a. Georgia Long-Arm Application 
The court began its analysis by quoting a portion of the Georgia 
long-arm statute.304 However, the court then stated that “[t]he statute 
confers jurisdiction to the ‘maximum extent permitted by due 
process.’”305 Consequently, the court proceeded with a due process 
analysis.306 Yet, in doing so, the court stated a “fair warning” test for due 
process, listing several factors that had been given in a Georgia Court of 
Appeals case in order to determine whether there were minimum 
contacts.307 After listing these factors, the court then proceeded to 
analyze MBS’s website contact and its telephone/purchase order contacts 
separately, finding that the website contact failed under the “purposeful 
availment” factor and that the telephone/purchase order contacts failed 
under the “claims-must-relate-to-the-act” factor, as discussed next. The 
court, using the Zippo test,308 determined that MBS’s website was a semi-
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 307 The factors to determine “fair warning” are “whether the nonresident’s conduct 
and connection with the forum state are such that the nonresident should reasonably 
anticipate being haled into court there, whether the nonresident acted to avail itself of the 
forum state’s law, whether the claim relates to those acts, and whether the exercise of 
jurisdiction is reasonable.” Barton S. Co., 318 F. Supp. 2d at 1176 (citing SES Indus., 
Inc. v. Intertrade Packaging Mach. Corp., 512 S.E.2d 316, 319 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999)). 
 308 The Zippo test derived from Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, 952 F. Supp. 1119 
(W.D. Pa.1997), which introduced the “influential ‘sliding scale’ model for applying 
personal jurisdiction principles to cases arising from electronic commerce.” Barton S. 
Co., 318 F. Supp.2d at 1177. The court found that  
[i]n holding that personal jurisdiction over the defendant was proper in the 
plaintiff’s home state, the Zippo court distinguished among interactive, 
semi-interactive, and passive websites: 
 . . . At one end of the spectrum are situations where a 
defendant clearly does business over the Internet. If the 
defendant enters into contracts with residents of a foreign 
jurisdiction that involve the knowing and repeated transmission 
of computer files over the Internet, personal jurisdiction is 
proper. At the opposite end are situations where a defendant 
has simply posted information on an Internet Web site which is 
accessible to users of foreign jurisdictions. A passive Web site 
that does little more than make information available to those 
who are interested in it is not grounds for the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction. The middle ground is occupied by 
interactive Web sites where a user can exchange information 
with the host computer. In these cases, the exercise of 
jurisdiction is determined by examining the level of 
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interactive website because customers could only fill out an order form 
and could not make payments or complete the order through the 
website.309 
 Additionally, the MBS website had never received any e-mail from 
anyone in Georgia, nor had MBS sent any e-mail via its website to 
anyone in Georgia. Thus, the court concluded “that the MBS website 
fails to furnish a Georgia contact adequate to support personal 
jurisdiction over MBS in the Georgia courts.” 310 Regarding the telephone 
and the purchase order contacts, the court determined that the trademark 
infringement action was not related to those activities, and then stated 
that the trademark infringement claim did not directly arise from these 
limited commercial contacts.311 Therefore, personal jurisdiction over 
MBS was lacking. 
b. Model Long-Arm Application 
The first inquiry is whether MBS’s forum activities (website, 
telephone and purchase orders) were continuous and systematic, or single 
or occasional. The website was not even a forum activity due to the fact 
that no one in Georgia had placed orders on the site and MBS had not 
received e-mail from or sent e-mail to anyone in Georgia through the 
site. The telephone and purchase order activities by MBS directed toward 
Barton Southern were single or occasional, because they were made on 
an infrequent basis and were not ongoing. 
The second inquiry is whether or not the trademark infringement 
action arose out of MBS’s forum activities. The website is not a forum 
activity, as discussed previously. The other activities describe a 
relationship between the defendant and the forum, but the trademark 
infringement claim did not arise out of the telephone conversations, 
which concerned the potential of MBS becoming a distributor of Barton 
Southern’s products, and the claim did not arise out of the purchase of 
Barton Southern products. Consequently, because there are no forum 
activities out of which the cause of action arises, the suit falls within 
Quadrant IV and, under subsection (3)(B)(4) of the Model Long-Arm, 
the absence of personal jurisdiction is established as a matter of law. 
Although the result is the same, the differences in application are 
worth noting. The federal district court’s analysis first cites the Georgia 
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Long-Arm statute, as though it will apply it, but then goes on to say that 
it reaches to due process limits. The court then states a federal due 
process “fairness test,” which it derives from a Georgia state court case. 
Then, for the telephone and purchase contacts, the court first states that 
the claim is not related to and then that the claim does not directly arise 
from these contacts. This mixture of terminology shows a lack of 
appreciation of the difference between the two phrases. For if a claim is 
not related to a contact, then it is a given that it does not directly arise 
from that same contact. The Model Long-Arm Statute’s application gives 
a much more logical and structured analysis of the question of personal 
jurisdiction, and strictly uses an “arising out of” criteria, as the looser 
“related to” criteria has not been adopted by a United States Supreme 
Court majority.312 
c. How Applying the Model Long-Arm Statute Recognizes the 
Intersecting Domains of the Corrective Justice and Enterprise 
Regulation Principles 
In this case, Barton Southern has allegedly suffered a wrong that 
requires a remedy. There is a nonreciprocal risk involved where one 
company’s trademark is infringed–it risks losing goodwill for its product 
as well as a loss in sales, while the infringer gains from additional sales–
but the level of non-reciprocity is minimal since the victim may engage 
(albeit not lawfully) in similar anti-competitive activity, may appeal 
directly to consumers to counteract the effects of infringement, and may 
stop the infringement altogether by the injunctive remedy afforded under 
both state and federal trademark protection laws. Further, in this case, the 
lack of substantial contacts with the forum does not justify Georgia in 
regulating MBS. Its website was not connected with Georgia and the 
trademark infringement claim did not arise out of the telephone and 
orders, which were also not sufficiently pervasive to justify the ultimate 
in regulation – treating a non-resident as a virtual resident under the 
compulsion of process predicated upon general personal jurisdiction. 
Thus, the operative facts of this case implicate only the corrective justice 
principle within the Georgia forum, falling outside the intersection with 
the enterprise regulation principle that would allow for the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction. 
                                                                                                             
 312 Compare Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 
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2. Gee v. Reingold313 
This case involved a breach of contract, negligence, and breach of 
fiduciary duty action by a client against his nonresident attorney. After 
Gee received a complaint, delivered by Federal Express from a 
Wisconsin company that was suing him in Wisconsin, Gee contacted 
Reingold, a Tennessee attorney, who advised him that the service was 
insufficient under Georgia law.314 When Gee was served by a sheriff’s 
deputy about two weeks later, Reingold contacted the corporation’s 
attorney to request an extension of time to answer the complaint. 
Subsequently, “Gee called Reingold’s office several times and left 
messages, and Gee went to Reingold’s office ‘two or three times,’ but 
Reingold never responded to the messages or saw Gee. No answer was 
filed in the Wisconsin action, and a default judgment was entered against 
Gee . . . for $356,800.”315 When the corporation filed suit in Georgia to 
domesticate the judgment against Gee, he filed suit against Reingold. 
The trial court dismissed the complaint against Reingold due to lack of 
personal jurisdiction.316 
a. Georgia Long-Arm Application 
In affirming the dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction, the 
Georgia Court of Appeals discussed subsections (1), (2), and (3) of the 
long-arm statute. First, the Court of Appeals determined that Reingold 
had not transacted business in Georgia in relation to the Wisconsin suit. 
“[T]he telephone conversations between Reingold and Gee, facsimile 
transmissions by Gee from Georgia to Tennessee, and Reingold’s 
mailing of bills to Gee in Georgia do not show that Reingold transacted 
business in Georgia within the meaning of the statute. Reingold’s 
services were performed in Tennessee and pertained to non-Georgia 
matters.”317 Also, “there [was] no evidence that Gee and Reingold 
negotiated any contracts in Georgia.”318 Thus, the court reasoned, 
Reingold was not amenable to personal jurisdiction under subsection (1). 
The court also determined that Reingold did not commit a tortious act 
within Georgia as required by subsection (2), because the alleged tortious 
act (or omission) occurred with respect to the default judgment in 
Wisconsin.319 Under subsection (3), the Court found that Reingold’s 
                                                                                                             
 313 578 S.E.2d 575 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003). 
 314 Id. at 577. 
 315 Id. 
 316 Id. 
 317 Id. at 578. 
 318 Id. 
 319 Id. at 579. 
430 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 3:339 
activities in Georgia were not sufficient to meet the requirements of that 
subsection.320 Consequently, the court declined to permit the state to 
exercise personal jurisdiction over Reingold.321 
b. Model Long-Arm Application 
The first inquiry is whether Reingold’s forum activities were 
continuous and systematic, or single or occasional. Reingold, who had 
been practicing for 40 years, had handled no more than ten cases in 
Georgia.322 Reingold had sent bills to Gee, as stated previously. These 
forum activities were only isolated. The telephone calls and facsimiles 
were initiated by Gee from Georgia, and thus were arguably not forum 
activities by Reingold. Also Reingold’s representation of Gee in an 
unrelated case involving a Tennessee employee of Gee’s was not a forum 
activity .323 Consequently, Reingold participated in only occasional or 
isolated forum activities.  
The second inquiry is whether or not the breach of contract, 
negligence, or breach of fiduciary duty claims arose out of Reingold’s 
forum activities. His only forum activities were the handling of a few 
cases in Georgia courts and the mailing of bills to Gee. The claims arose 
out of a default judgment that occurred in Wisconsin. The claims were in 
no way related to Reingold’s handling of the other Georgia cases, and 
did not arise out of his sending of bills to Gee. Therefore, because there 
are no forum activities out of which the cause of action arises, the suit 
falls within Quadrant IV and, under subsection (3)(B)(4) of the Model 
Long-Arm, the absence of personal jurisdiction is established as a matter 
of law. 
While the result is the same, the Model Long-Arm, by focusing on 
the characterization of the quality of the contacts, presents the rationale 
for the lack of minimum contacts in a more structured and principled 
manner. 
c. How Applying the Model Long-Arm Statute Recognizes the 
Intersecting Domains of the Corrective Justice and Enterprise 
Regulation Principles 
In this case, Gee has suffered an alleged injury that requires a 
remedy. However, because the operative facts showed little relation 
between Reingold and the forum, Georgia’s regulatory interest was weak 
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where the cause of action did not arise out of the few relations it had with 
the defendant. Thus, once again, the operative facts fall within the 
corrective justice domain, but outside the enterprise regulation domain of 
Georgia, making it improper for personal jurisdiction to be exercised 
over the defendant in Georgia. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
A. The Authors’ Map of the Territory Traversed 
We have shown in this article how the categorical long-arm 
statutes, with their inherent limitations, do not accord with the states’ 
desire to enable the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the limits of the 
due process clause as set by International Shoe. The resulting 
inconsistencies in interpretation as cases arose which revealed the 
unnecessary restrictions of the categorical approach, were highlighted by 
a case study of Georgia’s categorical long-arm statute. The need for a 
new approach was thus made clear. However, instead of simply 
proposing that states adopt an unguided limits-of-due-process approach, 
we, through a visual reconceptualization of personal jurisdiction, exposit 
a method that allows for the exercise of personal jurisdiction to reach the 
limits of due process with principled guidance based on the corrective 
justice and enterprise regulation principles. This visual 
reconceptualization was the basis for our proposed Model Long-Arm 
statute. That statute is logically and intellectually true to a regime of 
personal jurisdiction inaugurated by International Shoe that is 
consistently and completely laid out in the case, but whose existence is 
often overlooked by those who measure International Shoe by how other 
judges have employed it, rather than by the context and logic of the 
opinion itself. Finally, the application of the Model Long-Arm statute 
was compared to the application of Georgia’s categorical long-arm 
statute to illustrate how the Model Long-Arm is to be applied and how it 
would provide better and more predictable and principled results. 
B. A Coda for the Reader 
A decade ago, at its fiftieth anniversary, International Shoe was the 
subject of intensive scholarly scrutiny, generating a dozen articles, most 
of which denounced International Shoe as standardless, and sought to 
replace it with a variety of approaches, including a venue-style 
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analysis.324  What is rather amazing is that few of these experts appeared 
to have spent much time reading and evaluating International Shoe itself. 
Rather like a glossator who glosses upon the glosses of others, scholars 
have spilled much laser-printer ink complaining about the shortcomings 
of how subsequent courts have decided cases after International Shoe.325 
They have not devoted much, if any, time to encountering the text of the 
1945 opinion on its own terms and logic and, by critical reading, 
revealing the powerful internal logic of the approach. Not a single of 
these authors did so; not a single one recognized that the problem with 
subsequent cases was their failure to recognize the internal logic for the 
paradigm personal jurisdiction cases that, in this article, the authors have 
made transparent through identifying often-overlooked normative rules 
statements within International Shoe as well as visual conceputalizations 
of the operation of those rules. 
In recent years, Professor George Rutherglen has made one of the 
more aggressive assaults on International Shoe, declaring that the case 
“is one of the enduring monuments of Legal Realism and this is, we are 
told, a ‘negative philosophy fit to do negative work.’”326 And true to his 
charge that International Shoe is bete noir, the unwelcome offspring of 
legal realism, Professor Rutherglen declares that “it is difficult . . . to find 
a more effective and more thorough job of ‘trashing’ legal rules than has 
been accomplished by International Shoe.”327  He accuses the opinion of 
being written “at a very high level of abstraction,” of constituting no 
more than “realist criticism . . . disguised as a magisterial summary of 
existing law,” and, in his view, of amounting to a failure: “[I]n writing an 
opinion that tried to satisfy everyone, [Chief Justice] Stone offered 
guidance to no one.”328 
Yet, as Professor Youngblood first perceived in 1985, and as the 
authors have fully developed here and in earlier articles, International 
Shoe is a kind of Rosetta Stone that rewards those who study its text 
holistically. In fact, these efforts, the authors believe, fully meet 
Rutherglen’s concerns that “it should be possible to state more 
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specifically” the rules that create a general consistency among 
jurisdictional outcomes and that such an “effort . . . would be entirely 
consistent with the structure and ambitions of International Shoe 
itself.”329 Indeed, the authors here have used the text of International 
Shoe itself to go beyond the discernment of the rules by Youngblood in 
1985 to meet Rutherglen’s call for devising “presumptive rules,”330 
which the authors have done using the imperative implications that flow 
from the four scenarios of contacts and connectedness to cause of action 
envisioned in International Shoe itself. 
Grudgingly, it seems, Professor Rutherglen also observes that 
International Shoe “was a fine first step in the reexamination of 
jurisdictional theories, but it was never intended to be the last step.” With 
this, the authors agree in part. The solution that the authors see is not to 
resort, as some have done, to casting the eye wistfully abroad, wishing 
upon our legal system a European-style solution to a uniquely American 
jurisdictional problem.331 Rather, the solution is in reforming long-arm 
statutes themselves. The pedigree of such statutes along the early efforts 
of the Illinois model lies separate and apart from International Shoe’s 
internal logic. Thus, long-arm statutes, the implementing device of 
International Shoe, have been in a constant state of tension with the 
principle of International Shoe itself. This tension has lead to an 
incoherent distortion of the rules stated in that opinion, either along the 
lines of trying to make the statute such an incredibly lengthy laundry list 
of forecasts as to sink under its own hyper-categorization, as the North 
Carolina long-arm statute332 does, or to abdicate the legislative function 
entirely by simply, and lazily, incorporating gauzy, difficult to rectify 
notions of “due process” as the limit, as California333 and Rhode Island334 
famously have done in their long-arm statutes. The right approach is a 
twin-aimed one. 
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First, we must return to International Shoe for a close reading of 
the jurisdictional rules set out there, and to use those rules—and their 
vocabulary and concepts, rather than those of the Illinois legislature of 
the 1950s—to craft the long-arm statutes of the twenty-first century. 
Second, we must read International Shoe logically, holistically, and 
with metaphoric insight (for jurisdiction is one of the theoretical legal 
topics best understood by metaphor),335 to deduce the important 
evidentiary presumptions that Chief Justice Stone, most able lawyer and 
teacher that he was, instinctively and effortlessly embedded into the 
opinion, at such a level of subtlety that even the keenest observers of 
procedure in the last 60 years have tended to overlook their significance. 
Legislatures whose procedure committees will undertake this twin-
aimed effort are likely to produce a statute remarkable in at least two 
way: [1] that statute will appear alien in light of the received traditions of 
long-arm statutes; yet [2] that statute will recast the long-arm as in as 
revolutionary a manner as International Shoe recast Pennoyer. Such a 
statute is likely to look like the model statute propounded by the authors 
here; and such a statute is likely to foster the kind of results that have 
compelling integrity, both intellectually and practically. 
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